With British Prime Minister Tony Blair about to retire, the natural question is, Will the UK remain in Iraq much longer? His successor, Gordon Brown, seems far less inclined to support an indefinite occupation. Brown's personal political fortunes aren't tied to US President George W. Bush in the same fashion that Blair's were. Brown certainly doesn't want to have his tenure as PM defined from the very beginning by Iraq alone. All assurances to the contrary, the British government has strong reasons to consider an exit from Iraq, particularly since the UK has been a regular target of Islamist terrorism since 9/11. And that's not even counting the British casualties in Iraq.
The natural next question is, Can the US sustain the occupation, once the British leave? Unfortunately, that's the wrong question to ask. Obviously, it's physically possible to sustain the US troop deployment in Iraq. As long as that's true, the Bush Administration is disinclined to consider any exit strategy.
The Republicans were thrashed in the 2006 midterm elections. Bush's personal approval ratings have continued to disintegrate. A strong majority of Americans polled want deadlines for withdrawal. Other foreign policy priorities--Afghanistan, the "Islamist terrorism franchise" network, Iran, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the horn of Africa, Venezuela, you name it--need attention. The White House has yet to discuss how the US will pay the final bill for the Iraq war. The US military is strained to the breaking point. And yet, the last thing the President wants to discuss is withdrawal.
The credibility trap
Why? For a simple, and unfortunately very familiar, reason: credibility. An American president has, yet again, snared the United States in the credibility trap. In the minds of the people in the White House, the Iraq war is now a test of resolve--not merely for the United States, but for the people who run the executive branch. (That's one reason why the Administration remains hostile to dissenting opinions from within the national security bureaucracy.)
Sadly, the trap is largely an illusion. The United States lost the Vietnam War, but won the Cold War. American credibility suffered more from the frequent brain-dead determination to pursue ineffective strategies than it ever did from the final American withdrawal. Worse, the credibility trap fed on itself: to preserve its credibility, the US government pursued a Vietnam strategy that undermined its credibility. The more its credibility seemed to suffer, the more the Johnson Administration seemed determined to preserve it by "staying the course."
Pray for insecurity
Insecure people see admissions of failure or reversals of policy as a caustic rejection of themselves. It's not that they're unwilling to change direction: as many have already shown, Candidate Bush sounded very different than President Bush on many issues, including "nation-building." However, it's when the President stakes his personal prestige on some grand design, such as the invasion of Iraq, that options ossify into hard, unalterable positions.
It may sound apply the adjective insecure to Bush, but I think it's appropriate here. There are only three kinds of people who believe that any retreat is a cataclysmic failure: (1) those who believe that a Greater Truth has been revealed to them, through the hand of God, dialectical materialism, or some other transcendent agency; (2) those who believe, as Hitler did, that sheer willpower (Willenskfraft) can change any balance of forces; and (3) those unwilling to admit failure, for fear of sudden political collapse, or the harsh judgment of posterity.
I don't claim to know George W. Bush's heart, but I fervently hope that he falls in the third category. If his unwillingness to discuss the possibility of withdrawal is a symptom of either or both of the first two attitudes cited in the last paragraph, then he is completely immune to reason. No compelling argument, no one's personal charm or gravitas, no display of mass emotion will make him waver. Only brute political force, such as the assertion of the Congress of its shared role in foreign policy, will change the core principles of American strategy in Iraq. At least, if insecurity is his problem, some trusted person can explain to him that history will judge him worse for "staying the course" than for making a painful but necessary choice.