Counterinsurgency is hard, part I

THEORY
Twenty years ago, when I first started seriously studying revolutionary conflicts, I was immediately struck by the extreme challenge that governments face when fighting guerrillas. The Iraq war has given the American public a fresh appreciation of this important point. At the same time, the point is often lost amidst a great deal of confusion between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, "nation-building" and purely military questions, the defects of an indigenous regime and the problems with the American occupation.

Counterinsurgency is inherently challenging, since it often requires vast social, political, and economic changes. Counterinsurgency requires a military approach that's wholly unlike the doctrines that guide how conventional armed forces train, equip, and organize themselves. Both of those statements do not apply to counterterrorism, which in nearly every way is an easier challenge than counterinsurgency. The more we conflate counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, the more we miss the real opportunities and challenges in these two different realms of warfare.

The other great source of confusion about counterinsurgency lies in the American perspective on world affairs and our own national history. We tend to frame successes and failures in purely American terms., Watch the best-known films about the Vietnam War—Apocalypse Now, The Deer Hunter, The Green Berets, Platoon, Full Metal Jacket, etc.—and you'll learn a great deal about the American side of the war. The Vietnamese themselves, however, are nearly invisible in these stories. The same one-sidedness of this perspective on the Vietnam War often extends to autobiographical accounts, political histories of American intervention in Vietnam, and operational studies of particular battles or campaigns. Americans treat the most infamous counterinsurgency war in the nation's history as if it were a failed engineering project. Depending on whom you read, the problem with the Vietnam War was the restrictions on attacking North Vietnam, a theater strategy that used conventional techniques against an unconventional opponent, or simply a lack of appreciation for how much success the US actually achieved.

However, as I discussed in earlier postings about the general principles of strategy, war is never comparable to an engineering project. Vietnam was never just another battlefield like the Ardennes Forest or the Korean Peninsula. As in all wars between governments and revolutionaries, the United States was an important supporting character, but not the main protagonist.

A government does not need to completely collapse for the insurgency to exist. In many cases, the government is simply unable to control enough of its sovereign territory to prevent a guerrilla movement from taking root. In other cases, the government may be effective—perhaps brutally so—but is seen to be unrepresentative of major ethnic, regional, or sectarian groups. It's hard to say that the American Civil War happened because the government in Washington was weak. Quite the opposite: the future leaders of the Confederacy were worried about the power of the federal government to block the expansion of slavery into new territories. It's important, therefore, to shed the unstated assumption that guerrilla warfare is the offspring of governmental failure.

A complex framework of associations and attitudes hold all societies together. The government plays an important role in maintaining this framework, tying down some supports over here, urging citizens to strengthen these braces over there. Societies like the ones today in the United States, Japan, and the European Union are extremely complicated. However, modernity isn't the only source of that complexity: Whatever shape Afghanistan has taken in the last two centuries has been built around a complicated and shifting framework of clan and religious associations.

Insurgencies occur when elements of the societal framework unravel, or people deliberately sunder the bonds that hold sections of it together. Governmental failure is one possible source of weakness, but not the only one. For example, when a minority group dominates control of the state, as the Maronite Christians did in Lebanon, or Sunnis did in Iraq, important parts of the framework of power, authority, and largesse are pulled out of alignment with the rest of the framework. That's a better metaphor for the conditions under which insurgencies arise than a simplistic (but dramatic) picture of a regime in complete disorder.

The strains that damage or cleave the societal framework arise from several regular sources. The history of every guerrilla war starts with the recitation of some elements from this list:

• Painful societal transformation. The society is undergoing cultural, economic, or political transformations faster than the architects of the framework can re-build key parts of it. For example, many insurgencies start with the shift from subsistence to commodity agriculture. Rural populations see the normal class structure changed, often to their detriment. Their livelihoods are suddenly at risk. A way of life centered on the village changes as agricultural workers move geographically and economically from job to job. Elites that once protected the villages abandon their old roles in search of the greater wealth, prestige, and power that the new economy offers.
• Weak national identity. The hardest challenge to the societal framework exists when major portions of the population simply want to leave it. In many cases, the society, such as it is, was hastily erected during the colonial occupation of the region. However, you can't blame colonialism or its aftermath for everything. Long before the British ever arrived in the Indian subcontinent, irredentism was a challenge for the leaders of every major political configuration, from the Mauryan kingdom to the Mughal empire.
• Established corruption and repression. Irredentism is not the only thing that can weaken the bonds of legitimacy, however. Economic and political corruption can sever the ties between many citizens and their government. Meanwhile, the groups that benefit from this corruption reinforce the parts of the framework that benefit them. Repression can tighten some parts of the framework, but only at the expense of adding even greater strain against it.
• Social distance between elites and the rest of society. Whether the contract is regularly sworn, as was the case in European feudalism, or is codified in a constitution, as is the case with most modern societies, some compact exists in which the rulers swear to represent and protect the ruled. As mentioned earlier, societal transformations can jeopardize this contract, if for no other reason than the superficial appearance of elites changes. As Gaetano Mosca points out in The Ruling Class, the Polish nobility ruled harshly, but they looked, spoke, and acted like their fellow Poles. The first major challenge to their legitimacy came when they adopted Continental manners, culture, and language.
• The regime's inability to mute or redirect conflict. Official government institutions, such as elections, are important channels for disaffected groups that might otherwise take up the gun. As my fellow political bloggerMatt Shugart can tell you, formal mechanisms for the distribution of parliamentary seats can go a long way towards strengthening the bonds between a government and its citizens. Informal mechanisms for the muting and re-directingconflict, such as patron-client networks, are also worth mention. What the government cannot provide, the wealthy and powerful may be able to handle through less official channels.
• Memories of violence and outrage. Past catastrophes can weaken the societal framework, making it difficult to rebuild with the same strength it once had. Major events—for example, the infamous La Matanza massacre in El Salvador—can be as important as a cascade of smaller instances of repression, corruption, and violence.

While all of these represent threats to the regime's ability to suppress or defeat an insurgency, they don't in and of themselves explain why counterinsurgency is as difficult as it seems to be. To answer that question fully, please bear with me as I stretch the "societal framework" metaphor a bit more.

Suppose that you are standing with someone on a rickety, swaying catwalk. People who have traversed this catwalk know the precise steps needed to cross it without causing its collapse. For example, if you shift your weight while walking though a particular section, holding on to the left chain (but not the right one!), you can traverse that stretch of the catwalk safely.

Suddenly, while you and a colleague are standing on the catwalk, one of the chains snaps. The catwalk sways even more violently, threatening to toss both of you to your deaths. Your colleague only knows how the catwalk has worked in the past, so he insists on following the same delicate series of steps. You're worried that the old methods aren't going to work, now that the missing chain has entirely changed the load-bearing characteristics of the catwalk. Unfortunately, your best advice sounds like complete madness to your colleague: "If we use this nylon rope to tie down one section—and I know we've never used a rope before to do this—and we cut this other chain, balancing the weight better, we should be OK, as long as we take a completely new series of steps along the catwalk."

