Arms and influence

Fart, Barf, and Itch

IN THE NEWS
The FBI has earned its bad reputation for insularity. When the leaders at the top of the executive branch ask for orthodoxy, not measurable results, an already borderline dysfunctional organization can accrue even worse habits:

• The FBI is asking Congress for even broader latitude with "administrative subpoenas," its way of avoiding having to ask a judge for an actual subpoena. Administrative subpoenas allow the FBI to seize private information, often (probably usually) without notifying the target of the investigation. Their track record so far isn't that good, and it's not because the FBI lacks the law enforcement resources to nab terrorists planning mayhem to Americans.
• The FBI has also not asked for as many additional analysts as you might expect, given that counterterrorism is now supposed to be its top priority. On the one hand, to be fair, the FBI isn;t the only part of the executive branch that has been slow to increase its staff of people with the linguistic, cultural, and other skills needed. On the other hand, the FBI pushed hard to be at the center of domestic counterterrorism cases, and to expand its role in investigations abroad. With whom, exactly, is the question.

[Thanks to praktike for the pointers to these stories.]

Grand strategy after 9/11

IN THE NEWS
Many thanks to Armchair Generalist for this pointer to an excellent article by Stephen Biddle, entitled "American Grand Strategy after 9/11." If you're a regular reader of this blog, you know that I agree with his critique: hazy war aims are costing us greatly; we're throwing away tried-and-true methods of combating terrorists; we've defined the enemy so broadly and hazily that we'll never know if we've ever actually won; and so on.

Even if you don't agree with Biddle, these are the terms of discussion that we should be using in our current national security debate.

Is this the end of Doctor Doom?

IN THE NEWS
News items about Abu Musad al-Zarqawi's occasional misfortunes often have an undercurrent of anticipation about them. Shucks, we almost caught him at a checkpoint! Or today: He's wounded! Maybe it's curtains for him!

The implicit hope, of course, is that al-Zarqawi's death would deal a significant blow to Al Qaeda in Iraq. However, chances are that the suicide attacks against Iraqis and Americans would continue.

Zarqawi's organizational and leadership skills are unquestionable. After keeping an Islamist fringe group, Ansar al-Islam, going under the very noses of NATO forces in northern Iraq, he then seized the opportunity to expand to an even bigger organization after the 2003 invasion threw the door open to the entire country. In other internal wars, when someone of his notoriety is captured or killed--for example, Abimael Guzman, the leader of the Shining Path guerrillas in Peru--the insurgency suffers a crippling or even fatal blow.

But, of course, Iraq isn't Peru. Guzman was the guru of the Shining Path's ideology and strategy. Zarqawi, as capable as he is, peddles a fairly commonplace form of revolutionary Islam. The Shining Path was a sizeable guerrilla group, operating across a broad urban and rural front. Zarqawi's current terrorist organization, which is more or less a super-sized Ansar al-Islam, needs very few people to continue its current operations. By now, Zarqawi also has seasoned lieutenants who can take over in his stead. Plus, of course, the theater, operational, and tactical initiative remains in the hands of the insurgents--which is a polite way of saying that Iraq is still a shooting gallery for anyone who wants to kill anyone in the Iraqi and American security forces.

I often wonder if Americans watch too many action movies. There's always a kabuki-like predictability to the denouement of these films: after fighting and defeating the lower rungs of the bad guys' organization, the heroes reach the top, where the ultimate villain awaits for the climactic, decisive battle. Obviously, the job of counterinsurgency or counterterrorism would be a lot easier if you could take out the equivalent of Doctor Doom (pictured here), Professor Moriarty, or the Joker, and the whole structure beneath them would immediately crumble. This type of warfare, however, takes the patience, skill, and diligence needed to dismantle that organization piece by piece. The organization, not the leaders, are the true center of gravity.

Shadowy organizations like Al Qaeda in Iraq often have fissures we don't see, and terrorists frequently make mistakes. However, if someone found Abu Musad al-Zarqawi's body in a ditch today, I would expect the terrorist attacks to continue. We can always hope for a lucky break, but I wouldn't count on it in this case.

Shocking photos!

It's hard to write about the "Saddam Hussein in his pajamas" flap without laughing out loud. (Whoops, already succumbed to the urge.) How dare someone take a picture of the über-villain still awaiting justice! What sort of creature would want to raise questions about why it's taking months and months to complete what should be a slam-dunk prosecution!

Meanwhile, if you need to see something intentionally funny about this incident, click here.

Realpolitik, American style

IN THE NEWS
In foreign policy, it's just fine to put your own country's interests ahead of those of other nations. It's also OK to use public diplomacy to put a fig leaf of respectability over these hard-edged attitudes.

