Iraq for Iraqis

From this morning's Washington Post, bold new ideas in American policy about Iraq:

In the year since President Bush announced he was changing course in Iraq with a troop "surge" and a new strategy, U.S. military and diplomatic officials have begun their own quiet policy shift. After countless unsuccessful efforts to push Iraqis toward various political, economic and security goals, they have decided to let the Iraqis figure some things out themselves.

Of course, US Iraq strategy--erect and support a friendly, stable government capable of holding the country together--depended from the very beginning on "letting the Iraqis figure some things out for themselves." According to the Post, the impetus for this new policy is the failure of the American-devised benchmarks. If the Iraqi government can't meet goals we set for them, why not let them set the goals for themselves?

Given the realities of Iraq, this policy is an eminently practical approach at a regional level, and probably doomed at the national level. At the level of a province, city, or town, leaders have a decent chance of first agreeing on what these objectives might be, and then taking steps, with American assistance, to achieve them. A lot depends on the peculiarities of each situation: one town may have two competing factions which refuse to work with one another; a different town might not experience such divisions.

Sadly, the process of sectarian cleansing that has occurred does make it easier for local groups to reach consensus, since people will not be as fearful that adherents of some other branch of Islam were getting more than they deserved out of the deal. Of course, the long-term survival of Iraq as a country depends on defusing these religious tensions; Iraqis will have a smaller opportunity to achieve local amity before taking this reconciliation to the national stage.

At a national level--which is where crucial decisions about the oil industry, counterinsurgency strategy, and other critical matters need to be made--Iraqi-driven goals, timetables, and metrics are less feasible. The highest plane of Iraqi politics still summarizes and intensifies sectarian anxieties, factional rivalries, and violent disputes.

Still, it's not all bad news. Being the patron of a government beseiged by guerrillas is a tricky dance between public and private positions. Publicly, the United States has to appear to support the Iraqi leaders crafting their own approach. Privately, the US will exercise its leverage to steer these Iraqi leaders in what American officials think is the right direction.

This dance will be harder to continue without stumbling in the US Congress even more than Iraq itself. Legislators from both parties are skeptical of Iraqi national leaders, after nearly five years of infighting and paralysis. Members of the Senate and House have additional doubts about members of the Bush Administration and some top officers in the US military. Leaving aside the people actually working in Iraq, do their bosses in Washington understand what's the right course for Iraq? Do they even have a clear picture of where this road leads? These parallel lines of questioning will dominate the discussion of "Iraqization" in 2008.

P.S. Does anyone else think it's odd that an article about how Iraqis are supposed to be determining their own destiny includes no quotes from Iraqis?

Comments

[Mojo]

This isn’t about letting the Iraqis determine their future; it’s about moving the goalposts. The benchmark time lines were shattered and now they’re staring at failure of even the extensions unilaterally granted by the White House.
For the most part, the established goals aren’t some American construct we imposed (except a couple related to military organization which have already been met). The outstanding benchmarks are simply a list of some of the things which are indispensable to the very existence of an independent Iraqi state. What “Iraqi” alternative could there be to an agreement on control of oil and distribution of the revenue? How could Iraq become a full state without establishing at least a semblance of a monopoly on use of force (limiting the militias, building a legitimate police force and army, and establishing security at least in their own capital)? How long will the Kurds let the status of Kirkuk remain in limbo? Is even-handed enforcement of laws somehow now just a US interest and irrelevant to the insurgency?

[Mojo]

This isn’t about letting the Iraqis determine their future; it’s about moving the goalposts. The benchmark timelines were shattered and now they’re staring at failure of even the extensions unilaterally granted by the White House.
For the most part, the established goals aren’t some American construct we imposed (except a couple related to military organization which have already been met). The outstanding benchmarks are simply a list of some of the things which are indispensable to the very existence of an independent Iraqi state. What “Iraqi” alternative could there be to an agreement on control of oil and distribution of the revenue? How could Iraq become a full state without establishing at least a semblance of a monopoly on use of force (limiting the militias, building a legitimate police force and army, and establishing security at least in their own capital)? How long will the Kurds let the status of Kirkuk remain in limbo? Is even-handed enforcement of laws somehow now just a US interest and irrelevant to the insurgency?

[Mojo]

Sorry for the double post. I guess I don't have the hang of the new procedures yet.

[Barry]

"Sadly, the process of sectarian cleansing that has occurred does make it easier for local groups to reach consensus, since people will not be as fearful that adherents of some other branch of Islam were getting more than they deserved out of the deal."

I disagree. Ethnic cleansing has very likely spilled a *lot* of fresh blood, leading to people who actively hate and fear each other, with very good reason. When you sit down with people who have, are and will continue to kill your people, it's not a government.