IN THE NEWS
It's beginning to feel that history is taking a hand where individuals are failing. The debate over what really drives events, human beings or forces beyond their control, posits a false choice. Talk to people in positions of power and they'll often tell you how powerless they sometimes feel. On the other hand, there are historical moments that definitely would not have played out the way they did, had not particular people occupied important roles. For example, while Germany was undoubtedly going to make Europe go through some rough times while the Germans elbowed their way to the great power table, there's no doubt that Kaiser Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler steered Germany in a particular direction that, had someone else been at the helm, it probably would not have taken. Hitler especially symbolizes in the minds of many students of history not only a monstrous evil, but the principle that, at times, extraordinary circumstances give unusual individuals extraordinary opportunities.
Hitler's golden moment was the simultaneous weakening of German politics and the traditional European balance of power. The Weimar Republic failed to capture the allegiance of enough Germans willing to support it through hard times. French and British power proved incapable or unwilling to check German economic and military expansion, and the Soviet Union nearly opted out of Europe altogether. Hitler, whom Sebastian Haffner noted had an eye for the weaknesses of others, understood that much less stood in his way of his ambitions than his enemies and allies believed.
After enjoying the freedom to reshape Germany and unleash a war of choice, not of necessity, Hitler eventually ran aground on the hard, rocky reality of Germany's military limits. Having rapidly defeated his enemies prior to Operation Barbarossa, Hitler assumed that he would have as easy a time defeating the Soviets, who had seemed inept in their brief war with Finland. However, the German blitzkrieg met its match, not just in the Red Army, but in the vast territory of the USSR. Where the blitzkrieg worked well in the more limited confines of France, Norway, Poland, and other Nazi conquests, it could never be effective in completely running the enemy to ground in the Russian and Ukrainian steppes.
While I could discuss other "golden moments" and the extraordinary people, devils and saints alike, who took advantage of them--Napoleon, the Founding Fathers, Martin Luther King, Augustus--I hope the point is clear. "Golden moments" open different combinations of military, political, and economic possibilities. In some cases, the moment comes to a satisfactory close, when leaders and citizens turn what was once in flux into new, enduring realities, such as American constitutional government after the American War of Independence. At other times, the mistakes made by the very people who once successfully exploited the "golden moment" brings that chapter of history to a cataclysmic finish.
There was a golden moment in 2000. The Cold War had ended, but it was hard to describe what followed as an "international order." Some antipathies--for example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict--survived the Cold War, and new conflicts, such as the Balkan civil wars, erupted. The United States was the sole superpower, but it was clearly not able to dictate what it wanted to the Chinese, the Saudis, or even its German and French allies.
Meanwhile, inside the United States, the traditional balance between Republicans and Democrats wobbled. Perhaps more importantly, the Democratic Party's leaders seemed baffled by the new, energetic constituencies on the right, such as the Christian fundamentalists, conservative radio and TV opinion-makers, and the sub rosa coalition of financiers like Richard Mellon Scaife and the attack groups they funded. Add an electorate increasingly uninterested and unimpressed by politicians, and the stage was set for George W. Bush.
Bush seized the moment to, among other things, try to grab the Middle East by the throat. If you sweep aside the obviously fallacious arguments for invading and occupying Iraq--the phantom WMDs, the nation-building campaign to be headed by a man who campaigned against nation-building, the fictional link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden--you're left with what the neoconservatives clearly wanted: a chance to both erase the obnoxious Ba'ath Party regime and re-write the regional politics of the Middle East in the process.
However, while the United States did well militarily, first against the Taliban and then against the Iraqi Army, it soon reached the limits of its own military power. The Bush Administration's hopes evaporated in the hot, dusty streets of Baghdad, Karbala, Mosul, Najaf, and other Iraqi cities, where it proved incapable of dealing with a relatively small but exceptionally violent insurgency. The golden moment passed, and now the US government has to operate without the freedom of action it once had. The Bush team itself is under political siege, with increasing pressure not only coming from the usual sources, but now from a growing list of Republican politicians and notables unhappy with the stock answers it receives whenever they ask questions about Iraq.
Some of Bush's allies are also facing harder times. The second intifada flourished because Arafat and Sharon both worked hard to keep any negotiated peace from occurring. Now, the Likud has split, with Sharon defecting to create a centrist party. Since no level of reprisal has stopped suicide bombers from killing Israelis, Sharon knows that his political survival depends on taking steps--or, at least, appearing to take them--that the Likud Party would never tolerate. Most Israelis and Palestinians have known that the political destruction of either side in this conflict was never likely. Now, both sides may be more willing to act as though they believe it.
When "golden moments" pass, events may be less dramatic, and progress slower. However, the end result may be more enduring, since the accumulated work of many hands might do a better job than the hurried efforts of a few decision-makers. Many leaders who seize these "golden moments" find how devious history can be.
Where once they felt themselves masters of the globe, they suddenly face a world much different than the one they tried to engineer. Alexander the Great's empire died with him, leaving behind new "successor" states unlike anything Alexander had conceived. When Napoleon's empire collapsed, the nations of Europe committed themselves to balance of power arrangements designed to stop future Napoleons in their tracks. France itself survived and prospered, even without the French imperium. So, too, might the United States survive and prosper, even if the world in a decade looks very different from the one George W. Bush tried to create.
It may be implicit in what you say, but the problem is that golden moments can only be assayed in hindsight. Isn't that the human-affairs hell of it? Even if the hubristic prospector turns out to be right, the moment as it glitters in hand is almost always fool's gold. G. W. Bush & Co. seemed to see 9/11 as a promising flash in the pan. But only history distinguishes the rare element from the dross.
And how's that for crudely overrefining a metaphor?
Posted by: David Ollier Weber | 11/27/2005 at 21:28
Very eloquant and timely - the blogs have Sy Hersh talking about his concern that all Bush does these days is to talk about his legacy and how it will be viewed 20 years from now. As if he ought to be worried... he needs to focus on the present.
Posted by: J. | 11/28/2005 at 05:01
Not crude at all, David.
Posted by: Kingdaddy | 11/28/2005 at 09:54