However, it doesn't logically follow that you need to blame other countries for what's obviously your own mistakes. In fact, the more obvious your culpability, the deeper a hole you dig for yourself by childishly pointing the finger at someone else.

Case in point: the Bush Administration's leaked memo about the out-of-control opium production in Afghanistan. Just as our man in Kabul, President Hamid Karzai, is arriving in Washington for an official visit, American officials leak a memo blaming Karzai for not cracking down on opium producers enough.

I can only guess that the Administration is hoping that we've all forgotten the following sequence of events:

1. After the fall of the Najibullah government, opium production explodes under the corrupt mujahideen government. Afghan farmers realize the astronomically higher profits they'll make growing poppies, and smuggling out of the country their processed form, opium, is relatively easy.
2. Later, the Taliban leaders reduce the opium problem, but never completely. The United States and its NATO allies invade Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and its Al Qaeda allies.
3. The United States is slow to deploy military presence needed to contain both the Taliban/Al Qaeda remnants and opium traffickers. The US proves even slower to deliver the foreign aid needed, in part, to remove incentives for opium production.
4. Having lost interest in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration races to an even costlier war in Iraq.
5. Whenever the topic of Afghan aid arises, US officials throw up their hands and say, "What can we do, while we're struggling with the ballooning Iraq crisis?"

Undoubtedly, Karzai and his ministers have made mistakes. However, it's the height of hypocrisy—and embarrassing finger-pointing—to blame Karzai for the latest Afghan opium boom. The more effective the Afghan government's efforts to crack down on opium producers and smugglers, the more threatening the Kabul government looks to the remaining warlords. If the Afghan army and police grow too slowly, the warlords and narcotics traffickers will have an easier time resisting any military or economic threat to their current position. Over time, it will become harder for the government itself to prevent corruption within its own ranks. (It's also not a terribly good sign that Afghan commanders have yet to get any operational authority over joint Afghan-NATO missions.) The Afghan government needs a lot more muscle, a lot faster, than it has been getting. That reality is indifferent to whatever opinion you have of Hamid Karzai as a leader.

The plane truth

IN THE NEWS
I didn't post last week because of a business trip. Sure, it was busy, but the real problem was, believe it or not, lack of Internet access, both at the hotel and at the trade show where our company had a booth. Unbelievable, and highly frustrating.

There was an incident during the trip that highlighted, yet again, the vulnerabilities that still exist in airline security. On the way home, the airline I was traveling got word of an oncoming storm. You'd think a routine affair like bad weather would be easy to handle, but the airline had only one employee working the desk at the terminal. Because of delays, I was actually switched to a flight that had been scheduled to leave earlier, but was delayed by the storm warnings. The plane had been boarded and de-planed twice, so you can imagine the mood of the passengers.

What concerned me, though, was the burden put on this one airline representative at the gate. She was fielding questions, handling complaints, booking passengers on and off the flight, and, inexplicably, policing the open door to the plane. Meanwhile, impatient passengers were walking on the plane without checking in again, so the airline rep had to regularly drop what she was doing and chase them down before they seated themselves again. She didn't catch all of them. In fact, someone booked for a later flight helped himself to a seat on this one.

I've had some mishaps with the TSA before. For example, I absentmindedly carried a Swiss army knife that I normally keep in my laptop case onto a flight. Surprisingly, the screeners missed it.

No security can ever be perfect, particularly when processing the number of passengers and bags at the rate the TSA does. However, the incident last week made me see the strands the airlines contribute to the security web, and what happens when their contributions are weakened.

War and Kulturkampf

IN THE NEWS
Perhaps it's finally dawning on more people that, for a faction of the Republican Party, the goal of US foreign policy after 9/11 isn't simply the defeat of Al Qaeda. Instead, for this radical right coalition, the 9/11 attacks merely energized them for a broader "clash of civilizations," which has both domestic and international dimensions.

Otherwise, how can you explain their willingness to bar women from combat duty, at a time when the military needs everyone it can get? Or, earlier, why was there a decision to dismiss several Arabic translators because they were gay, when turning a blind eye (in other words, actually following the "don't ask, don't tell" policy) seemed necessary for the war in Iraq?

There is a group dedicated to a broad Kulturkampf, both at home and abroad. The dogged campaign to eliminate evolution from Kansas' K-12 curriculum is connected to the effort to send evangelical missionaries (and even Christian rock music) to Muslim countries. Their war is different from the one normally depicted as official US foreign policy. It's also the unofficial campaign of many people in the executive and legislative branches of the US government. It's time for people to stop acting surprised by news items like the ones cited above and recognize this movement for what it is.

