The future of counterinsurgency

Looking beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, how prepared will the US military be for the next counterinsurgency war? Here are the warning signs that military professionals aren't going to be any readier than, say, they were for the Iraq War:

• Officers mouth the right words, but they don't embrace the ideas behind counterinsurgency. That's exactly what the US military did during the early 1960s, when the Pentagon felt that it could avoid President Kennedy's pressures to take counterinsurgency by adopting the language, without changing doctrine or organization.
• Military leaders start focusing on something else. In the waning days of the Vietnam War, American military professionals had already stopped paying attention to counterinsurgency, preferring to invest their time and dwindling resources on conventional and nuclear warfare between the superpowers.
• A few enthusiasts continue to champion counterinsurgency, but little changes. In other words, the war colleges might have several counterinsurgency "true believers" on staff, but the rest of the military's overall TO&E and doctrine remain the same. After the Vietnam War, some in the Defense Department did try to ensure that the United States would be prepared for the next Vietnam. Unfortunately, these individuals were largely isolated, facing not only resistance from generals and admirals who refused to believe that another Vietnam would ever happen, but severe penalties in their personal careers if they continued crusading for counterinsurgency.

The third warning sign is the hardest to discern, since you need to sift through the details of budgets, assignments, and promotions to track what happens to the counterinsurgency experts. The first two warning signs are easier to discern, since you can find them in military journals, the proceedings of Defense Department conferences, and other highly public materials.

The summer issue of Parameters, the Army War College journal, points towards a more optimistic future for counterinsurgency warfare, even as the news from Iraq remains grim. I often cite Parameters on this blog because it gives some insight into what the leaders of the US Army are thinking and discussing. The summer issue includes a "social networks" view of counterinsurgency, a review of the Marines' new counterinsurgency manual, a "think piece" about defining victory in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and book reviews on these and related topics.

It's clear that the authors of these articles aren't merely paying lip service to counterinsurgency principles. No one says, as many American officers did during the Vietnam era, that any good army can defeat guerrillas.

Why do the prospects for counterinsurgency after Iraq seem better than the same situation after Vietnam? I'm sure that military professionals know that the American electorate understands the level of challenge that Iraq and Afghanistan posed, and the necessity of meeting that challenge. It also helps that there isn't a superpower conflict to justify ignoring counterinsurgency for other forms of potential conflict.

After Vietnam, many observers warned that, like it or not, Americans would face another counterinsurgency war. The same principle applies when US involvement in Iraq comes to an end. Let's be better prepared, this time.

Comments

[TCO]

I think that their is a whole lot of ignorance on counter-insurgency. But the advocates of it also lack some perspective. I could make Iraq safe. The same way we made Arizona safe in the 1890s. But there is not the will (nor should there be) for that sort of thing.

I could also do a lot of "pay one Indian tribe to kill another". And this is something we can probably get away with easier. But it does not still establish definite control. It is more of a meddling type thing. Fun and useful for an imperial power. But not matching the Wilson dreams of neocons or the "dominance" verbology of network centric warriors.

Oh...and I mean more what we did in Somalia recently with the Ethipians than what we did, than the recently touted tribal stuff versus Al Queda, which isn't really affecting the end state and will be forgotten when we leave Iraq. The basic concept is interesting, though. You're really outsourcing brutality, outsourcing responsability, outsourcing dying. It's a bit like rendition. We won't torture you, we'll just hand you over to someone who will.

Oh...and Americans HATE learning languages. We don't even teach our spies (err...diplomats) well. We don't demand performance there. We're just intellectually lazy and culturally arrogant on that. And its so foundational and simple. But we won't change on that. And I don't think the CI types appreciate it either. They want to send more people to Monterey. But that's not the answer. Paying people more and hiring smarter people is the answer. aNd holding balls to the fire.

[Tim]

It's institutional. The changes that would have to happen to make the CI outlook a reality, would also mean you'd have people walking out the door, rather than enforce a bullshit policy.