You wouldn't be surprised if your colleague rejected your bold plan, no matter how right you may be. This fictional situation is analogous to the real situation governments fighting insurgencies face. Leaders cannot step outside the societal framework to fix it. Instead, they have to radically alter it in unfamiliar ways that may present new, even greater dangers. For example, outside counterinsurgency experts may advise a government that the best way to defeat guerrillas is land reform. The shift to commodity agriculture may have wrecked the lives of so many people that substantial re-distribution of agricultural land is the only way to regain the population's trust and allegiance. However, the people listening to this advice are usually the same people who are most benefiting from the new commodity-based rural economy. Even if they're not the direct beneficiaries, these leaders may depend on the patronage of the latifundia for their current position in the government or the military.

Some additional challenges to fixing the societal framework while standing inside it include the following:

• Illegitimate leaders can't sell legitimate solutions. Once the government loses legitimacy with significant portions of the population, it cannot regain it overnight. Worse, these same leaders are the ones responsible for arguing for their own legitimacy. If you've been cheated by a used car dealer, you're probably not going to be interested in hearing how he won't cheat you again if you just give him another chance. You're equally unlikely to follow his recommendation for a different car dealer.
• Identity politics is about more than just dividing the spoils. Frequently, separatist movements start when the government doesn't allocate seats in the legislature, control of key ministries, lucrative contracts, or other commodities to be had. However, identity politics, the root of irredentism, is not just horse-trading among groups over government spoils. Inequities may sharpen differences among groups that don't trust each other directly, or who don't want to be part of the same society at all.
• Security forces are as much the problem as the solution. When threatened by guerrillas, the prop on which governments first lean is the security apparatus. However, the military and police may be the chief source of the brutality and graft that give the guerrillas a strong political argument against the current regime Asking the security forces to assume primary duty for defeating the insurgency may easily turn out to be a greater license to commit theft, torture, and murder.
• It's hard to reform while under siege. Governments under siege look for dramatic measures. People who advocate slow reforms, whose immediate effects may be impossible to measure, often don't get the audience they deserve.
• Outrage may be muted, but it doesn't necessarily disappear. There's an important difference between re-building trust and silencing anyone who voices distrust. Repressive measures may create the temporary appearance of calm, as was the case in the Diem regime's crackdown on its political opponents, or the Somoza government's temporary defeat of the Sandinistas. Meanwhile, antipathies lie just below the surface, waiting for a chance for an even more violent eruption.

Given this picture, you might conclude that counterinsurgency is impossible. That would be a mistake, since approximately half of all guerrilla movements in the last century failed. Usually, the guerrillas have themselves to blame as much as the government: for example, the ELAS movement in the Greek Civil War fought a series of conventional battles that could have been avoided, ran contrary to the principles of guerrilla strategy, and proved disastrously ineffective. At other times, the government deserves the majority of credit for defeating the insurgents, such has been the case in the Philippines for the last five decades.

However, it's important to be circumspect when defining victory. Rarely do governments completely eradicate guerrilla movements. In the case of the Philippines, the Hukbalahap movement disappeared, but the Moros remained, albeit contained to the remote regions of the Philippine Islands. (In fact, the original movement has now added an Islamist faction, Abu Sayyaf, which has collaborated with Al Qaeda.) Some guerrilla wars end with the government and the insurgents agreeing on a power sharing arrangement or elections—or both, usually in that order. Victory means the end of the major threat. Eradication of the threat, or elimination of the guerrillas as a political movement, is not required.

PRACTICE
Leaving the United States out of the picture for the moment, you can see exactly how challenging the counterinsurgency war in Iraq is for the new Iraqi government itself. The "societal framework" of Iraq was a colonial creation, a new territory that the British created to reward the Hashemite dynasty for its support in the Arab Revolt. Iraq's geography contains the landscape of Sunni-Shi'ite conflicts, such as the shrine of the martyred Ali in Karbala. The Ba'athists unleashed violent repression that sharpened divisions among Kurds, Shi'ites, and Sunnis. Hussein exacerbated these divisions by giving Sunnis—and members of Saddam Hussein's clan in particular—dominance of the government and military.

The new generation of Iraqi leaders bring their own set of baggage. Many former exiles may feel comfortable in the American and European corridors of, but they appear foreign to many Iraqis. Some who stayed in Iraq may have collaborated with the Ba'athists more than they should have, if their only goal had been survival. Repression afforded little opportunity for different groups to work together, or even maintain regular contacts with one another.

As I said earlier, the societal framework does not have to collapse entirely for an insurgency to start. Given as fragile as Iraqi society already was, it would have been surprising had there not been an insurgency following the overthrow of the Ba'athist regime. The only hope there was of preventing a guerrilla movement from coalescing, or containing it once it had taken shape, was to preserve a major portion of the military, police, border guard, and intelligence units from the old regime. While some leaders, such as the officers who led the attacks on the Kurds and Marsh Arabs, clearly should have been removed, and agencies like the notorious Mukhabarat dismantled, some portion of the security forces should have remained intact. Without it, there was nothing to stop the insurgency, which formed almost immediately after US troops entered Baghdad. (The invasion of Iraq concluded in April 2003; the first significant insurgent attacks occurred just one month later, in May.) The Ba'ath Party's strategy of organizing irregular Fedayeen units is partly to blame for the insurgency's rapid outbreak, but the diverse Iraqi insurgency includes a lot more than just disgruntled ex-Ba'athists.

The worse news from Iraq, however, isn't the latest suicide bombing. The increasing reports that newly-trained Iraqi units are torturing and murdering civilians changes the whole course of the war. (Click here, here, and here for some of these accounts.) Hastily-trained soldiers, thrown into perilous situations like the ones found in the narrow streets and shadowed houses of Iraq, are likely to shoot at nearly anything that looks like it might be a threat. The strains of constant danger, the personal moral crises soldiers face when they realize that they've shot the wrong person, the messages from political and military leaders about the insurgents hidden among sympathizers in the population, combine to create cynicism, fatalism, and brutality. With weak leadership, no experience fighting a counterinsurgency war, and a history of distrust among clans and sects, the worst crimes can be executed under the banner of fighting the insurgency.

The pressure to turn out more conscripts only increases the likelihood of further torture, blackmail, kidnapping, and assassination by the very people responsible for winning the precious trust and respect of the Iraqi population. Not only is the Iraqi government losing what little control it had over the security forces, but the United States is simultaneously helping and hurting the situation. Unfortunately, where it can help, the US government often lacks adequate means. Where it is hurting, the Bush Administration shows no realization of the problems it is creating. I'll discuss these points in more detail in the next "official" post, covering the counterinsurgency challenges a great power patron faces when supporting a besieged government.

Comments

[J.]

This is an incredibly valuable post you've written. I doubt that many people, even in the military, have considered the differences between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Very nicely done, sir.

[J Thomas]

Very very good.

If you republish it elsewhere, it might be good to have a short section on terrorism and anti-terrorism, to highlight how it differens from insurgency and counter-insurgency. While these differences should be obvious to the discerning reader, a short description might help the rset of us.

[Matthew Shugart]

Excellent post. (Seems I say that a lot here.)

