Defense Secretary Robert Gates is, quite literally, the picture of a man on the horns of a particularly painful dilemma. To fight the Iraq War without re-instituting the draft, the US government relies on "private security firms"--mercenaries, by another name. These guns-for-hire are not the sort of troops needed to fight a counterinsurgency war. On the contrary: mercenaries are often responsible for incidents that alienate average Iraqis, instead of convincing them that the government and its American backer are on their side. For example, last week, British security contractors fired on a taxi, injuring three Iraqis. The deeper the political crisis gets, the greater the need for troops in both defensive and offensive roles--and the pressure builds to hire private firms for the jobs that US soldiers might otherwise perform.
To some extent, privatization in the Defense Department is inevitable. From running the commissary to building software systems, the private sector has a role to play in supporting the US military, at home and in the field. The real problem, of course, is when the private sector has to fight.
The private sector might be appropriate for some combat roles, such as piloting drones. Even in these situations, it's worth asking whether the expertise needed for these tasks should be farmed out, instead of being kept in house.
Defenders of privatization might still argue that some role exists for private security as bodyguards. However, even in this limited capacity, mercenaries are the wrong tool for the job in Iraq. In a war with no front lines, in which the use of force might have grave political repercussions, anyone with a gun bears enormous responsibility. Nervous mercenaries with itchy trigger fingers are the worst possible troops for these situations.
To be fair, that is a caricature of the over 100 private security companies operated in Iraq. Certainly, the description fits many of the 180,000 civilian employees in Iraq, but not all of them. However, even the best among them--the most highly-trained, seasoned veterans of service in special operations forces units--don't necessarily fit the mission, either.
There's a big difference between the mission of counterinsurgency and the skills of special operations forces. While a SOF veteran who served in Colombia might have learned many skills relevant to the Iraq War, there's no assurance that they have all the necessary skills. Knowledge of the language and culture are critical. So, too, is an understanding of the difference between, say, fighting drug smugglers and guerrillas. Being a tough and smart commando does not necessarily make you a smart and tough guerrilla fighter.
Even if there were no war in Iraq, the Defense Department's dependence on private security firms would be a hard trend to reverse. It started before the Bush Administration took office in 2001. Rumsfeld's grand design for "military transformation," combined with the Iraq War, have made the situation vastly worse. Sadly, because the way the Administration has decided to fight this war, the US government feels dependent on the very people who often undermine the US mission in Iraq.
I think the article in today's Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/20/AR2007102001325_pf.html) makes a good case that the dysfunction is not solely limited to the Department of Defense's over-reliance on privatization, but also the broader disconnect within the US government between Rumsfeld's military and the political officers at State who were tasked with reconstruction after 2004. The idea that the two would need to work together in a unified national effort just wasn't there, and so State became more dependent on PSCs like Blackwater to protect its employees, in what arguably should of been one of the core missions for the US military in Iraq.
Posted by: mc_masterchef | 10/21/2007 at 18:41