WWII: The fascist perspective

IN THE NEWS
Lately, we've been fighting WWII all over again. It started with Bush's speech unexpected critique of the Yalta Conference. Today, we have Pat Buchanan presenting what I can only call the fascist perspective on the war in Europe. I'm not saying that Buchanan is a fascist, but he's basically echoing Hitler's notions about the likely British response to the invasion of Poland:

True, U.S. and British troops liberated France, Holland and Belgium from Nazi occupation. But before Britain declared war on Germany, France, Holland and Belgium did not need to be liberated. They were free. They were only invaded and occupied after Britain and France declared war on Germany – on behalf of Poland.

When one considers the losses suffered by Britain and France – hundreds of thousands dead, destitution, bankruptcy, the end of the empires – was World War II worth it, considering that Poland and all the other nations east of the Elbe were lost anyway?

If the objective of the West was the destruction of Nazi Germany, it was a "smashing" success. But why destroy Hitler? If to liberate Germans, it was not worth it. After all, the Germans voted Hitler in.

Was that worth fighting a world war – with 50 million dead?

The war Britain and France declared to defend Polish freedom ended up making Poland and all of Eastern and Central Europe safe for Stalinism. And at the festivities in Moscow, Americans and Russians were front and center, smiling – not British and French. Understandably.

Um. Yeah. In 1939, Hitler thought that Britain would look at the likely cost of another general war in Europe, realize its natural racial affinity with the Germans, and do effectively nothing on behalf of Poland. He calculated incorrectly. Assessing France as an enemy, he spotted weaknesses that even many of his generals missed, so he already planned on a war with France to avenge the outcome of WWI. Any war with France meant German divisions sweeping through the Benelux countries. Meanwhile, in the East, both Hitler and Stalin assumed a final apocalyptic struggle was inevitable. Hitler saw a final confrontation between the German and Slavic peoples; Stalin imagined fascism, the most militant form of capitalism, turning its deadly attentions to its ultimate enemy, the Soviet state.

In short, Hitler wasn't just reacting to French and British foreign policy. He had a National Socialist programme, and the will to see it executed to its conclusion. The only people who believe in the thesis that, "The Nazis were just responding to circumstances," are Holocaust deniers.

I'm not terribly surprised at Buchanan's Father Coughlin-like outburst. Nor am I surprised to hear George Bush dust off the old canards from the John Birch Society's screeds about Yalta. There is an ugly undercurrent in the radical right's version of recent history--unsupported by the facts, but consistent with a particular ideology. It's hard to know where to start: Overlooking the brutality of the Nazi occupation of Poland, including the infamous Warsaw Ghetto? Failing to count the number of people killed by the Nazis, and then projecting forward to the number of potential victims had Germany not been defeated? The ridiculousness of ignoring Hitler's plan for Weltmacht and Lebensraum?
 
The only people who should be surprised are those who haven't been following the careers of Buchanan and his fellow travelers. So why, exactly, is he still writing a column, appearing as a talking head, and getting the kid gloves treatment by any media or political figure in contact with him?

You may qualify for a civil war!

IN THE NEWS
I have mixed feelings about this Newsday article that's making the rounds in the blogs today. What good does it do to label the conflict in Iraq a civil war instead of an insurgency, the recent troubles, or whatever else you might call it?

First, there are no universally agreed-upon definitions of many of these terms. Professionals who write about terrorism, guerrilla warfare, fourth generation warfare, and the like usually start their books with a statement like, "I am defining [insert term here] the following way."

That's not the same as saying there are no standards. There is agreement among scholars and practicioners of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary warfare about the rough contours of these conflicts. The efforts to delineate crisply-defined edges between different types of combatants or methods is where agreement breaks down. For example, would you equate the Taliban remnants in Afghanistan with the French maquis during WWII? I don't think everyone reading this post would answer in exactly the same way.

Second, common assumptions about the scale of violence needed to sustain a "civil war" are usually wrong. It takes far fewer insurgents to make an insurgency than most people would expect. Only a few thousand Taliban guerrillas--maybe even under 1,000--are sufficient to keep the movement alive and kicking. During many phases of internal wars, the insurgents are merely trying to sustain enough political and military strength to survive until opportunities to expand arise.

Third, what makes a "civil" war is intent, not strength. One side is trying to reshape the political landscape, by seceding, toppling a leader, replacing an entire regime, or just forcing a government to change particular policies.

I know why many bloggers are jumping on the Newsday article. Civil war is shorthand for things are not going well in Iraq. It's also a way of expressing concern that the different ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraq will begin fighting more directly, or new groups who have been sidelined will enter the fray. So why not just say that?

No, we're not out of ideas yet

IN THE NEWS
I had occasion to re-read this year-old speech by Anthony Zinni. I guess I'm a member of the Zinni Fan Club, but I wish I had received a badge, decoder ring, or something.

Zinni's comments still resonate one year later. I appreciate his humility, but his "ideas that are not quite a plan" actually do make sense as the core axioms of a fresh approach to Iraq.