Another good reason to read the last issue of Small Wars Journal is Dan Green's article, "The Political Officer As Counter-Insurgent," a practical guide to life on the front lines (such as they are) of counterinsurgency. There are two strong reasons for reading it:
- You're still learning about counterinsurgency, and you'd like to hear, from an operational or tactical level, what it takes to win these sorts of conflicts.
- You're a counterinsurgency grognard, but you'd like an article to pull out whenever you need to demonstrate how different counterinsurgency is from conventional warfare. (Click here for a comparison.)
On that last point, it's worth skimming the Army's manual for the general-purpose infantryman, FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, to compare it with Green's field guide to counterinsurgency. You'll notice immediately how standard US military doctrine has nothing intrinsically to do with counterinsurgency. Even if you throw in specialized publications covering relevant topics--for example, FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, or FM 3-07, Stability and Support Operations--you'll still notice gaps. Even the Marines' venerable Small Wars Manual didn't cover everything.
However the wars and Afghanistan and Iraq conclude, the United States cannot afford to have its military--not to mention the rest of the government--go for another generation without making the tangible, permanent changes needed to fight guerrillas better.
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