Arms and influence

Security theater

Bruce Schneier has a great phrase for the post-9/11 world, "security theater." It's easy to guess what it means: the appearance of improving security, versus actual improvements. Theater is as important to counterterrorism as it is to terrorism. In both cases, you're trying to inspire a particular emotion, either terror or sobriety. Unfortunately, theater isn't everything.

That's what makes anecdotes like Jane Galt's experience with the TSA infuriating. Airport security procedures are pretty mindless. (Are shoes the only apparel in which terrorists have considered hiding explosives?) Of course, the TSA needs to standardize its response at the security checkpoint, to ensure some rigor and efficiency in the process. Mindlessness, in this sense, is a natural part of bureaucracy.

Mindlessness at that level needs to be balanced by the impression of mindfulness at other levels. Even though the TSA checkpoint staff need to keep going through the motions, other parts of the TSA need to be thinking a few steps ahead of potential terrorists. Unfortunately, the recent history of Red Team analysis at the TSA is not good. The Red Team, which tests the sort of methods terrorists might use, succeed at alarming rates, as high as 90%. In 2006, a former FAA Red Team member who was appalled at the pre-9/11 vulnerabilities said that the situation had not significantly improved. The 9/11 Commission was hardly impressed with the TSA's progress.

Let's be generous and assume that skilled professionals in the TSA are out-thinking terrorists in the deadly game of measure and countermeasure. The excessive secrecy of the Bush Administration has ensured that no one will hear this comforting news. Obviously, there are ways of talking about any such programs without giving too many details.

Counterterrorism and theater aren't antithetical. In fact, counterterrorism can't succeed without theater--it just has to be the right kind.

[Thanks to Outside the Beltway for the original link to Jane Galt's piece.]

The AWOL president

Says retired General William Odom, former NSA director:

I am not now nor have I ever been a Democrat or a Republican. Thus, I do not speak for the Democratic Party. I speak for myself, as a non-partisan retired military officer who is a former Director of the National Security Agency. I do so because Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, asked me.

In principle, I do not favor Congressional involvement in the execution of U.S. foreign and military policy. I have seen its perverse effects in many cases. The conflict in Iraq is different. Over the past couple of years, the President has let it proceed on automatic pilot, making no corrections in the face of accumulating evidence that his strategy is failing and cannot be rescued...

To put this in a simple army metaphor, the Commander-in-Chief seems to have gone AWOL, that is ‘absent without leave.’ He neither acts nor talks as though he is in charge.

Zounds.

The snarl begins in Colombia

Since I'm usually in a hurry to put away the Christmas decorations, I rarely do a good job of storing the lights. When I pull on the end of a cord, I'm usually dismayed to be holding a huge, messy tangle of lights, far bigger and more complicated than I had expected. Of course, I only have myself to blame--the snarl is purely the result of my own neglect.

While people in the US national security community have been spending all their time dealing with the Iraq problem, other issues keep getting haphazardly tossed into the closet. Eventually, when we start tugging on one of these problems, a lot of others emerge.

Case in point: Chiquita's admission that it was paying right-wing paramilitary groups to continue operations in Colombia. The story, as we learned today, won't stop there. A Colombian prosecutor is investigating other multinational corporations that may have made similar arrangements with irregular forces. It would be amazing if Chiquita were the only company who paid protection money, and it would be equally amazing if the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia were the only recipients. The FARC, certainly, have been in the extortion business for a long time.

Let's keep pulling this thread. Have corporations cut similar deals in other countries? Yes, undoubtedly. There are plenty of places in Latin America, Africa, and Asia where roving groups with guns can make all kinds of trouble. During the 1990s, when energy companies were trying to build Central Asian gas and oil pipelines as an alternative to Persian Gulf exports, companies like Unocal regularly paid bribes to Afghan warlords. In Nigeria, a small guerrilla group attacked oil platforms and kidnapped oil company workers. And, of course, in Iraq, various insurgent groups--ranging from genuine revolutionaries to criminal gangs with revolutionary names--have been extorting money from foreign corporations. (Which, of course, is where some of the reconstruction money disappeared.)

Keep pulling, and out pops another unwelcome detail: who is protecting these corporations? If you're going to mine diamonds in Western Africa, you won't count on the rebels or governments to stay bribed--particularly if the leaders of these factions have an uncertain grip on their own forces. The same "security firms" that are doing a brisk business with the US government today are making even more money from private corporations. Therefore, the lines between the public and private part of US national security is even more blurred, both in the means (these mercenary companies) and the ends (the employers demanding their services).

