Arms and influence

Head 'em off at the No Spin Zone

IN THE NEWS
Since we can guess that the Bush Administration and Congressional Republicans are going to aggressively push the claim that, "Now is not the time to question the people in charge—just think of the troops, our enemies, blah blah blah," it should be possible to bury this canard quickly.

• The United States did not have to invade Iraq.
• The United States did not have to prepare as poorly as it did for the occupation.
• The US government did not have to continue to watch its strategic reserve of ground forces evaporate, just to avoid the political cost of admitting the occupation was fundamentally misconceived.
• The US government did not have to pursue strategies for dealing with Iran and North Korea that provided practically no incentives for these regimes to abandon their nuclear programs.
• The US government did not have to stop paying serious attention to the problems of locking down nuclear technology and materials in the countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union.
• The Bush Administration should not have asked for immunity from criticism, and no one—journalists, elected officials, and voters—should have granted it.

Therefore, there is every reason to question what President Bush and company do next. The troops will not be demoralized; they've already demonsrated their commitment. Our enemies will not take encouragement from dissent; they've already aggressively pursued nuclear weapons programs for their own reaons that have nothing to do with the amount or quality of debate in the United States. Our allies will not abandon us; they've shown real willingness to continue working with the United States, even as its government pursued aggressively ad hoc, unilateralist policies.

Most importantly, the North Korean announcement must be an election issue. Candidates must have the opportunity to mount a convincing defense or critique of the decisions that failed to deter the North Korean government from testing a nuclear weapon. Democratic debate must be about important questions, such as American grand strategy in the vexing, post-Cold War world. Otherwise, we're guilty of embracing a nihilist's view of democracy, "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Let's beat North Korea, not be North Korea.

Something's gotta give

IN THE NEWS
Let's assume that the track of history leads from North Korea's test of a nuclear warhead to a military confrontation with the United States. However difficult to avoid that outcome may be, once we have arrived, American foreign policy must change fundamentally.

The US Army brigade in South Korea is a classic remnant of the Cold War, with two important functions. First, American troops act as a "tripwire" that is supposed to deter an attack. Just as the Soviets were supposed to worry about the American response to an attack on West Berlin, the North Korean government is supposed to be deterred from attacking South Korea.

If deterrence fails, American troops are expected to repeat the script of the Korean War: fight a delaying action with their South Korean allies until the United States can airlift or sealift the forces needed for a counteroffensive. During the Cold War the challenge of mobilizing that counter-punch was a constant source of anxiety. What if the US military was already fighting another war elsewhere? While a major war in Europe definitely would have made it hard to move forces into Korea (the "one-and-a-half war" problem), even a smaller-scale war in the Middle East or Asia (the "half and half war" problem?) could have put the Korean counter-offensive at risk.

Since Iraq has bled the US reserve of ground forces dry, it's hard to see where the troops rallied to South Korea's defense would come from. The US government now faces several hard choices, all of which would re-define the Bush Administration's strategy of the last few years:

• Abandon Iraq. The US forces in Iraq might be shifted to South Korea—but not quickly, and certainly not at a great political cost. The Bush Administration has staked the prestige of the United States in Iraq. Even if everyone understood that, regrettably, the US had to sacrifice the Iraqi war effort for defensive or offensive operations in Korea, the Bush team will have inflicted substantial harm on American interests in the Middle East, particularly with American allies.
• Institute the draft. The US government might try to increase its "strategic depth" by expanding the armed forces. Since volunteer recruitment has already plummeted to alarming rates, the only alternative is compulsory recruitment—the draft. However, the draft won't expand American military power immediately. Troops need to be inducted, trained, equipped, and deployed. Equipment stores and facilities would need to be expanded. It's important to remember that, after the Pearl Harbor raid, American draftees did not see combat until 1942, and then only in small numbers compared to the bigger operations in the Mediterranean, France, and the Pacific. American success also depends on the quality of the troops deployed. Unfortunately, quality does not come quickly.
• Let someone else handle North Korea. The United States can contribute its naval and air assets to any military operations, but someone else—presumably, China, Japan, or a UN-organized coalition—would need to handle the ground any ground component. Ceding this role to China would accelerate an already alarming trend, in which US distraction elsewhere has eroded US power and influence in East Asia. Even if you ignore many of the silly, alarmist predictions about growing Chinese power, having China fill that vacuum may not be in the interests of the United States. For obvious historical reasons, Koreans would reject having Japanese troops return to the peninsula, Without a strong US commitment, the UN may not be able to build a coalition force strong enough to handle repel North Korean attacks, occupy North Korea if the Communist regime collapses, or handle large numbers of refuees. Certainly, the half-hearted UN deployment to Lebanon has not set an encouraging example.