I am hoping for a Kingdaddy critique of the two very interesting articles on counterinsurgency in the Dec. 19 edition of The New Republic. (You do still read TNR, don't you, Kingdaddy? It was you who got me started on it many yers go!)

[breaker]

The assumption that indigenous muslim populations can be won by such obsolescent and failed methods as "nation building," appeasement handouts, and other bribes is both utterly falacious and demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of muslim pyschology. Pouring billions into buiklding up the infrastructure of enemy nations has never worked before and it will not work now. The ugly truths about fighting muslim imperialism are denied in every way. The domestic left's politically imposition of exaggerated "Rules of Engagement", "Laws of Warfare" and the total emlimination of any reasonabe coercive questioning (thus destroying HUMINT)is nothing more than sabotage of America's warfughting effort calculated to cause the defeat of America.
High Ranking US Army Officers Who Are ACLU Operatives
In another example of the Pentagon's public relations effort, it brought in Marine Corps Colonel Dwight Sullivan, a veteran of six years on staff with the ACLU, to be chief defense counsel for the Pentagon's military tribunals. Sullivan has a long and well known history of leftist, anti-American subversive activities. His selection by “the Pentagon,” (who in the Hell selected Sullivan and why?) is a key indicator that unknown Pentagon decision makers are allied with, or part of, pro-muslim, anti-American leftist subversive elements.
In the past, Sullivan has championed homosexual special privileges as being superior to those of non-homosexuals. He has also been a strong opponent of Christianity who has fought to keep the Ten Commandments off public property.
So far, Sullivan has represented numerous individuals have been charged before military commissions or tribunals. He is in liaison with a coterie of neo-Marxist federal judges linked to the ACLU. The first hearings presided over by Sullivan took place in a makeshift courtroom in Guantanamo Bay in August 2004. In November a federal district judge in Washington ruled the commissions were illegal, bringing the process to a halt. After a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court, Pentagon officials said trials would soon resume.
It is instructive to study ACLU operatives within the Pentagon. A native of Silver Spring, Md., and a graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law, Sullivan began his military career as a prosecutor in Okinawa, Japan, in 1987. After just one year, he was reassigned to the appellate defense division of the Navy and the Marine Corps, where he took on the case of a Marine Corps clerk convicted of murdering his supervising officer and murdering and sexually assaulting the officer's wife.
When Sullivan came into the case in 1989 with another junior military lawyer, the defendant, Lance Corporal Ronnie Curtis, had already been sentenced to death. The first thing Sullivan and his co-counsel did was prepare a motion arguing that they were not qualified to provide representation in a capital case. The motion resulted in the appointment of experienced death-penalty defense lawyer Robert Morin. Now a judge on the D.C. Superior Court, Morin is a card carrying leftist.
Sullivan put in roughly four years on the case, a special allowance made for Sullivan but disallowed to all non-minority or non-leftist defended soldiers being tried by military courts. Ultimately, in 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces set aside Curtis' death sentence because his trial lawyer “hadn't raised mitigating factors in his defense.” The left hardly ever loses in US military or civilian courts.
Sullivan handled other interesting cases as an appellate defense lawyer. For example, he fought a Marine's conviction for engaging in consensual sex with a potential female recruit. He got that charge dismissed, but lost on a second count that the man had oral sex with the same woman. "They said Article 125, which is the military sodomy offense, makes it a crime just to have oral sex," Sullivan says. He appealed, but lost. "It would have come out differently after Lawrence v. Texas," Sullivan argues.
The unusual nature of some of Sullivan's cases drew interest from regional ACLU chapters. After being approached by ACLU recruiters he publicly identified with the neo-marxist ideology of that organization.
In 1997, Sullivan was teaching evidence law at the Naval Justice School in Newport, R.I. (a hot bed of leftist military lawyers), and saw an advertisement for an opening at the Maryland ACLU. Ready to leave active duty after 10 years and interested in returning to Maryland, he applied for the job and was hired.
In his six years as managing attorney in the ACLU's Baltimore office, Sullivan won a case striking down the state's anti-sodomy statute and fought off a referendum to repeal a gay rights law. He participated in anti-Christian First Amendment litigation that challenged a Ten Commandments monument in Frederick, Md., and in another case that contested the public school system's Easter holiday.
Sullivan also continued to push reforms to outlaw the death penalty for blacks. In 2000, when aides to then Maryland Gov. Parris Glendening and state lawmakers agreed to fund a study of racial inequities in the application of the death penalty, Sullivan was at the negotiating table.
In January 2003, as the country prepared to go to war in Iraq, Sullivan was called up to active duty. High ranking Clintonian leftist cliques within the Pentagon foresaw that US military officers, working from inside the military, could utilize lawfare to aid America’s enemies. They could also serve as leftist spies within the military.
Colonel Sullivan was assigned to the case of death row inmate Jesse Quintanilla, a Marine Corps sergeant. Sullivan presented the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Criminal Court of Appeals with more than 100 reasons that Quintanilla's 1996 death sentence for the murder of his unit's executive officer was improper. None of his objections were truly based on legal fairness. For example, one of his arguments for retrial was: “A military prosecutor kept the murder weapon after the trial and had it mounted on a plaque as a trophy.” The court set aside Quintanilla's death sentence.
The ACLU has infiltrated the upper echelons of the Pentagon. The generals and colonels who are members and active agents of the ACLU must be identified and repudiated. Top US armed forces officers working for a known leftist subversive organization is unacceptable.
The Weird & Treasonous FBI, Allied With The ACLU