Yank harder, and out pop other questions. How does the revolving door between national militaries and the security companies work? Who is receiving campaign contributions from Blackwater, Dyncorp, and similar companies? How much does the United States have invested in Plan Colombia, and how well is it paying off? In other countries riven by inernal war, such as Colombia, are we investing too much, too little, or the wrong resources to handle the threat at hand?

These are all important issues. They're also the issues that Americans are largely ignoring, while Iraq consumes all available time, resources, and attention. Worst of all, we haven't even mentioned international terrorism yet.

Theme of the week

Mosts of my posts this week will follow the same line of argument:

• Iraq is not the only national security priority.
• In fact, it's not as important as the cumulative weight of other priorities.
• Iraq is blotting out these other priorities.
• Even if the US prevails in Iraq, the cost of ignoring nearly everything else is far greater than anything that can be gained in Iraq.

Well, it's something

It's a happy day when you wake up in the morning, the sun is shining, the coffee tastes good, and a possible discussion between the US Secretary of State and the Iranian Foreign Minister is considered to be unremarkable. The forum is yet another Middle East summit, in which the appearance of diplomacy is more important than what actually gets accomplished. (However, these forums always provide a mechanism for private discussions, beyond what the representatives are saying in public.)

We can only hope that Condoleeza Rice has more to discuss with Iran's government than just Iraq--or even just Iraq and Iran's nuclear program. Any discussion that focuses purely on one or both of these issues omits other Iranian interests, such as its energy projects with India, Russia, and other countries. In other words, while security issues top the list, compartmentalizing them removes what little leverage the US government has with Iran. In that case, private diplomacy will look much like public diplomacy at the Sharm al-Sheikh summit, a statement of positions.

[If the name Sharm al-Sheikh sounds familiar, the resort is the location of terrorist attacks in 2005, and an ugly incident in 1985, when an Egyptian soldier killed several Israeli tourists.]

Today, I'm a rover

I'm on the road today, so I won't be posting. Meanwhile, enjoy Tom Waits performing "Cold, Cold Ground." This song became the only song played twice on Homicide: LIfe on the Streets, a TV series filled with great music.  That makes "Cold, Cold Ground" as close to an anthem of that show as any song, aside from the theme music.

If I understand Waits' lyrics, "Cold, Cold Ground is about the craziness and indifference of violence. That makes it a good choice for this blog.

The fall of The New Republic

What the hell happened to The New Republic? Twenty years ago, it was a magazine full of clever, iconoclastic, and readable analysis. Today...Well, just listen to TNR editor-at-large Peter Beinart, interviewed by Bill Moyers in "Buying the War."

I had thought about writing a longer critique of TNR, whose political analysis has descended into profane silliness. However, you might hear all you need to hear straight from Beinart's lips. You'll see why a once-respectable journal of critical opinion has devolved so far, so fast. Beinart remains unapologetic that, because his lack of Middle East expertise, he credulously repeated the Administration's claims about Iraq.

Rule #8 of a sane world: People who don't know what they're talking about should be clearly identified as such.

During Operation DESERT STORM, I was a talking head. When Iraqi SCUDs were falling on Tel Aviv, I appeared on CNN. The anchorperson asked me, "Why aren't the Israelis using the PATRIOT missile batteries to shoot down the SCUDs?"

I paused before answering. I knew that the readiness of the PATRIOT crews was in question, but for the life of me, I couldn't remember the exact details. Rather than blurt out something that would later prove to be wrong, I said (to paraphrase myself, since I don't have a transcript), "I'm not sure. I just know that they're not ready yet."

By today's standards, I was a bad pundit. If I had blustered my way through that interview, nothing bad would have happened to me. For my career as a talking head, bravado was more important than accuracy. Uncertainty makes bad television, in today's degenerate form of broadcast journalism. Pundits are wrong all the time, but they keep getting invited back to speak to the electronic agora.

Perhaps the biggest story about the 2003 invasion of Iraq was the calamitous, borderline criminal failure of the American press.

Why 2003 still matters

I'm in the middle of watching the Bill Moyers special, "Buying the War." Why do we keep returning to the events of 2002 and 2003?

• Because no one has paid. That's important because...
• Until someone pays, there's no reason to think something equally bad won't happen again.

