IN THE NEWS
A few days ago, I posted a critique of a thoughtful essay on FX-Based, a blog that is sympathetic to the "effects-based operations" (EBO) school of thought. You can read the rebuttal by Sonny, the author of the original FX-Based post, in the comments section of my response. Let me continue the dialogue here.
[Sonny:] Regarding "Shock and Awe": Is Saddam in power right now? Shock and awe was succesful in meeting its intended effect: depose the Saddam regime. "Shock and awe" was never meant to address the reconstruction and insurgency.
"Shock and awe" didn't depose the Ba'athist regime. In fact, it manifestly failed. Remember the prepatory bombing that was supposed to decapitate the Iraqi leadership? Not only did it miss the intended target, but it also didn't compel the Iraqi military to surrender. In fact, it was a far less impressive display of air power than the weeks of bombing in Operation DESERT STORM that preceded the "ground war."
While this result wasn't surprising at the time, recent revelations make it even more consistent with many observers' expectations. The recent Foreign Affairs article, "Saddam's Delusions," provides some new insights into the people who were supposed to be affected by effects-based operations. Unfortunately, the articles' conclusions point in the opposite direction of what "shock and awe" advocates had claimed. Hussein's regime was already politically fragile. If his generals were unwilling to make a Stalingrad-esque defense of Baghdad, Hussein's time was clearly up--as long as ground forces were poised to achieve that result.
[Sonny:] "But that's not what Duohet, Wolfowitz, and other members of the EBO school have been arguing. Instead, they've claimed that attacks on the strategic foundation of an enemy's warmaking ability can single-handedly win a war."
[Sonny:] Find me a quote by Douhet (or Wolfowitz who I don't think even knows what EBO is) that claims that.
Fair enough. Unfortunately, Duohet is not commercially available in English translation (he was an Italian general between the two world wars). Since I'm not at a university library at the moment, I'll fall back on my copy of the essay, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists", by David MacIsaac, included in Makers of Modern Strategy. To date, I've never heard anyone take issue with this summary--feel free to quote Duohet back at me, if your references contradict this characterization of his ideas.
...Duohet's theory of war broke down into a few key points that might be abbreviated as follows: (1) modern warfare allows for no distinction between combatants and noncombatants; (2) successful offensives by surface forces are no longer possible; (3) the advantages of speed and elevation in the three-dimensional arena of aerial warfare have made it impossible to take defensive measures against an offensive aerial strategy; (4) therefore, a nation must be prepared at the outset to launch massive bombing attacks against the enemy centers of population, government, and industry--hit first and hit hard to shatter enemy civilian morale, leaving the independent government no option but sue for peace; (5) to do this an independent air force armed with long-range bombardment aircraft, maintained in a constant state of readiness, is the primary requirement.
That's exactly the reading of Duohet that informed the "shock and awe" theorists of the Cold War, the government and think tank strategists who looked for ways to win a war with the USSR, the PRC, or other adversaries through strategic nuclear attacks. It's also the sort of approach that, out of desperation, many governments with no other good options hope will work. However, wishes and theories are not the same thing.
[Sonny:] ROLLING THUNDER? Not an EBO.
Au contraire, Operation ROLLING THUNDER was one of the purest applications of Duohet-style EBO in the last 50 years. The Johnson Administration, unwilling to trigger a theater escalation like the one that occurred when US forces invaded North Korea, used strategic bombing in an effort to force the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to make peace with its South Vietnamese and American adversaries. If MacIsaac's summary of Duohet doesn't sound enough like ROLLING THUNDER to you, here's a quote from the Pentagon Papers, in which the US government outlines its rationale behind the strategic bombing of the DRV:
1. We emphasize that our primary target in advocating a reprisal policy is the improvement of the situation in South Vietnam. Action against the North is usually urged as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an important but longer-range purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South--in the minds of the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres...
