The troops not in Iraq

IN THE NEWS
Fred Kaplan has a concise answer to the question, What are the 850,000 troops not in Iraq doing?

I haven't said anything about the President's speech earlier this week because, frankly, there wasn't much to talk about. He didn't change the current formula under which we're fighting the war. Had Bush argued for the re-introduction of the draft, the creation of a Middle Eastern version of NATO, the re-organization of the coalition forces under the NATO or UN banner, or the transfer of US troops from other theaters, we'd all have more to talk about.

Here's a key paragraph from Kaplan's article about what "staying the course" under the current formula means:

It would be possible to put a few more of these brigades on the battlefield. Soldiers could be given less training and be allowed less time at their home bases. But the chiefs know that if they did that, they would soon have a disgruntled, ill-prepared Army—and a smaller Army, too, since such strains would torpedo recruitment and re-enlistment rates, which even now are falling well below target. (Soldiers and civilians might feel differently if the war in Iraq were truly a war of national survival or a titanic struggle of civilizations. During World War II, after all, millions were perfunctorily trained before shipping out to Europe or the Pacific, and they stayed there for years until the fighting was over. But the stakes of the present war are far less momentous.)

For regular readers of Arms and Influence, sorry to yet again harp on an old point. If Iraq were important enough to invade, it would have been important enough to declare war against. The fears of nuclear escalation spirals that stopped the United States from declaring war against North Korea or North Vietnam didn't exist in 2003. By confidently planting the flag, the Bush Administration could have mobilized more American resources for the war effort, if needed. Instead, like the English campaign against the rebellious American colonists, the US strategy operates under artificial, counterproductive constraints.

I don't think that it's too late to change the formula, both politically and militarily. US leaders  haven't done so yet.

Comments

[J.]

Well technically you can only count the Marines and Army, since the AF and Navy aren't really doing squat on the ground. So that's a pool of about 525,000 Army and 175,000 Marines, say 600,000, and of that, 135,000 are in Iraq. About 200,000 are probably in training, peacekeeping missions (Bosnia), homeland defense missions or in administrative positions, and about 200,000 others are probably refitting/relaxing from their deployment last year. So yeah, we could probably throw a few more brigades in there, except that would imperil our ability to work another contingency. Like Iran or something... kidding. But going from 700,000 Army guys in the 1990s to 525,000 really put a crimp in our capabilities.

[J.]

You know, I always end up focusing on the active service members and forget about the Reserves and Guard. From that point, yeah, where are all the people? Right now about half the population in Iraq is NG/Reserve, although it is said that this strategy is going away and there will be far fewer NG/Reservists in theater. So from that standpoint, the burden is still on the active force.

[Kingdaddy]

And, as we know, the Guard and Reserves work for short wars (the 1991 Gulf War) and very small long-term commitments (the Balkans peacekeeping operation). A big, long-term deployment? Not so good.

You have a good post today on what our enemies might conclude about our ability to fight more than one war. I'd like to think that the weirdly optimistic talk from the White House about Iraq war is intended to keep the Iranians and North Koreans guessing about our real capabilities. Unfortunately, (1) I don't think they're too puzzled by our current force projection limits, and (2) the Administration's comments seem directed at the US public, not a foreign audience.