It seems a bit silly to have to repeat the basic tenets of accountability in government, but that's where we are. Americans can be forgiving people. If a public servant thought a calculated risk was worthwhile, debated all the pros and cons, and made a straightforward case to the American public and our allies, the outcome may still be terrible. That's the nature of politics, and of foreign policy: every decision is a gamble made in the face of incomplete information and uncertain results.

Of course, that's not exactly the story of Iraq.  It was the story of the Iran-Contra scandal, which ended the government careers of scoundrels such as Eliott Abrams and John Poindexter...Temporarily. Of course, these two characters came back to work for an Administration where the word "accountability" is a foreign, incomprehensible word. The outrageous return of Abrams and Poindexter is evidence that, left to its own devices, the Administration will continue to reward, not punish, people responsible for foreign policy fiascoes.

Meanwhile, the same "patriotism police" work energetically to discredit people who scrutinize the invasion of Iraq. If for no other reason, the resistance to further investigation is a compelling reason to investigate further.

High Noon In The Shrubs

[This post was inspired by the accidental conjunction of (1) reading this analysis of the President's taste in cowboy art, and (2) watching High Noon, one of my all-time favorite movies, for the umpteenth time.]

INT. THE TOWN CHURCH - DAYTIME
The church is filled with townspeople. Reverend Hezekiah is leading them in a hymn, while the organist plays earnestly, if somewhat clumsily.

Suddenly, the MARSHAL bursts into the church. The organist immediately stops. The townspeople's hymn sputters out in surprise.

REVEREND
What can I do for you, Marshal?

MARSHAL
I need all the able-bodied men to follow me to Scorpion Gulch. We're going to deal
with these Mexican bandits once and for all!

A worried muttering begins among the parishioners.

BILL (the town doctor)
Uh, forgive me for being confused, Marshal, but what does that have to do
with the Apaches who attacked the Henderson farm and killed the whole family?
We were just praying for their souls.

MARSHAL
Bill, you fool! Don't you know that the Apaches and the banditos are in cahoots!

The muttering grows even louder.

REVEREND
Quiet, quiet! We don't want a panic here, do we?

A pregnant pause ensues, in which the REVEREND and the MARSHAL exchange a long stare. Suddenly, the REVEREND looks away.

REVEREND
Well, I guess, if the Marshal says that there's cause for concern...

MARSHAL
That's right! The Henderson massacre was just the beginning! Those Mexicans can't wait
to get the jump on one of you. Like you, Pete! {Points at PETE.] Or maybe Miss Purdy! The
schoolhouse is pretty darn vulnerable on the edge of town.

Miss Purdy clutches her hands to her chest and swoons.

JOE (the town dry goods merchant)
Something here doesn't make sense, Marshal. The Apaches and the bandits hate each
other. Plus, those Mexicans might have held up a couple of stages, but
they've never killed anyone.

MARSHAL
But they're our sworn enemies, Joe! You know that! And I have proof that the Indians
and the bandits have been meeting, figuring out ways to attack this town and kill all of us!

DAN (the editor of the town paper)
All right, Marshal, where's your proof.

MARSHAL (patting his coat pocket)
Right here.

DAN
Can I see it?

MARSHAL
No. If I showed it to you, you'd figure out how I got it, secret-like, and then we'd
never have any more information about the Apaches or the bandits.

DAN (shrugs)
OK, that makes sense. [Sits down.]

MARSHAL
Besides, if we don't get rid of the bandits, we'll never take care of those Apaches!

BOB (the town barber)
Now I'm lost. Why do we need to take care of the bandits first, if the
Apaches are the real threat.

The Marshal charges over to Bob's pew, grabs him by the lapels, and slaps him across the face.

MARSHAL
I've never seen such cowardice in all my life! Bob, why don't you go down to
the graveyard and spit on the Henderson family's newly-dug plots! I'm sure
they'll be happy to listen to your nonsense.

The townspeople around BOB shake their fists angrily at him, yelling curses. BOB slumps into his pew, defeated.

MARSHAL
Now, men, let's ride!

Every man between the ages of 17 and 70 rises from their seats and begins moving toward the door.

MARSHAL
Wait, wait, wait! Deputy Don tells me that we only need four men. [Points in quick
succession at four young men.] You, you, you, and you, come with me!

FADE OUT

Flags of our brothers

Flags Of Our Fathers showed how, when you try to market a war, you wind up playing with the rawest emotions imaginable. The sad, sordid, and infuriating story of how the Army mishandled Pat Tillman's death is yet another example.