EBO in the USA

IN THE NEWS

FX-Based seems to be a blog devoted to the defense of "effects-based operations," or EBOs. To quote from one recent post:

First of all, EBO is a methodology, an approach and a way of thinking used for planning, executing and assessing operations and not a new "theory" of war or a particular strategy. It is not an "easy-win concept", but rather a cross-dimensional, cross-discipline way of thinking that seeks to integrate all the instruments of power to the maximum extent possible.

EBOs, the author argues, are not "miracle strategies," the way some critics have argued. World War II provides some fuel for this debate: was strategic bombing supposed to win the war single-handedly, or was it merely an adjunct to Allied theater strategy?

It would have probably been more costly, in terms of lives and aircraft, to send C-47's full or paratroopers and drop them directly on top of the engine factories and Romanian oil fields. The best way to attack those targets, at the time, was using long-range bombers. Today, we would use stealth bombers with precision weapons and cruise missiles, technologies not available during WWII.

I think it's a mistake to be too humble about what EBO theorists—Duohet and Doolittle before World War II; Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, and their brethren during the Cold War; the "military transformationists" behind the American "shock and awe" strategy in 2003—have thought or said. If effects-based operations are nothing more than an adjunct to traditional military strategy, why does they need their own term (and inevitable acronym)?

There's no doubt that strategic bombing played an important role in defeating Germany and Japan in World War II, as did other forms of strategic warfare. Submarines, an old instrument of strategic warfare, had crippled Japan's war economy long before the Enola Gay dropped the next generation's strategic weapon on Hiroshima.

But that's not what Duohet, Wolfowitz, and other members of the EBO school have been arguing. Instead, they've claimed that attacks on the strategic foundation of an enemy's warmaking ability can single-handedly win a war. Conventional and unconventional munitions dropped on population centers can terrorize civilians. Attacks on the engines of the war economy—factories, railroads, ports, etc.—can bleed the enemy dry.  Destroying communications equipment and killing enemy leaders can erase the enemy's C3I. This ambitious vision of modern warfare fired EBO theorists, not some pedestrian acknowledgement the Allied bombing of Schweinfurt and Ploesti made the German economy less functional.

I'm not sure how comfortable some EBO enthusiasts might be in admitting it, but the most successful practitioner of EBO methods in recent history was President Bill Clinton. Air attacks, not a ground invasion, forced the Serbs to end the wars with their neighbors, eventually leading to the Nuremburg-like trial of Slobodan Milošević.

While you might give Clinton and EBO methods some credit for ending the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, there's a lot more to that particular story. Still, it's a case study with a more successful, less ambiguous ending than strategic bombing in World War II, "shock and awe" in Iraq, the terror bombing of populated areas in the Spanish Civil War, or Operation ROLLING THUNDER. In fact, a lot of the hard-nosed people who might be attracted to EBO often make an argument about the Vietnam War that runs contrary to EBO thinking. According to the Harry Summers-esque view, unless the United States had been willing to escalate ROLLING THUNDER to nuclear levels, the United States could not have defeated North Vietnam without a ground invasion. In other words, even some of the most die-hard defenders of a conventional military strategy in the Vietnam War would not embrace EBO as a surrogate.

Comments

[Rob]

He seems to think that, if we accept a fairly conventional notion of causation, then we have to accept his version of EBO. How strange.

[Sonny]

FX-Based is not solely devoted to the defense of EBO. Read other posts and find out for yourselves. No one on the Allied side during WWII expected the Nazis to surrender as result of the Allied air campaign. The bombing in Europe was part of a greater, combined effort. The Allied air campaing did contribute to the withdrawal of the Nazis back to Germany. Resources that the Germans had to use to repair their infracstructure were resources that did not go to Rommel or Paulus. Was the air campaign against Germany the decisive blow against Germany? Few things in war are by themselves decisive. There's no silver bullets in war.

