Normally, when the Army publishes a new field manual, it's no excuse to stop the presses. The new operations manual, FM 3-0, is the exception.
The old: must-read, but not a lot to digest
Army field manuals are dry reading. If you're a rifle platoon leader, here are the standard formations and maneuvers to assault a fixed position. If you're new to the artillery, here's what acronyms like TOT and FFO mean.
The manuals are also pretty vague, providing, at best, the rough outlines of what each job demands. Doctrine isn't supposed to be a straitjacket, forcing people to act in highly detailed, almost robotic ways. The US Army tries to breed people who can take orders, act without hesitation, but also think on their feet.
Traditionally, the manuals have said little about the larger strategic and political context. That omission is understandable, if you believe that military operations are separate from political decisions and outcomes. In fact, the conventional warfare mindset, which has guided the Army through most of its history, sees warfare as the derivative of politics. That's Clausewitzian in only a limited sense, but appropriate for a country which has kept the military strictly subordinate to the civilian since the days of Washington and the Continental Congress.
Meanwhile, warfare has evolved into a tangle of political and military action. Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism have some of the tightest connection between politics and violence. However, carrier battle groups deployed to the Persian Gulf to "send a message" are also part of a parallel political and military effort, as much as the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, the Army's discomfort with counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, special operations, and other highly politicized military operations led to doctrinal ghettoization. In the 1980s, the Department of Defense stuffed operations as different as peacekeeping (dampening conflict) and "proinsurgency" (training and equipping insurgents to escalate conflict) into the same doctrinal pigeonhole, "low intensity conflict" (LIC). Specialized Army manuals covered LIC and its subcomponents, almost ensuring that 99% of Army officers wouldn't read them.
The manuals, therefore, reflected the great irony of the US Army, and the American military in general. The war for which the Army prepared the most, a NATO/Warsaw Pact version of Ragnarok in Central Europe, didn't happen--and given the superpower balance of terror, was highly unlikely to happen. Meanwhile, the real shooting wars in which the US Army was either directly or indirectly involved--for example, the civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua--were the sorts of conflicts the Army tried to avoid talking about.
The new: now with more mental nutrition
That backstory makes reading the newly released FM 3-0 a bit of a shock. It takes efforts to explain the forces generating conflict, instead of leaving them a distant political vision on the far, far side of the battlefield. The first chapter of FM 3-0, "The Operational Environment," discusses everything from globalization to urbanization in a decent level of detail, with even some thoughtful, interesting passages that are alien to Army field manuals. Here's an example:
1-3. Technology will be another double-edged sword. Often, innovations that improve the quality of life and livelihood are also used by adversaries to destroy those lives. It would seem as though technology is an asymmetric advantage of developed nations. They have greater access to research facilities to develop and innovate. Technology also gives nations access to the industrial base. These nations can then mass-produce advanced products and widely distribute them at relatively low costs. The low cost of products, their userfriendly design, and their availability in a global economy makes advanced technology accessible to unstable states as well as extremist organizations. The revolution and proliferation of benefits derived from integrating multidisciplinary nano- and bio-technologies and smart materials potentially promises to improve living conditions. However, these products will not always be available at the pace and in the quantities necessary to make them and their benefits as universally available as desired. This disparity can create another source of friction between the haves and have-nots. Moreover, the proliferation, falling costs, and availability of technologically advanced products—especially expanded information technologies using mobile networks and expanded use of wireless and global fiber-optic networks—enable nonstate adversaries to acquire them.
OK, maybe it's not exactly Alvin Toffler or Jared Diamond, but it is something that Army officers are supposed to read and digest.
Most books that include the words "operational art" fumble their description of what the operational level of strategy really is. Clausewitz, who is quoted liberally (and accurately) throughout FM 3-0, thought it was the most important facet of strategy to master, and the most difficult to understand.
To the credit of FM 3-0's authors, the new manual provides a top-notch description of the operational art. It includes helpful warnings about the pitfalls of operational-level strategy, such as this one:
6-4. A natural tension exists between the levels of war and echelons of command. This tension stems from different perspectives, requirements, and constraints associated with command at each level of war. Between the levels of war, the horizons for planning, preparation, and execution differ greatly.
And, hallelujah, the new FM 3-0 treats insurgency and terrorism as a normal part of modern warfare, and therefore a necessary part of the Army's mission. In fact, the first few pages of Chapter 2, "The Continuum of Operations," almost make general war--the sort of conventional interstate conflict the Army has traditionally preferred--the exception, not the norm.
Most official statements of Army doctrine struggle to find the right words to describe revolutionary warfare. It's refreshing, therefore, to read the following passage in FM 3-0, which neatly defines insurgency and puts it into operational context:
2-6. Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). It is a condition of politically motivated conflict involving significant intra- or interstate violence but usually short of large-scale operations by opposing conventional forces. Insurgencies often include widespread use of irregular forces and terrorist tactics. An insurgency may develop in the aftermath of general war or through degeneration of unstable peace. Insurgencies may also emerge on their own from chronic social or economic conditions. In addition, some conflicts, such as the Chinese Revolution, have escalated from protracted insurgencies into general wars. Intervention by a foreign power in an insurgency may increase the threat to regional stability.
There, that wasn't so hard, was it? Revolutionary warfare isn't a set of tactics; instead, people with revolutionary ambitions pick the techniques, normally "asymmetric," that make the most sense at a particular point in time. "Terrorist tactics" are a means to an end--a far different view of than the normal stereotype of "terrorists," depicted as people obsessed with a particular method over a desired political outcome.
Breaking with tradition
FM 3-0 isn't perfect. For example, the first appendix lapses into some of the traditional language used to convey strategic principles (mass, maneuver, economy of force, etc.), which fits most comfortably with conventional, interstate conflicts. Napoleon might have seized the initiative at Austerlitz, by tricking the Austrians and Russians into thinking he had a weaker force than he really did. In a far different but no less important way, Hamas stole the initiative from Fatah during the second intifada through a combination of political mobilization and terror attacks. The next generation of Army officers need to understand how their opponents might steal the initiative from them in ways that have nothing to do with the electronic battlefield or better close air support coordination.
Still, FM 3-0 is a big step forward in the history of Army doctrine. It would be startling if the hard lessons of the last several years had no part in this change of heart. However, it's important to remember that, all along, there have been people in the US military who had a better understanding of conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq than many of their superiors. FM 3-0 may be the result of giving them a chance to speak.
[For another view of FM 3-0, with critical comments about its treatment of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, click here.]
[A quick aside: FM 3-0 does not read like one of the "military transformationist" tracts of a few years ago. In other words, I wouldn't give Cebrowski, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, et al. credit for the new, improved approach reflected in this manual. In fact, many elements of FM 3-0 run counter to the "transformationist" doctrines.]
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