At some point, the status quo in Iraq would prove to be unsustainable. Just as someone running a dangerously high fever must, after a certain number of days, either recover or die, the situation in Iraq could not continue forever. Americans might have grown sufficiently disgusted with the lack of progress to demand an end to the war. The US and Iraqi governments might have decisively won, or (increasingly likely) the internecine violence would have escalated beyond the point where anyone in Washington or Baghdad could determine the war's outcome. Now, we see another way the situation in Iraq could not be sustained: key regions, like the Korean peninsula, would not remain calm forever. If Iraq had been making a slow recovery—gradually dealing with violence directed against the regime, or among segments of the Iraqi population—an expensive investment in extraordinary measures might be justifiable. However, urgent priorities elsewhere may make the American endgame in Iraq a messy, bloody exercise in triage.

Hardware isn't everything

IN THE NEWS
One likely effect of the North Korean announcement is to shift attention away from American ground forces to the rest of the US military. While it's the natural course of the discussion, an exclusive focus on the Navy and Air Force—the "big hardware" portion of the armed forces—will not provide a solution to the North Korean problem.

Most immediately, American air units in South Korea, Japan, and the United States, plus the US Third and Seventh Fleets, are available to blockade North Korea and strike at targets of opportunity. However, it remains to be seen what opportunities for punitive and disarming strikes exist, or what the North Korean response would be. American military planners have already admitted that the odds are poor that the United States could disarm the Iranian or North Korean nuclear program through air and missile strikes alone  The facilities are too dispersed, often in the worst kind of geography for precision bombing, mountainous terrain. Even if the US were able to hit every North Korean nuclear and production facility, the obvious question would be, What's next?

We can predict at least one immediate consequence: a North Korean attack on South Korea. Whether the North Korean army tries to seize control of the South, or merely retaliate with conventional and chemical artillery attacks on Seoul and other population centers, the US would need ground forces to take the next step: eliminate the North Korean government. Even with its nuclear fangs removed, the North Korean government would remain a menace to the South, and perhaps would have reasons to try for one last gamble to end the decades-long stalemate on the Korean peninsula.

At this point, we might wish for the North Korean government to expire. Hunger, poverty, disgust with the "Kim Family Regime," and the example of a better life across the border in South Korea, represent a risk to the regime's survival, even without a military confrontation with the United States. If North Korean generals begin to defect, or the regime loses control over a riotous population, political collapse will create new problems that can only be resolved with ground forces. Refugees will begin moving south, in numbers beyond the South Korean government's ability to manage. The territory of North Korea will need to be occupied, particularly since nuclear weapons, manufacturing facilities, materials, and expertise need to be secured. While the risk of a civil war is lower in a hypothetical occupation of North Korea than it was in Iraq, not every North Korean general or party official may surrender quietly—particularly if a poorly-executed occupation makes "warlordism" an attractive option in many regions.

The United States has an impressive array of carrier battle groups, attack submarines, tactical air assets, and strategic bombers that it can hurl at North Korea. However, the last several years have taught Americans an important lesson about warfare: your own strength matters far less than what you actually do with it.

Undeterred

IN THE NEWS
The favorite sport of talking heads, op-ed columnists, and bloggers for the next several days will be Spot the Motive. Why did the North Korean government decide to test a nuclear warhead, knowing the likely response from South Korea, China, Japan, and the United States? The more important question is, Why did deterrence fail?

Kim Jong Il and his subordinates may have seen several benefits in the nuclear test. At the very least, confirming that North Korea's nuclear capability is more than theoretical gives that government leverage it didn't have before. Before the nuclear test, observers worried what would happen if the North Korean government faced collapse; now, foreign governments have an even stronger argument for swallowing their discomfort with the "Kim Family Regime" (KFR) and helping keep that government alive. A desperate, unpredictable government, armed with even a meager nuclear capability, is what Kim no doubt is guessing the rest of the world would rather not face. All public bluster aside, the governments of the United States, South korea, Japan, and other nations have very sober reasons to keep the North Korean government from the brink of collapse.

At worst, the North Korean government means what it says: it is in a de facto state of war with the United States and its South Korean ally. As soon as the North Koreans develop a delivery mechanism—which may be as simple as a fishing boat—it may execute a nuclear strike.

The North Korean's real motives are undoubtedly somewhere between these two extremes. The KFR wants more than just extra food aid; the regime also knows that any first strike would mean their own annihilation. The North Korean government, therefore, is likely building a greater deterrence against any conventional nuclear attack. Kim probably believes that, once the current sense of crisis subsides, his government's long-term prospects for survival and its bargaining power are greatly improved.

However, we're just engaging in the modern version of Kremlinology, the attempt to penetrate the thinking of top leaders in a secretive, totalitarian regime. Right now, the US government and its allies have a bigger problem: is there anything deterring regimes like North Korea from developing nuclear arsenals?