FBI officials who were interrogating terrorism suspects at the U.S. detention site at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2002 and 2003 strenuously objected to aggressive techniques the military was using to interrogate terrorists and believed that "such methods are illegal," according to FBI memos .
FBI agents wrote several documents spelling out why they are at odds with interrogators working for a Defense Intelligence Agency human intelligence group and with guidance from senior Pentagon officials. The agents also repeatedly expressed their concerns to the senior military officer at the base -- Major General Geoffrey Miller -- and argued that the less aggressive FBI-approved methods were more effective. However, that claim has proven to be false on several occassions in the past. (See Quikmaneivers publication: FBI Treason Conspiracy)
“Although MGEN Miller acknowledged positive aspects of this approach, it was apparent that he favored DHS's interrogation methods, despite FBI assertions that such methods could easily result in the elicitation of unreliable and legally inadmissible information," one FBI agent wrote to senior FBI officials in May 2003, referring to the Defense Humint Service. The current FBI, under its pro-Muslim director, nicknamed "Gestapo Mueller," has constantly worked to "represent the 'rights' of foreign terrorists since 9/11.
Army General Miller later traveled to Iraq and oversaw all detention operations there.
The American Civil Liberties Union, which obtained the FBI memos in a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, first released versions of them in December 2004. Memos released thereafter included previously blacked-out statements and detailed discussions of FBI's concerns.
"Now we can say that the documents show conclusively that abuse and torture at Guantanamo was not the result of rogue elements but was the consequence of policies deliberately adopted by senior military and Pentagon officials," ACLU attorney Jameel Jaffer said.
Lt. Colonel John Skinner, a Pentagon spokesman, said a series of investigations and reviews have shown that Defense Department officials never encouraged or condoned abuse. "No matter how hard some may try to manipulate documents and information to support their myth, the facts tell a different story," Skinner said. "Guantanamo remains a safe, humane and professional detention operation."
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approved an expanded list of interrogation tactics in December 2002 for use on important terrorists. Rumsfeld later rescinded the list. A military investigation, convened by ACLU allies within the Pentagon, into allegations of abuse at Guantanamo Bay found the cumulative effect of the detainee's treatment was abusive, but not illegal.
FBI documents also show that FBI officials declined to get involved in investigating the Abu Ghraib abuses in January 2004, days after officials learned there was photographic evidence of abuse and several months before they became public.
"First, the matter truly is outside our mission and would squander resources," an FBI official wrote on Jan. 22, 2004. "Second, we need to maintain good will and relations with those operating the prison. Our involvement in the investigation of the alleged abuse might harm our liaison." The FBI's ant-military, pro-terrorist stance has already alienated that part of the US military that remains pro-American.
The other armr of the subversive federation working within America, the media, has worked hand in hand with the the ACLU for years. For example, the leftist Associated Press cordinates its lawfare activities with the ACLU.
A federal judge ordered the Pentagon to release the identities of detainees at Guantanamo Bay to the Associated Press (AP), a move that would force the government to break its secrecy and reveal the most comprehensive list yet of those who have been imprisoned there. The AP has been seeking the information since it filed a lawsuit in 2004. The AP has a long record of treason against the United States and is controlled by a clique of fanatic neo-marxist Arabists. The AP is a tri-traitor organization. The agency circulates distorted leftist propaganda disguised as “news.” (Many local newspapers within the US will not report any news story that is not sanctioned, reported or guided by the AP.) It also carries out treasonous “lawfare” against the best interests of the American people and in favor of America’s enemies. In addition, the AP makes news by its overt aggressive acts. The total of theses three treasonous categories of operations has failed to precipitate ant federal investigation of the AP in spite of numerous complaints.
U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff, a leftists, anti-American “jurist”, in New York gave the Defense Department a deadline to release uncensored transcripts of detainee hearings. Previously released documents have had identities and other details blacked out.
THE FRUIT OF FBI, ACLU, AND MEDIA SUBVERSION
Veteran military interrogators say the public release of the Army's new restrictions on techniques tip the hand to terrorists and enemies worldwide, virtually ruling out the possibility that prisoners will offer up any effective intelligence in the field.
While interrogation instructors are currently undergoing four-hour classes, and the Army is spending millions dispatching mobile training teams to all corners of the world, those with expertise in battlefield human intelligence say the restrictive policies will mean more combat deaths and injuries and more successful terrorist attacks.
America's police departments are allowed to use more intensive interrogations of petty criminals than the US military can apply to murderous Muslim terrorists, thanks to the ACLU. The new ACKU-instigated terrorist interrogation policies now require techniques formerly considered routine in the questioning of hostiles to be approved by high-ranking officers.
For instance, the relartively mild technique known as "Mutt and Jeff," or "good cop, bad cop" in civilian terminology, now requires approval by a full colonel. Use of the "False Flag" technique, in which interrogators pretend to be from another country, requires approval of a colonel. The technique of "separation," which can mean up to 30 days of solitary confinement, now requires approval by a general.
Critics who have employed workable interrogation techniques successfully for years in military situations say that the new ACLU-inspired "pro-terrorist" requirements alone would ensure that little meaningful intelligence could be extracted from prisoners. But worse, they say, is the fact that U.S. enemies around the globe now know just how far U.S. interrogators can go – thereby making it easier to withstand the pressures applied on them.
"Do our combat brigade and division commanders have time to review these requests for every single terrorist detainee?" asks one veteran interrogator? "Of course not," he answers. "What is not stated is that in order for these commanders to approve these techniques, the judge advocate general has to approve it. The military police commander has to approve it. And the medical staff has to approve it, before the commander will authorize the technique. The reality is none of these approaches will ever be run, and in the worst case scenario – you find a terrorist bomb cell leader who's got 10 guys planting IEDs today, you will not be able to do anything to him before your soldiers and/or Iraqi civilians die."
One critic said "tactical HUMINT" – meaning human intelligence gathering – is now a dead concept as far as effectiveness is concerned. "The worst thing is that the new manual has been released, with no secret amendments totally unclassified to the world – not even 'for official use only,'" said a field interrogator with experience in Iraq. "All the briefers were honest enough to state that every terrorist entity in the world is now fully aware of all of our techniques and all of our limitations and, therefore, is prepared to resist. The rationale is that the Army and the DoD (Department of Defense) want no bad press and doesn't want anybody in the world to think we are doing anything 'sneaky.'" The ACLU is effectively murdering the most important intelligence gathering method, HUMINT.
The new guidelines are laid out in Field Manual 2-22.3, "Human Intelligence Collector Operations." "FM 2-22.3 is an important part of the Army's commitment to improve human intelligence operations, including interrogation operations," explained Lt. Gen. John F. Kimmons, the Army's deputy chief of staff for intelligence. "It broadens the functions and capabilities of our HUMINT soldiers and incorporates lessons learned into our doctrine. This FM represents the result of a very extensive coordination process throughout the Department of Defense involving our most senior leaders and combatant commanders."
As the Army explains it: "The new manual clarifies military intelligence and military police roles and responsibilities; specifies requirements for non-DoD access to detainees under DoD control; specifies that commanders are responsible and accountable for compliance with provisions of FM 2-22.3 and for ensuring humane detainee treatment; and notes that all military personnel are responsible and accountable for immediately reporting suspected detainee abuse."
The new manual, in accordance with Geneva Conventions, explicitly prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and is in complete compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. "The new FM builds upon previous doctrine, incorporates lessons learned, and provides clear and specific guidance to commanders and soldiers in the field on the conduct of HUMINT operations," said Thomas Gandy, director of counterintelligence, human intelligence, foreign disclosure and security.
Effective human intelligence and interrogation operations are more important than ever to meet the intelligence requirements of our forces operating for extended periods in complex, irregular warfare environments, he added.
The new manual was designed to deal with the kinds of abuses revealed by the Abu Ghraib scandal, but even before the manual was released publicly, veteran interrogators said the new procedures would cut down on the amount and quality of information about impending attacks by terrorist enemies. In any event, the so-called Abu Ghraib”scandal” was a tempest in a teapot. No real torture was being carried out. Yet the arch-journalistic traitor Seymour Hirsh was able to spread anti-American propaganda that was swallowed without any resistance by the duplicitous and deceitful Bush administration. There is no doubt that President Bush works from a hidden agenda that does not favor the best interests of the American people.
One naive military source suggested, sarcastically: "Sounds like we're all going to need good lawyers before we start questioning prisoners." Hell Yes! This is lawfare, not a ballgame on television !
There is the usual confusion emanating from mostly ignorant U.S. military sources, some of whom are astonished the ACLU was permitted to interfere in the interrogations of hardened al-Qaida and Taliban enemy combatants. Where have those guys been?
According to military sources, ACLU lawyers advised the majority of terrorist prisoners that they did not have to answer questions from military interrogators. "It's as if they were shoplifters in the U.S.," said one source. "The lawyers may have left by now, but the damage is done. We’re sending guys down to interrogate on taxpayer's dime for absolutely no reason now."
Apparently, the stupid generals at the Pentagon believe that the presence of ACLU lawyers at Guantanamo will help persuade the world it can give suspected terrorists a fair trial. The ACLU has been at the forefront of accusing Americans with allegations of abuse of terrorist prisoners. Funded by US taxpayers, the ACLU is supposed to protect American civil liberties, not the civil liberties of foreign mass murderous and psychopaths of every stripe. In fact the ACLU is an anti-American lawfare agency and a most serious threat to American freedom because no one effectively opposes their treasonous behavior.
One Example of Hundreds of ACLU Subversive Initiatives
The ACLU employs a covert investigation organization that illegally obtains secret federal documents. The American Civil Liberties Union has released heretofore secret US documents containing disturbing new revelations about the MATRIX database surveillance program, including the fact that it was under the direct managerial control of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and that Florida Governor Jeb Bush gave a personal briefing on the program to Vice President Dick Cheney.
The group also announced that it had written to Nuala O’Connor Kelly, Chief Privacy Officer of DHS, asking her to investigate DHS’s role in the Matrix program. "We were surprised to learn that DHS is playing a central role not only in funding this program, but also in managing it," said Barry Steinhardt, Director of the ACLU’s Technology and Liberty Program. "The federal government’s involvement is eerily reminiscent of the Pentagon’s ‘Total Information Awareness’ data-mining program, which was based on the same concept of sorting through everyone’s data in an attempt to identify terrorists. Congress shut down TIA, and it should shut down the Matrix as well."
At a news conference in Miami, the ACLU issued a briefing paper describing the new revelations and their significance, based on documents obtained from public records requests filed in Florida, Georgia, New York, Utah, and with the Justice Department. "We have long been appalled at Florida’s seemingly central role in developing and pushing this intrusive system in which a government file is created on everyone, whether they are a terrorist suspect or completely innocent of any suspicion," said Howard Simon, Executive Director of the ACLU of Florida. "But perhaps even more disturbing, this revelation suggests that Florida has been no more than a tool of the federal authorities."
MATRIX (the Multistate Anti-TeRrorism Information eXchange) is the latest data-mining program to emerge from the government. This surveillance system combines information about individuals from government databases and private-sector data companies, and makes that data available for search by government officials to comb through the millions of files in a search for "anomalies" that may be indicative of terrorist or other criminal activity.
According to a document obtained through an ACLU open-records request to the state of New York, DHS in July 2003 approved a request for $8 million for the operation and expansion of the Matrix. However, DHS informed Matrix officials that in exchange for the $8 million, the agency would enter into a "Cooperative Agreement" rather than a grant, under which DHS would "maintain managerial oversight and control" of the Matrix.
In its letter to Kelly, the ACLU asked her to conduct an investigation of how the Matrix operates, what the role of DHS has been, and how it has been utilized by the department.
Another classified document obtained by the ACLU indicated that Matrix operators sent to federal law enforcement authorities a list of 120,000 names of individuals who had been scored with a high "terrorism quotient." Seisint, the company that operates Matrix, claimed that scores of arrests resulted from the list. "If this is how our officials are operating in the war against terrorism, it not only raises the chilling prospect that any innocent American could become vulnerable to having their name spit out by some unreliable computer as a suspect, but it fails to inspire confidence in how our nation is being protected against attack," Steinhardt said.
Other documents released by ACLU subversives included Governor Bush’s "briefing points" for a meeting on Matrix with Vice President Cheney, at which he sought the Vice President’s support for additional federal funds for the program. Other documents show that Governor Bush has personally taken a lead role in selling the program to other states.