Since you mention Kahn. MAD. What nation has attacked another with a nuclear bomb since 1945? MAD might sound ludicrous but it achieved the intended effect.

First time I read that Wolfowitz is a member of the "EBO school", whatever that means. I consider him more a member of the "pipe dream-based operations" school. The vast majority of EBO theorist (Mitchell, Deptula, Warden, etc.) are (of have been) practicioners. EBO was not conceived in academia and it's actually practiced every day around the world by many forces, including terrorists who mostly operate using an EBO approach. 9/11 was an EBO; we are still feeling the effects long after the smoke cleared, the rubble was collected and the bodies were buried. The damage extended far beyond thephysical targets.

Regarding "Shock and Awe": Is Saddam in power right now? Shock and awe was succesful in meeting its intended effect: depose the Saddam regime. "Shock and awe" was never meant to address the reconstruction and insurgency.

"But that's not what Duohet, Wolfowitz, and other members of the EBO school have been arguing. Instead, they've claimed that attacks on the strategic foundation of an enemy's warmaking ability can single-handedly win a war."

Find me a quote by Douhet (or Wolfowitz who I don't think even knows what EBO is) that claims that.

There is no such thing as "EBO enthusiasts". EBO is not a hobby. Most people who use EBO approaches actually do this for a living.

ROLLING THUNDER? Not an EBO.

Nobody has to accept "my version" of EBO. EBO plans are very rarely (if ever) formulated by a single person.

Most of the critics only criticize. Seldom they provide viable alternatives. Most of the time they don't have to. We practicioners, on the other hand, have to come up with solutions every day. EBO is just one of the many toola in our toolkit. Take care,

Capt "Sonny", out.

[Rob]

Sadly, I don't have my Douhet with me, but there's no doubt that he (and other strategic bombing enthusiasts, including Arthur Harris) most certainly believed that bombers were THE weapon necessary to win the war. Harris relentlessly fought the idea that strategic bombers should be used for anything other than the destruction of enemy morale; he resented their use against industry, communications, and in a tactical role.

[Rob]

On the question of what Douhet believed, let's ask Lt. Colonel Richard H. Estes, USAF:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/6win90.html

"Douhet believed that, with the advent of technology, the army and navy had become "organs of indirect attrition of national resistance." The air arm, on the other hand, could act directly to break national resistance at the very source. But not just any air force would do. Douhet rejected the idea of an auxiliary air arm of the army or navy or a collection of "knights-errant" flying fighters. Rather, he called for a fleet of massive, self-defending bombers that would dominate not only the enemy, but also the military budget of Italy--or any other country that would listen to his ideas. He wanted an air force that could win not just air battles but total command of the air. This command of the air would have a debilitating effect on the capability of land and sea forces, which would be relegated to a secondary role in future conflicts. The army and navy would remain part of an "indivisible whole" of the three armed services but would no longer be a significant factor in successfully resolving a war.7 With the ascendance of the air force, "the history of the war ... presents no more interest."8"

[Sonny]

Fair enough, however the influence of Douhet's writings on current EBO approaches (and the Air Force) should not be overstated. Also, remember that Douhet was writing during the initial years of air combat. There's is usually a tendency to overestimate (or at least misjudge) the impact of new technologies. Douhet also assumes that if you create and atmosphere of terror in a population through aerial bombardment, a sane leader will eventually surrender because the population will rise up and revolt. Based on our experience since WWI, we know this is seldom the case. Even Billy Mitchell, a comteporary of Douhet, did not entirely spouse Douhet's ideas. Neither did the Air Corps Tactical School later on. Most current airpower thinkers clearly acknowledge and recognize the limitations of Douhet's theories and, more importantly, of airpower itself. An effects-based approach to operations (with all its limitations) is, however, not exclusive to the application of airpower, and not exclusive to the Air Force. Again, I would like to see alternatives to this approach other than "Only killing wins wars".