What does it mean for counterinsurgency to “work”? That’s the question implied in a recent Washington Post article, which described the “blood feuds” that continue to simmer, if not boil, during the recent escalation of US forces in Baghad and the Anbar province.
The article quickly bounced from blog to blog—not surprisingly, since it might reflect what you already have concluded about Iraq. However, we need to move beyond the desire for an Aha! moment, and look for some measures of success with which everyone can agree.
So, at this stage in a counterinsurgency campaign, how do you know you’re winning? Here are some possible signs:
- The frequency of violence drops. This statistic is the simplest, which should make you immediately suspicious of how well it describes the complex reality of a war.
- The type of attack changes. You might see a switch from raids on military targets to terror attacks on civilians and conclude that the guerrillas are getting more desperate. On the other hand, even desperate measures may still undermine the regime’s political base.
- The size of guerrilla groups drops. The simple equation is, progress equals fewer insurgents. However, that begs the question of how big a revolutionary movement needs to be. Since few successful revolutionaries enjoyed the approval of a majority of the population, size matters only to a point.
- Recruitment into guerrilla groups slows or stops. The political appeal of the insurgents may wane, or the government may be dismantling these organizations faster than the guerrillas can re-build them.
- The quality of intelligence about the insurgents improves. Improvements in the amount and quality of information about guerrillas can be a measure of both the government’s improved effectiveness, and the revolutionaries’ decreasing effectiveness.
- The government increasingly governs. In other words, the regime’s political, administrative, judicial, and police organization function, without competition, in an increasing number of regions. Obviously, this return of the government needs to be permanent, to be permanent, the regime needs to achieve some amount of acquiescence and support.
You might think of a few other possible measures, but that’s a pretty good list for now. Which is the best? Without a doubt, the last one. Fewer guerrilla attacks, shrinking insurgent organizations, more information about the guerrillas—these are the preconditions for a final step, when an embattled regime re-ascends the seat of power. Many regimes fail to take that last step. For example, the Somoza regime routed the Sandinistas, but failed to convince enough Nicaraguans that the regime deserved their s tolerance. The broad anti-Somoza movement gave the Sandinistas the opportunity to seize power that their earlier, failed military campaigns in the jungles and mountains of Nicaragua couldn’t create.
Any escalation of military, police, and intelligence efforts can, at best, create an opportunity for the regime. The regime may be unable to seize that opportunity, often because of the grave political defects that allowed the insurgency to arise in the first place.
Sadly, the Iraqi government seems unable to seize whatever opportunity the “surge” presented. Suppressing bombers and snipers doesn’t heal the political fractures in Iraq:
"We are in the middle of it," Garrett said, indicating the center of his area of operations, which is the size of Rhode Island. "I'm not fighting one sect or the other. I'm fighting both. And not only am I fighting both, but at certain points I have to put my forces in between the Sunni and Shia groups to protect the populace."
Later:
"We are in the land of the blood feuds," said Maj. Rick Williams, a liaison to tribes in the area. "It's very difficult to tell a tribal fight from a sectarian fight because interests are pretty mixed. You can't just put up a fence."
Of course, the Washington Post article is told purely from the US military’s point of view. You don’t hear the perspective of local clan leaders or government officials who may be trying to negotiate an end to the chronic violence. However, the situation as delicate as this one, with few incentives that either the American military or the Iraqi government can offer, seems like only a “negative peace,” a temporary lull in violence.
Victory does not necessarily mean a complete end to all violence. In fact, most guerrilla wars don’t end with a final spasm of violence, with one side or the other completely defeated in some Ragnarok-like final battle. However one defines victory, however, the situation in Iraq seems far from resembling it.