Chapter 10
Myths About US Interrogation
By Mr. Carol

Our national angst over the use of supposedly harsh interrogation against captured jihadis and Ba’athists has gotten out of hand. What started as an academic nuisance is fast degenerating into a genuine strategic liability.
Recently it was announced that CIA officers may face prosecution for interrogation methods that, although officially sanctioned at the time they were used, have since been ruled off-limits by nervous bureaucrats caving in to the post-Abu Ghraib hysteria. This is even more destructive that it first appears, since risk aversion at the CIA was one of the reasons cited by the 9/11 Commission for the failures that let al Qaeda slip through. Simply put, if you create a climate in which intelligence collectors are constantly looking over their shoulders for fear of offending the political sensitivities of the ACLU and its allies in Washington, you might as well turn national security over to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and be done with it.
Much of the blame for this mess lies with three common myths that distort the way Americans think about interrogation, especially hostile interrogation. Our national interests would be well-served if we put these fables to rest, once and for all.
Myth #1: Hostile interrogation doesn’t work.
The strongest version of this myth involves, not the methods used by American forces in Afghanistan or Iraq, but genuine torture — the tear-off-an-arm kind of approach used by Saddam and al Qaeda. And the idea behind the myth is easy to understand. If a man is being tortured, he will say anything to make his tormentors stop, regardless of whether it’s true. Honesty is the last thing on his mind. Therefore, the argument concludes, we cannot rely on information extracted under extreme duress.
Unfortunately, what substance there is to this line of thought — and there is some — applies equally well to all methods of human intelligence collection. If you are running a spy whose motivation is money, for example, you’re always concerned that he will tell you whatever it takes to keep the cash flowing. Or if you have a foreign government mole who is motivated by revenge for the slights he has suffered throughout his career, you constantly suspect he’s making up stories that put his colleagues and superiors in the worst possible light. Good intelligence officers are forever questioning the veracity of the information their sources provide.
So when a captured terrorist starts talking after 72 hours without sleep, of course we must be suspicious about what he is telling us. But that’s not unique to interrogation, hostile or otherwise. It’s a feature of all HUMINT collection.
The flip side of the coercion-is-counterproductive myth is the belief that straightforward prisoner debriefings are usually good enough. But the fact is, they aren’t. The jihadis are a tougher, more determined lot than we are used to dealing with. Hostile interrogation will sometimes get them to talk, but low-stress interviews hardly ever do. Whatever else one says about coercive techniques, they aren’t being employed frivolously. Our forces are using them to address a very real problem, i.e., the impotence of conventional interrogation when used against the likes of al Qaeda or the Saddam Fedeyeen.
Myth #2: American methods amount to torture.
The ACLU has done our nation a valuable service, no doubt in spite of itself. In late December, the organization released a bundle of declassified (and highly redacted) FBI emails obtained through a lawsuit against the Federal government. The ACLU claims the emails document the torture of prisoners at Guantánamo and elsewhere, which they don’t. What they do reveal, however, is no less important.
First, they give us a picture of FBI Special Agents who, more than three years into the war on terror, are still unable to look beyond the Bureau’s traditional crime-and-punishment view of the world. One FBI official on assignment in Iraq writes, “[W]e have been very careful to instruct our personnel to use only standard interview techniques which we would utilize back home in our regular [law enforcement] work.” Another complains that, in one particular instance, Defense Department interrogation tactics “destroyed any chance of prosecuting this detainee.”
Do these thoughts represent the conventional wisdom inside the FBI? Does a significant chunk of the Bureau actually believe “interview techniques” appropriate for a marijuana grower in Humboldt County are the same ones that should be used against Zarqawi’s head-choppers in Iraq? Or that a top priority at Guantánamo is to make sure captured terrorists can someday face a jury of their peers? If so, we need to rethink the FBI’s role in the war on terror, at least when it comes to international action. (Editors Note: The FBI has been totally subverted by leftist pro-muslims and is part of the problem.)
Second, the emails offer a sketch of the kinds of interrogation techniques the ACLU (and, evidently, some in the FBI) regard as “torture.” Loud music. Bright lights. People yelling. Sleep deprivation. Squatting. Black hoods. Growling dogs on leashes, not physically touching the prisoner. One fellow had to sit on the floor with an Israeli flag draped around his shoulders, while heavy metal blared and strobe lights flashed. None of these sound pleasant. But torture? Come on.
Myth #3: Hostile interrogation violates the Geneva conventions.
This is not so much a myth as an irrelevancy. When thinking about the Geneva conventions, it’s crucial to keep in mind precisely that they are conventions — i.e., rules drawn-up and agreed upon by several parties for mutual benefit. They are practical understandings between nations, not abstract humanitarian principles. The conventions mandate, inter alia, that if your side captures one of my soldiers, you must treat him in certain ways. In return, I promise to treat your soldiers the same. The Geneva conventions are a pact to ensure mutual benefit, not a unilateral gift from one side to another.
From their refusal to wear uniforms, to deliberate attacks on innocent civilians, to the beheadings of prisoners, al Qaeda and company have consistently — in word and deed — repudiated the Geneva conventions and similar notions of reciprocal behavior. “Conventions” are meaningless if only one side affirms them, and there is no reason for the United States to pretend otherwise.
Conclusion
We Americans hold ourselves to high standards, and that’s good. Real abuses that offend our core sensibilities, like the nihilism at Abu Ghraib, should be condemned and their perpetrators punished.
But we also need to think realistically about interrogation. Stress isn’t the same as torture, and loud music isn’t the rack. We must keep these differences clear and distinct, lest we put ourselves at a needless disadvantage.
The author, Mr. Carroll is a former officer in the Clandestine Service of the CIA.