In other words, ROLLING THUNDER was supposed to strike at the enemy's willingness to continue fighting via the National Liberation Front. Later, the modifications of ROLLING THUNDER--the gradual escalation, the pauses, etc.--were part of a very Duohet-like strategy against the North Vietnamese regime's willingness to sustain its war effort.
[Sonny:] There is no such thing as "EBO enthusiasts". EBO is not a hobby. Most people who use EBO approaches actually do this for a living.
That's a snide way of trying to deflect criticism by taking issue with a particular choice of words. If I had said "EBO advocates," would you have objected that EBO isn't a political action committee?
[Sonny:] Most of the critics only criticize. Seldom they provide viable alternatives. Most of the time they don't have to. We practicioners, on the other hand, have to come up with solutions every day. EBO is just one of the many toola in our toolkit.
That's an even more snide deflection. If you read this blog (see the "Core Topic" postings to the left for some examples), or many others like it (see the list of blogs to the right), you'll find that many people critical of "shock and awe" and American strategies in Iraq have been taking great pains to propose alternatives. Rather than invent new doctrines, we've been falling back on the battle-tested methods used to defeat terrorists and insurgents. The problem is, people high up in the Administration weren't interested in hearing what has worked before, until long after "shock and awe," "tipping points," and other overheated fantasies devolved into more prosaic, more protracted realities.
Either EBO is some new approach, worthy of its own acronym, or (as Sonny himself seems to say at the end of this post), it's old strategies dressed up in new rhetorical clothing. Either way, EBO isn't worth that much consideration.
[P.S. What exactly is a "methodology," other than one of the several layers of strategy? And what great wisdom does the rather pedestrian quote Sun Tzu ("You have strengths and weaknesses. These come from your position.") convey, other than re-state the obvious?]
Excellent discussion. I have seen Bobby over at "Bobby's World" talk about EBO also in a bit more depth. It struck me as strategic planning "metrics and measures" applied to warfare, a nice methodology for Pentagon planners but if (1) you don't pick the right metrics and measures and (2) you don't adjust one's practices based on trends pointing out your strategy isn't working; then strategic planning or EBO isn't going to help.
I saw an article noting that Columbia's drug trade is booming and increasing despite continued US funds and support to the military. Where's their "EBO"?
Posted by: J. | 05/22/2006 at 06:50
...And the Taliban is mounting a counteroffensive. In other words, they seem neither shocked nor awed.
Posted by: Kingdaddy | 05/22/2006 at 08:25
Kingdaddy,
Thanks for the links to FX-Based. I might respond to your comments in the near future. Nice swipe at my Sun Tzu quote. There's quite a bit of wisdom in that quote. Alas, the English word "position" does not quite convey the concept of "xing", which is means both our physical position and our condition. A closer translation would be "shape" or "form", but that's still lacking. Defeating or surpassing our opponents can be useful, but only if it improves our position, our xing. Beating opponents does us no good if it leaves us in a worse position than before.
EBO's are not exclusive to airpower. Please read this article from The New Yorker, detailing the effects-based campaign led by Col McMaster in Tal Afar. http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060410fa_fact2
An effects-based approach to operations is, at the very least, worthy of some consideration. It's an approach that goes beyond the mere enunciation of the layers of strategy.
Why EBO needs it own acronym? When has the US military shied away from assigning an acronym to a concept or object? Why do we call a "business trip" a TDY, a move a PCS, we work in AOCs and TOCs, move trough LOCs, have DEROS when we go overseas, follow our TTPs, write CONOPS, eat MREs, drop GBUs, load LGBs, submit RFIs, strike JDPIs or DMPIs, build a MAAP, work as an IWO or CCO, fly an ATO, ask the SIDO, make sure we have CSAR, go to SERE training, brief the CFACC, call the ASOC, the list goes on...Conversations would take forever if we did not use acronyms.
Posted by: Sonny | 05/22/2006 at 21:45