What's wrong with the "surge"? (4)

Previous posts in this series: grand strategy (1, 2); theater strategy (3).

IN THE NEWS
At the theater level, the Bush Administration’s proposed escalation dos not change the regional balance of power. If you sweep away every other attempt to justify the invasion and occupation of Iraq—the unconventional weapons that weren’t there, the non-existent Al Qaeda/Ba’athist connection, the attempt to implant democratic institutions—the strongest argument left for fighting in Iraq is any effect it might have on Middle Eastern politics. Maybe the war might give regional trouble-makers like Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria pause. Perhaps the war might moderate the Sunni-Shi’ite rift, if for no other reason than Iraq shows the horrible turn sectarian disagreements can take. Maybe the investment of blood and treasure might demonstrate the West’s willingness to invest more in resolving the Middle East’s problems.

Unfortunately, to achieve ambitious goals, the United States will need more than an additional 21,500 troops. Iran continues to benefit from the Iraq war, a painful truth that no short-term battle for Baghdad can change. The US has little leverage over Syria. Nothing has changed the US relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates. Most painfully, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict gets little American attention, and certainly does not change as a result of the “surge.” The Bush Administration’s “new” strategy does not commit Americans and Europeans to greater efforts in the Middle East. In fact, the meager scale of the "surge" implies that the US may not be able to sustain its war effort for much longer.

The “surge” is not the dramatic mobilization that might have a chance of changing some elements of the Middle Eastern balance of power. This short-term, small-scale escalation is not the pebble that begins the avalanche of change. It is, obviously, a last-ditch effort to salvage a failed strategy. The “surge”does not change US goals at the theater level  to something attainable. (He might, for example, have spoken of containing the violence in Iraq, while shifting attention to the Israeli-Palestinian problem.) The “surge” also does not provide adequate means to achieve whatever the goals are at the moment.

Bush has made a fetish of staying in Iraq, just as Lyndon Johnson became fixated on staying in Vietnam. However, by the time Johnson left office, the US government had already started the slow disengagement from the Vietnam War. In other words, Johnson was already willing to admit that, at the theater level, there were matters more important in Asia than just Vietnam.

In contrast, Bush has proposed to divert more resources into Iraq, which means they will not be available in Afghanistan and other places. The “surge” reduces American freedom of action in the Middle East (not to mention other theaters), based on the remote possibility that a short-term troop escalation will somehow unravel the Gordian knot of the Iraq war. Unfortunately, as we’ll see, this proposal has little chance of working at the operational and tactical levels.

Comments

[sglover]

The “surge” reduces American freedom of action in the Middle East (not to mention other theaters), based on the remote possibility that a short-term troop escalation will somehow unravel the Gordian knot of the Iraq war.

Do you believe that this is really true, though? I mean, do you think that Bush and Cheney and the gang honestly expect ANYTHING to result from the "surge"? I don't see any strategy at work, other than running out the clock and dumping the whole botch in the next guy's lap.

[sglover]

Ach, I forgot to put quotes around your statement...