[buy viagra]

Guerrilla warfare is the irregular warfare and combat in which a small group of combatants use mobile military tactics in the form of ambushes and raids to combat a larger and less mobile formal army.

The term means "little war" in Spanish and was created during the Peninsular War. The concept acknowledges a conflict between armed civilians against a powerful nation state army, either foreign or domestic and uses tactics such as ambush, sabotage and mobility in attacking vulnerable targets in enemy territory. The tactics of guerrilla warfare were used successfully in the recent 20th century by among others the People's Liberation Army in the Chinese Civil War, Fidel Castro's rebel army in the Cuban Revolution, and by the Viet Cong, the North Vietnam Army in the Vietnam War, the Kosovo Liberation Army in the Kosovo War and the Bosnian War, and the Irish Republican Army during the Irish War of Independence. Most factions of the Iraqi Insurgency, Colombia's FARC, and the Communist Party of India (Maoist) are said to be engaged in some form of guerrilla warfare — as was, until recently, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist).

[generic viagra]

The more we conflate counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, the more we miss the real opportunities and challenges in these two different realms of warfare.

[caverta]

To be honest, this article made me understand the genuineness. I understood many things, Related to the topic. I keep on wondering why people keep on wondering so much on the topic. People should start reading your blog in order to get maximum information on the stuff. Things will become more significant after reading your articles. The way these article are full of information and the comments posted show the popularity of your posts.

[Discount ugg boots]

In all likelihood,Women Timberlands the Germans could blow a Air Force

Ones hole through one or more sections of it, in which case Women

Parda shoes the French army would have Authentic Air Jordans to rush to plug these holes before the operationally nimble Wehrmacht could exploit them.

Since the Belgian gap was a hole that already existed in the Maginot Line Wide Women Shoes Kid Kicks.

[glass]

I will actually tell you how to grow them, but let me get to the topic of the title first.

[bondage sex]

Very interesting! I have no expert, but I want have to know more and more, on your blog just interesting and useful information.

[lacoste observe]

I have no expert, but I want have to know more and more, on your blog just interesting and useful information.

[buy brand levitra online]

The more we conflate counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, the more we miss the real opportunities and challenges in these two different realms of warfare.

[cameremote.tumblr.com]

Thank you for every other magnificent article. The place else may just anyone get that type of information in such an ideal manner of writing? I've a presentation next week, and I am at the search for such info.

[YouTube]

Great post. I was checking continuously this blog and I'm impressed! Very helpful info particularly the last part :) I care for such info a lot. I was seeking this certain info for a long time. Thank you and best of luck.

[site]

Hey would you mind letting me know which web host you're working with? I've loaded your blog in 3 different internet browsers and I must say this blog loads a lot faster then most. Can you recommend a good internet hosting provider at a honest price? Cheers, I appreciate it!

[grizzlygadgets.com]

That is good news and bad news headlines for players. Rennick is accused of commencing bank accounts under totally different corporation names. The agreement has been very common knowledge since some EIG exhibition in Copenhagen last October. galaxy s3 accessories (grizzlygadgets.com) Samsung Galaxy S3 Accessories (Http://Grizzlygadgets.Com/Accessories-For-Samsung-Galaxy) best iphone 4s cases ipad 3 Cases case for galaxy s3 phone cases for samsung galaxy s3 best iphone case ipad keyboard case iphone 4s covers coolest iphone 4 cases best iphone 5 cases best ipad case (grizzlygadgets.com) metal iphone case Best Iphone 4 Cases best galaxy s3 accessories case for ipad 2 iphone 5 charger best iphone cases iphone 4 case waterproof iphone 4 case galaxy s3 charging case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/accessories-for-samsung-galaxy) best ipad 3 cases iphone 4 cases ipad case cool iphone accessories ipad 3 accessories iphone 5 adapter samsung galaxy s2 accessories (http://grizzlygadgets.com/) waterproof iphone 4 case iphone 5 covers galaxy s3 accessories iphone 4 covers best case for iphone 4s keyboard for ipad Apple Ipad 2 Case ipad mini accessories Ipad 3 Cases ipad 3 Case best case for iphone 5 waterproof iphone 4 case best case for iphone 5 [grizzlygadgets.com] iphone 4 case (grizzlygadgets.com) targus ipad 3 case best ipad 3 cases cool iphone case ipad 2 cases ipad mini cases ipad mini keyboard case ipad 2 leather case cases for ipad 3 iphone charger - http://grizzlygadgets.com/iphone-accessory - cases for ipad 2 phone cases for samsung galaxy s3 Unique Iphone 4s Case best samsung galaxy s3 case best iphone 5 cases best iphone 4 cases iphone 4s case (grizzlygadgets.com) ipad bluetooth keyboard ipad 3 keyboard iphone 4 cases (http://grizzlygadgets.com/) Iphone 5 Accessories iphone 4s leather case best iphone cases apple ipad accessories s3 cases iphone 5 cable case for samsung galaxy s3 custom iphone cases metal iphone case iphone 4 covers best case for iphone 5 iphone 4 aluminum case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/aluminum-iphone-cases) best ipad 3 case galaxy s3 accessories iphone 5 screen protector best iphone 5 cases best ipad keyboard ipad 3 covers mini ipad case iphone covers iphone cases 4 iphone 4 Covers best case for galaxy s3 best case for iphone 4 iphone 5 leather case best iphone 4s cases, http://grizzlygadgets.com/best-iphone-cases, cases for ipad 3 (http://grizzlygadgets.com/new-ipad-3-cases) best iphone case best ipad 3 cases best case for ipad 3 iphone 5 lifeproof case iphone aluminum case [grizzlygadgets.com] ipad accessories cases for ipad 3 Iphone 5 Cases best iphone accessories cases for samsung galaxy s2 iphone 4 case best ipad keyboard top iphone cases (http://grizzlygadgets.com/) iphone 4s case best ipad cover i phone accessories iphone covers - http://Grizzlygadgets.com - iphone 4s cases (http://grizzlygadgets.com/iphone-case) iphone 5 screen protector

