The political side of counterinsurgency, part I

Kenneth Payne's recent article in Parameters, "Waging Communication War," raises one of the critical questions around counterinsurgency: How does the political action part work, exactly?

Payne can't possibly answer the question fully in a short article. However, it's important to recognize how little guidance most statements of counterinsurgency doctrine provide. For example:

• Everyone can agree that it's important to understand the population of people whom you're trying to win away from the insurgents. But what constitutes a convincing argument for supporting the government over the guerrillas?
• Where do you begin, with the local elites or average people?
• Are you trying to win the population's support or acquiescence?
• How do you know you've succeeded? And how lasting is that success?

And so on. For the lieutenant or captain stepping into the job of counterinsurgency, even the best books on the subject have surprisingly little to say that provides specific guidance. Just saying that, "Every country is different," is even worse. Surely there's some practical guidance that someone can provide.

Some of the more recent training developed in the US Army and Marines is helpful on this score. I'd also like to offer another source of advice, something that Payne alludes to but only begins to explore, contemporary theories about marketing.

Now, before you roll your eyes, let me just say that the kind of advice I'm talking about goes beyond what people often think of, when they hear marketing. Slick advertising executives of the sort you see on Mad Men need not apply. Instead, there are some very down-to-earth ideas about how businesses and consumers make economic decisions that have some relevance in the counterinsurgency biz. I'll sketch out a few of them in some upcoming posts.

Comments

[Matt]

I have only read the introduction, but Tequila Junction by H. John Poole looks to be promising. Have you read it or heard of it? I saw it on a desk at work the other day.

[John Bushman]

While I acknowledge that the recently published counterinsurgency doctrine does not provide a clear operational plan for the “political action part,” the purpose of doctrine is to provide a document that captures and clarifies enduring key themes and guidance to commanders and staffs to aide their future mission planning and execution.
The United States Army has amassed a significant collection of lessons learned from the last 7 years, primarily from the experiences of tactical-level officers, Lieutenants and Captains. Senior Army leadership has had to internalize these lessons learned and develop equipment, operations concepts, and training to try to adapt an enormous organization to meet those tactical demands. That bottom-up learning is symbolic of what makes the U.S. Army unique and enduring; trust in its people and adaptability to meet the needs of the mission.
It relies heavily on its people to understand the mission, the command intent, and to develop and execute plans and operations accordingly. By providing specified tasks and prescriptive methods for gaining local population support or accounting for the population across the full spectrum of operations, “winning hearts and minds;” the execution arm of the military is actually handicapped.
As you noted, it is the training provided to the Army’s tactical personnel that has the greatest potential to provide the “how” to account for the local population during all types of operations. However, even that training can only remain relevant to the current situation. Marketing campaigns and strategies fall into that very category – they change with the desires or means of the target population. I propose that the current counterinsurgency framework is sufficient for the concepts it lays forth and the value it, and the new FM 3-0 “Operations” places on the human element of conflict.
Where the Army must provide better fidelity is in the training of its people to be adaptive thinkers and to incorporate multiple ideas from experience into actionable plans that support a greater campaign narrative. To do this, time and resources must be expended to challenge Army leaders in training environments to use their ideas to persuade populations or groups and to understand by trial and error, the impact that their tactics may have in the form of second and third order effects in a population. The only way to accomplish such training is to provide collaborative environments for the sharing of ideas and vignettes between personnel, and open forums for debate and peer criticism. Then, those ideas (such as marketing themes applied to political action) can be incorporated into unit tactics. The lessons learned from those tactics that incorporated a new idea must then be resubmitted as vignettes back into the collaborative environment so that tactic can be vetted further and perhaps become a doctrinal fundamental or principle one day.

Major John Bushman, student, Command and General Staff College, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The views expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

[jordan shoes]

Later I got to know the word“dormitory”. In AE it means one building, whereas it means one room in British English（BE）.The New Zealander misunderstood me because she spoke New Zealander English（NE）, which, as we know, is much related to BE.

Nowadays, not a few English learners, who try to catch up with the fashion, choose to speak AE.Yet, the problem is that they cannot speak pure AE, but half AE and half BE instead.I think it necessary to keep one style in order to avoid misunderstanding

[authentic nikes]

I love how you guys always change the mysterious voodoo into common sense tests.

[Lonepanther.wordpress.com]

It is delusion to believe that you can convince a population you are their friend when clearly the real motives of the invasion is that country's natural resources.

Can't do it, nada. Best you can hope for is they fear you more than the insurgents. Begin seducing with the local elites because they are probably corrupt anyway and won't mind you bombing the people into submission.

[Oakley Sunglasses UK]

Nice pic! Good light! It's very inspiring for me.

[Global UGGs]

Not only an excellent way to promote a new business, but a reliable way to increase sales. In this economy, this is definately a way to sustain your growth. Who doesn't need more clients? Give it away if you can, and keep traffic coming in!

[freelance writer]

The United States Army has amassed a noteworthy gathering of lessons studied from the final 7 years, principally from the encounters of tactical-level officers, Lieutenants and Captains.

[Microsoft Office]

This article is GREAT it can be EXCELLENT JOB and what a great tool!

[essay writer]

I respect USA Army guys, I am agree, thank you a lot!

[moncler outlet]

Now it so happened, that, in spite of Emma's resolution of never marrying, there was something in the name, in the idea, of Mr. Frank Churchill, which always interested her.

[foot massager]

She had frequently thought, -- especially since his father's marriage with Miss Taylor,—that if she were to marry, he was the very person to suit her in age, character, and condition.

[Rolex Swiss Replica]

It's a funny thing to make up with a mask.It's really important to get a lot of rest.

[cheapjerseys]

The lane which opened yesterday made upcheap jerseys
only a small section of the 30 miles of VIP routes coming into force on July 25, two days before the opening ceremony. Ex-top traffic cop Kevin Delaney, head of road safety at the cheap jerseys
Institute of Advanced Motorists, said: “The Games Lanes have reduced those for ordinary traffic. If there is a breakdown or a crash, the road network just wouldn’t cope.” The M4 lane is being nfl jerseys cheap
introduced early to handle the rush from Heathrow as competitors arrive. Some 335 athletes and more than 1,000 “Olympic family” members passed through the wholesale jerseys
airport yesterday – with 16,000 athletes and thousands more officials and back-up staff due over the next week. But a VIP bus carrying US stars took four hours to baseball jerseys
cover the estimated 45-minute journey from Heathrow to the high-security Olympic Village in Stratford, East London, after its driver got LOST. Hurdler Kerron Clement tweeted: “Um, so we’ve been lost on the cheap jerseys wholesale road for 4hrs. Not a good first impression London.” He added: “Athletes are sleepy, hungry and need to pee. Could we get to the Olympic Village please.” Meanwhile, Australian team members, told how they were held up for cheap jerseys free shipping three hours because their driver could not work his satnav. A physio working with the Aussie team eventually guided the bus in using an app on his smartphone.