We shouldn't be surprised that "the surge" is not officially "working." The US government didn't start this escalation with a clear definition of what constituted success; whatever the definition, the resources deployed seemed inadequate to the task. What's surprising, perhaps, is the number of people watching this four-year war who still have no idea how guerrillas fight, and what it will take to defeat them.
Let's review the basics of "the surge." The Bush Administration ordered a relatively small increase in the number of troops deployed in Iraq. The actual numbers changed, when you factored in (1) the extended tours of military personnel already deployed, and (2) a parallel increase in the number of "private security forces" (mercenaries) not included in the original announcement. The goal remained the same: clear and secure Baghdad. That objective was never going to be easy.
The hard task of urban warfare
Under any circumstances, clear and secure operations in cities is challenging, and nearly always imperfect in its results. In the most famous example, the Battle of Stalingrad, encircled German troops trapped in Der Kessel ("The Cauldron") held on, despite low supplies, low morale, harsh weather, and a staggering numerical disadvantage. And that, of course, was a conventional battle, in which the combatants were relatively easy to identify (though Soviet civilians died in horrific numbers).
In other cases of urban guerrilla warfare, a smart, dedicated, organized opponent can take years to completely clear from a city. Counterinsurgency forces often fail to identify all the guerrilla fighters and agents within a city. Inevitably, the guerrillas try to re-infiltrate; rarely are defensive measures, such as checkpoints and regular sweeps, sufficient.
Making a city 100% guerrilla-free, and then 100% guerrilla-proof, is a major undertaking, and in many cases, something of a mirage. You can reduce the number of guerrillas, but you can't eliminate them altogether--unless they commit major strategic mistakes, as the Tupemaros did in Uruguay. The normal case looks more like Belfast, Kandahar, Lima, or Hebron, where the urban guerrilla was never completely eradicated.
The expected reaction
As long as I've been writing posts here at Arms and Influence, I've taken extra effort to point out the common but fatal mistake of assuming that your enemy in any conflict won't react. The same principle applies to the surge. Of course, Iraqi guerrilla factions moved out of the way of US and Iraqi forces in Baghdad, temporarily moving operations to other parts of Iraq. Of course, many of them switched tactics, deciding to lay low for the time being, or even--as in the case of the Army of the Mahdi--position themselves as a shadow army and police force. Of course, insurgents switched to lower risk attacks, such as bombing instead of sniping, to communicate defiance in the face of US and Iraqi efforts.
The critical question about the surge isn't, "How safe is Baghdad today?" More important is how long the effects of this small-scale escalation can last. That question, of course, has more dimensions than just the number of bombs detonated or rounds fired.
As I indicated in earlier posts, "the surge" doesn't change the politics of the Iraq war, in both Iraq and the United States. The Bush Administration has burned up so much of its credibility that, even if the surge made Baghdad dramatically safer, Americans are skeptical about the long-term prospects for victory. And what, for the US and Iraqi governments, does "victory" really mean? Today, the answer is no more clear than on the first day of the 2003 invasion.
Security alone isn't victory
Certainly, Baghdad residents are happy for any reduction in violence. It's easy to underestimate the value of that political currency--but it's also easy to lose it. If personal safety were the only concern, there would not be an internal war in the first place. A focus on security might eliminate some of the smaller, most violent factions in this war. It may not satisfy some of the groups using these factions, along with other instruments, to make cynical power grabs, express their outrage against the status quo, or simply keep other Iraqi groups off-balance.
Nor will the surge, by itself, drive a wedge between Iraqi groups. Rather than sneering at talks between US officials and Iraqi insurgents, we should be applauding these efforts (as long, of course, as we're talking to the right groups, in the right fashion). According to the current political and military formula, there is no other way to defeat Iraq's guerrilla factions except by exploiting the differences among them. Prime targets include some of the disaffected Ba'athists, who at some point may be convinced that the armed struggle isn't getting them anywhere, and some of the more cynical groups that have been more interested in prestige and money than any political agenda.
The surge, therefore, needs to do more than provide a short-term security fix. Bigger strategic changes are needed, which this temporary, minor escalation has yet to provide.
Before the invasion, anyone taking a serious look at the US military's doctrines for urban warfare and counterinsurgency found serious flaws in both areas. (Here's an example.) Since the invasion, US forces have been trying to innovate as best they can, and have improved their operational, tactical, and technical approaches in many ways. However, they can't do the job alone--particularly if the US public still doesn't know what the war in Iraq is supposed to achieve.
As indicated in yesterday's NYT article, the expectations about the surge were far too optimistic. Guerrillas return quickly to "cleared" neighborhoods. Violence in some areas has worsened, which should be no surprise. The hoopla over the surge provided a major opportunity for insurgents to make a loud, bloody point with just a few well-timed bombs. Shi'ite factions are using the surge as cover for pushing more Sunnis out of Baghdad. Iraqi police and military units are sometimes hesitant to rush into dangerous situations, if the Americans appear eager to prove that the latest campaign is working.
None of this is to say that the Iraqi insurgents are invincible. However, the surge does not seem to have seized the initiative from the guerrillas, nor has it exploited their weaknesses as much as it might have.
[For an earlier series of posts about "the surge," click here.]
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