[best case for iphone 4]

Plus obtain may not be that will afford the amount of money they are spending on gas while driving as well as forth to the gambling establishment a certain amount of that time period per month. The game comes made with guns, bikini babes, and an Aston-Martin type spy car. ipad 2 case review phone cases for samsung galaxy s3 ipad 2 accessories iphone 4 charger [grizzlygadgets.com] cases for ipad 3 ipad keyboard best cases for iphone 5 ipad case with keyboard top iphone cases galaxy s3 Accessories best iphone 4 Case ipad 4 case ipad case with keyboard Iphone 5 Cases new ipad accessories ipad 2 covers ipad smart cover best ipad mini case speck iphone 4 case aluminum iphone 4 case Iphone 4 Charger - Grizzlygadgets.Com, s3 accessories Metal Iphone 5 Case ipad 2 covers and cases new ipad case ipad accessories (http://grizzlygadgets.com/ipad-accessories) Targus Ipad Case best iphone 5 case iphone 4 case iphone 4 Case ipad charger ipad 3 accessories designer iphone cases best case for ipad 2 case for ipad 2 best ipad case best iphone 4 cases stylus for ipad 3 cheap iphone 4 cases best iphone 4 cases case for samsung galaxy s2 kate spade iphone case cool ipad 2 cases ipad Bluetooth keyboard cool ipad accessories aluminum iphone case galaxy S3 charging case Ipad mini covers Ipad Stand best ipad 2 case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/best-ipad-case) ipad charger custom iphone cases lifeproof iphone case iphone 4 wallet case galaxy s3 accessories (http://grizzlygadgets.com/accessories-for-samsung-galaxy) ipad 2 cases And covers kate spade iphone 4 case mini ipad case iphone covers accessories for samsung galaxy s3 iphone 5 accessories, grizzlygadgets.com, cases for the samsung galaxy S3 ipad 3 accessories best iphone cases ipad keyboard case iphone 5 cases iphone charger Iphone Charger cases for ipad 2 ipad 3 accessories ipad mini keyboard Case samsung galaxy s3 cases ipad mini cover iphone 4 cases (grizzlygadgets.com) iphone 4 covers ipad 2 cases and covers (grizzlygadgets.com) ipad 4 cases phone cases for iphone 4 - grizzlygadgets.com - Iphone 4S Case best ipad accessories iphone cases best iphone 4 cases (grizzlygadgets.com) iphone cases [Grizzlygadgets.Com] best case for iphone 5 cool ipad 2 cases iphone accessories logitech ipad keyboard cool iphone accessories aluminum iphone 4 case best iphone 5 accessories ipad Stand (grizzlygadgets.com) iphone 5 battery case ipad cover (http://grizzlygadgets.com/apple-ipad-cases) Ipad accessories ipad mini case (grizzlygadgets.com) phone cases for iphone 4 ipad case ipad 3 cases best iphone 5 cases best ipad mini case ipad mini covers top iphone cases ipad 3 cases and covers ipad mini cover iphone 5 case ipad mini cases best case for iphone 4

[iphone 4 leather case]

Three five reel slots really are also a big visit with players. While having the success of each of our Internet, the success to the online casino is now also observed. They help a masse of people in getting rid of issues and problems in their personal and a professional life. iphone 4 leather case Ipad 3 Covers best galaxy s3 accessories - http://grizzlygadgets.com/accessories-for-samsung-galaxy?16289 - samsung galaxy s3 case lifeproof iphone 4s case best ipad 3 case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/) ipad mini case best iphone 4 case (Julianne) ipad 3 cases phone accessories best iphone cases (http://grizzlygadgets.com/best-iphone-cases?18595) best iphone 4 case Best Ipad 4 Cases cute iphone 5 cases iphone case iphone 5 bumper case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/iphone-5-case?5555) iphone cases aluminum iphone 5 cases - grizzlygadgets.com - iphone accessories iphone 4s Leather case iphone 5 headphones mini ipad covers ipad 2 accessories logitech ipad keyboard ipad keyboard case iphone 4 case ipad cover with keyboard (grizzlygadgets.com) aluminum iphone 4 case galaxy s3 case iphone 5 accessories ipad case galaxy s2 phone cases best Case for iphone 80 case for samsung galaxy s113 iphone accessories best iphone case samsung galaxy s3 cases mini ipad cases cases for iphone 29 cases for galaxy s95 iphone aluminum case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/aluminum-iphone-cases?28712) unique iphone 4 case samsung galaxy s3 phone cases best ipad mini cases Galaxy S3 Case best ipad mini case ipad 2 cases (grizzlygadgets.com) kate spade iphone 4 case ipad stylus, grizzlygadgets.com, speck iphone 5 case best ipad accessories; grizzlygadgets.com, ipad 3 cases best case for galaxy s54 Samsung galaxy s3 accessories best case for ipad 17 best iphone case cute iphone 5 cases (grizzlygadgets.com) best case for galaxy s91 ipad 2 cases cases for galaxy s68 ipad cases ipad mini accessories cool iphone 5 cases iphone 5 accessories iphone 5 case iphone 5 adapter samsung s3 cases iphone 5 cases iphone 5 case best ipad case best iphone 5 cases ipad 2 cases (grizzlygadgets.com) iphone 5 cases iphone 4s accessories ipad 4 cases ipad accessories iphone 4s case iphone 4s accessories iphone 5 aluminum case (grizzlygadgets.com) accessories for galaxy s46; grizzlygadgets.com, s3 accessories ipad cases iphone 4s cases iphone 5 case (grizzlygadgets.com) Best iphone 4 Cases Ipad accessories iphone 5 accessories; grizzlygadgets.com, best ipad 2 case Ipad Smart cover unique iphone 4 case best case for iphone 5 lifeproof case for galaxy s45 iphone 4s leather case lifeproof iphone 4s case [http://grizzlygadgets.com/?1467] iphone 4 case ipad mini keyboard ipad 2 covers cheap Iphone 5 cases iphone 5 lifeproof case (http://grizzlygadgets.com) iphone cases iphone 4 wallet case (grizzlygadgets.Com) waterproof iphone case iphone 4s Case Ipad mini accessories iphone 5 case iphone 5 aluminum case - grizzlygadgets.com - cheap iphone 5 cases