The answer is, sadly, the deterrent is not as powerful as it should be. There hasn't been much dialogue between the US and Iran, or the US and North Korea. Combined with the all-carrot, no-sticks public position that the Bush Administration has taken, these regimes see their own survival at stake. Meanwhile, the US military is bogged down in Iraq, while its overall readiness continues to erode. The Bush Administration is also eager to overlook the misdeeds of its allies, such as human rights abuses in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. American inability to prevent India and Pakistan from going nuclear—not to mention the nuclear cooperation deal the Bush Administration recently made with India's government—may lead other allies to see opportunities to start quiet nuclear programs of their own. Certainly, what happens next in Japan—a country with new incentives to expand its military and develop its own nuclear arsenal—will be an important barometer of nuclear proliferation among American allies.

Of course, the United States is not the only major power interested in non-proliferation. The Europeans have played the leading role in trying to deflect Iran's nuclear plans. China had hoped to keep North Korea from going nuclear, and may continue to pressure the KFR about further nuclear or missile development. Russia has often run interference for nuclear wannabes, but the North Korean test may change Russia's position. The United Nations, of course, represents the opportunity for global and regional powers to pursue non-proliferation through less confrontational, more neutral avenues. The United States, therefore, has good reasons at the moment for using the UN Security Council in its traditional role as a forum for organizing and channeling international opposition in a crisis. At the same time, the UN can provide the private, mediated channels for bargaining and threatening that the United States will need to deal with the North Koreans. If the US and Libya hadn't already been negotiating in secret for several years, any "demonstration effect" the Iraq invasion had on Qadaffi would have been wasted.

The Bush Administration has had five years to test its own theory of deterrence. That strategy has clearly failed. Iran and North Korea have marched deliberately towards gaining nuclear warheads and the means to deliver them. The priority now is re-establishing deterrence, not insisting that the ultra-hawks were right all along.

A lack of options

IN THE NEWS
Since there's very little the United States can do to respond to the North Korean missile tests, other governments are driving events. Japan wants immediate sanctions against the North Koreans, but it's unclear who's ready to impose them. South Korea, fearing how the paranoid North Korean regime might lash out if faced with economic or military collapse, isn't willing to endorse harsh measures. China is happy to broker any negotiations, since it accrues more prestige and influence in Asia in the process. Other major powers are notably silent. The North Koreans lose nothing by threatening further missile tests.

It shouldn't be surprising, therefore, that the United States has agreed to bilateral talks with North Korea. The fig leaf of respectability is the six-nation talks that are supposed to happen simultaneously; for the North Koreans, the real goal is one-on-one talks with the United States. By proving that they can force the US government into bilateral negotiations, Kim Jong Il gains leverage with everyone else. Unless American leaders can figure out how to change the situation, the North Koreans will maintain the diplomatic initiative.

Is lack of US diplomatic leadership necessarily bad? Perhaps the South Koreans are right in thinking that the North Koreans will eventually re-integrate with the South. From this perspective, patience  is more important than immediately responding to North Korean provocations. Maybe the Japanese need this opportunity to assert their national security interests, without having to look to the United States for approval. Or, maybe, the future of East Asia still depends on an external superpower capable of playing balancer.

We're in the thick of a volatile time for the Korean Peninsula, so it's hard to say where the current road leads. Whatever happens in the two Koreas, there is one bad outcome that is hard to deny: the global campaign to curb the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies has suffered its most serious blow since the end of the Cold War.

Missile envy

IN THE NEWS
Without rehashing the history of the last few years, it's clear that the United States has few options for responding to North Korea's planned missile test:

• The United States is clearly in no position to make military threats against North Korea. Attacks launched purely from air or naval forces have little chance of wiping out the North Korean missile program (or nuclear weapons facilities, for that matter).
• With its military overstretched, the United States is in no position to contemplate an invasion of North Korea.
• Even if the US were to abandon Iraq to free up its conventional military strength for an invasion of North Korea or Iran, it is not clear that the Bush Administration would wage war against North Korea any better than it did against Iraq and Afghanistan.
• Building an international coalition against North Korea for either military or economic action will be difficult. Aside from a few countries, such as Japan, with a obvious stake in curbing North Korean military power, most potential allies are highly suspicious and skeptical of the United States (as the ineffectiveness of  rallying a coalition against Iran and Syria show).
• North Korea still cares about economic sanctions, which might block access to hard currency and revive food and energy shortages.
• On the other hand, South Korea—the chief conduit through which the North achieves any economic gains—is disinclined to end the recent thaw in relations between the two Koreas. South Korean public opinion has been very forgiving of North Korean military policies, which makes it difficult to imagine the US government rushing forward, even if it had a freer hand.
• North Korea has already seen how it can whip up a crisis, and get a distracted United States to make concessions.

The North Korean government certainly knew the likely American response—which says a lot about the predicament in which the United States finds itself. Russia and China are likely to have more effect on Kim Jong Il's plans than the United States.