[grizzlygadgets.com]

They help a much of people in rising issues and problems in their personal and professional life. Individuals are focusing inside extracting more fun the actual free online games-games as a much cheaper and low cost form of entertainment. cool iphone 5 cases (grizzlygadgets.com) iphone 5 screen protector mini Ipad cases galaxy s2 phone cases best iphone case best ipad case iphone 5 accessories ipad keyboard leather iphone 5 cases best iphone 5 case new ipad cases iphone cases (grizzlygadgets.com) best iphone 4 case iphone 4 accessories ipad cases with keyboard cool iphone accessories leather ipad 2 case metal iphone case iphone 5 leather cases (http://grizzlygadgets.com) ipad mini cases ipad stand (grizzlygadgets.com) best iphone 4s cases Iphone 4s Case iphone 5 charger iphone 4s cases (grizzlygadgets.com) best ipad case leather iphone case best iphone 5 cases ipad 4 cases - http://grizzlygadgets.com/apple-ipad-cases?7431, coolest iphone 4 cases s3 case (grizzlygadgets.com) best iphone 4 case best ipad 3 cases aluminum iphone 5 case Iphone Covers kate spade ipad case iphone 5 leather cases samsung Galaxy S3 accessories Iphone Leather Case ipad keyboard (grizzlygadgets.com) ipad mini cases Best ipad Cases ipad 3 cases and covers iphone 5 cases best ipad keyboard case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/best-ipad-case?27687) metal iphone 5 cases (Http://grizzlygadgets.com) Ipad 3 Covers; Grizzlygadgets.Com, best ipad 3 cases Iphone 5 case iphone 4s case iphone 5 case ipad mini keyboard case best iphone 4 case leather iphone 5 cases ipad keyboard - grizzlygadgets.com - samsung galaxy s3 accessories cool iphone 4 cases iphone 5 wallet case iphone 5 screen protector life proof iphone case iphone 4 charger (http://grizzlygadgets.com/iphone-4-4s-Accessory?18876) best case for iphone 5 targus Ipad 3 case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/New-ipad-3-Cases?3708) iphone covers (grizzlygadgets.com) cool iphone case custom ipad 3 cases best iphone 4 cases Iphone 5 Case cases for galaxy s32 samsung galaxy s3 cases (Http://grizzlygadgets.com) samsung galaxy s3 cases amazon - http://grizzlygadgets.com/ - cases for samsung galaxy s78 - grizzlygadgets.com - iphone accessories iphone 5 covers phone cases for galaxy s91 iphone 4s cases custom ipad 3 cases ipad case With keyboard ipad 2 leather case best ipad accessories - grizzlygadgets.com - ipad 3 cases and covers iphone 5 leather case (grizzlygadgets.com) ipad mini cover ipad accessories iphone accessories waterproof iphone case cool iphone covers best iphone cases galaxy s3 case otterbox (grizzlygadgets.com) ipad 3 cases with keyboard (http://grizzlygadgets.com/ipad-3-accessory?13669) unique iphone 4 cases galaxy s3 charging case [http://grizzlygadgets.com] galaxy s3 accessories cool ipad accessories best ipad 3 cases iphone 4 Case ipad cover Iphone 5 Cases iphone 5 charger ipad 4 cases best case for iphone 4s targus Ipad 3 case ipad mini covers ipad 3 cases best iphone cases iphone 5 case (grizzlygadgets.com) phone cases for galaxy s85 (http://grizzlygadgets.Com)

[ipad 3 cases and covers]

Today there is if you have to travel to a casino to play casino free games and you can play the casino games of selection just from the convenience of your homes. All over blackjack the player gains an advantage when occasions has a shortage using cards valued 2,3,4,5 and as a result 6. ipad 3 cases and covers ipad mini cover cheap iphone 4 cases best iphone 4s cases michael kors iphone case ipad mini accessories iphone 4s covers michael kors iphone case iphone 4 accessories (http://grizzlygadgets.com/iphone-4-4s-accessory?12603) best iphone 4 case (http://grizzlygadgets.com) ipad 3 cases cases for ipad 66 (grizzlygadgets.com) galaxy s2 phone case ipad smart cover ipad mini keyboard case speck iphone 5 case Ipad Bluetooth Keyboard (Http://Grizzlygadgets.Com/) Iphone Cases best Case for galaxy S58, grizzlygadgets.Com, Best ipad keyboard best iphone 5 Accessories best Ipad cover (http://Grizzlygadgets.com/best-ipad-case?22388) Iphone 5 charger ipad keyboard case ipad mini case iphone 5 accessories best Case for iphone 5 ipad 2 cases best iphone 4 case galaxy s3 waterproof case ipad Mini keyboard Case iphone 4s case iphone cases ipad Mini Keyboard phone cases for galaxy s76 (http://grizzlygadgets.com) iphone 5 waterproof case iphone 4 cases galaxy s3 case iphone 5 accessories iphone 4s cases iphone 4 case best ipad 3 cases Iphone 4 Accessories best ipad 2 case best ipad keyboard case waterproof iphone case Iphone 4S Cases aluminum iphone 4 case ipad keyboard (http://grizzlygadgets.com/ipad-accessories?7412) Samsung galaxy s3 accessories Ipad 2 Covers best ipad mini cases samsung galaxy s2 case iphone 5 accessories cool iphone 5 cases ipad 3 cases ipad 4 cases best iphone 4 cases ipad keyboards Ipad 2 Accessories best iphone 4 case ipad 3 keyboard case (Brendan) iphone 4 accessories ipad cover with keyboard s3 case logitech ipad keyboard (grizzlygadgets.com) ipad 2 cases samsung galaxy s3 covers iphone 4s case cool iphone 4 cases best ipad accessories samsung s3 Accessories iphone 5 bumper case (grizzlygadgets.com) Samsung galaxy S3 Cases amazon best iphone case best iphone 4s case samsung s3 case - grizzlygadgets.com - best iphone 5 cases ipad case best iphone 5 accessories (http://grizzlygadgets.com/best-iphone-cases?11612) ipad cover With keyboard ipad charger covers for ipad 116 leather iphone case - grizzlygadgets.com, cheap iphone 5 cases (grizzlygadgets.com) iphone 5 aluminum case case for samsung galaxy s3 Targus Ipad Case samsung s3 cases; grizzlygadgets.com, galaxy s3 case otterbox unique iphone 4s case Case For Galaxy S106 Ipad keyboard ipad accessories ipad charger mini ipad Case (grizzlygadgets.Com) ipad 2 covers accessories for samsung galaxy s3 iphone 4 cases (http://grizzlygadgets.com) ipad mini cover - http://Grizzlygadgets.Com/, s3 case galaxy s2 accessories cool iphone 4 case custom iphone case Phone accessories leather iphone 5 cases galaxy S3 Accessories - grizzlygadgets.Com -