Arms and influence

Mall security guards sent to Iraq

IN THE NEWS
It's scary when the line between reality and the joke news stories in The Onion disappear. Unfortunately, in your web browser, you can juxtapose this news item from The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette with this piece in The Onion.

In the real world, the US Army, desperate to fill troop transports headed for Iraq, drafted (yes, that's the correct word) Frederick Pistorius, who already fulfilled several years of active duty in the Marine Corps and reserve duty in the Army. While you read Pistorius' story, you find yourself hoping, Please God, let this just be a tragic but fixable incident of normal Army FUBAR. Then you get to the part where Pistorius describes his fellow "recruits," none of whom were medically screened, including someone fresh from knee surgery, and you have to admit that the situation is as bad as you feared. (Anyone remember the Volksgrenadiers?)

Meanwhile, in the darkly satiric world of The Onion, one of the lead stories this week is, US To Send 30,000 Mall Security Guards to Iraq. Satire is supposed to resemble reality, not the other way around.

Four views of Fallujah

IN THE NEWS 

Some recent conversations, including Jim G's comments on an earlier post, got me thinking further about the operational objective in the current assault on Fallujah. I've heard a lot of different theories about what the actual goal might be.

I've written a lot about the levels of strategy, how the higher levels shape the ends and means of the lower levels of strategy. The Fallujah assault--an event at the operational level of strategy--is a piece of a larger theater strategy. Depending on what the theater strategy for Iraq is, it may help explain how the attacks on Fallujah unfold, and when they'll end.

#1: A show for the folks at home

Some observers seem convinced that the siege of Fallujah is designed to bolster American public support for the war. If American and Iraqi forces can rout the insurgents in their toughest stronghold, it may sway some skeptics.

If this is indeed the goal, the US military would pursue a low-risk, high-profile strategy, aimed more at the cameras instead of the enemy. In fact, they might even repeat the kind of staged attack used in the Jessica Lynch "rescue," only on a much larger scale.

The problem with this thesis is, the attack seems far more substantive--and destructive--than something concocted to boost public support. The assault--timed for just after the November elections in the United States--involves a substantial commitment of troops (15,000 ground combat forces), an aggressive goal (retaking the entire city), and a serious amount of lead flying. This is no Potemkin attack.

#2: An Iraqi Verdun

Another interpretation I've heard purports that the United States is aggressively pursuing an attrition strategy, using its overstretched forces carefully for the highest possible gain. Given the number of insurgents in Fallujah, its political significance as a symbol of resistance, and the familiarity US forces already have fighting through this particular city, Fallujah seems a logical place for an attack. The goal is to wear down the enemy at the center of their strength. Seizing control of Fallujah denies the insurgents a base of operations, but more importantly, it draws them into a fight where many of them will die.

If this interpretation is correct--and I hope that it's not--it basically tells us that the United States is pursuing one of the worst possible counterinsurgency strategies. We learned in Vietnam how meaningless body counts can be, when faced with a politically determined enemy willing and able to take heavy casualties. Worse, the operational strategy required--assaulting with as much infantry, armor, artillery, and air power the US can muster--is ensured to drive more Iraqis into the arms of the enemy. There will be no middle ground for people caught in Fallujah, just siding with the people levelling their city, and those luring the Americans into creating this kind of devastation. Not only will angry residents of Fallujah join the insurgents, but the large, indifferent political middle, the people who only want to get on with their lives, will have nowhere to go.

#3: A 21-gun salute to Iraqi democracy

The most common perspective on Fallujah argues that the operation is all about the Iraqi elections. If US and Iraqi forces can retake and hold Fallujah, the interim government has a better chance of convincing the larger Iraqi population of its credibility. In several days of battle, according to this view, the Iraqi government will have gone from being a group of well-dressed former exiles to someone who can genuinely take charge in major parts of the country.

If you believe this to be the approach we're taking, or the one we should be taking, everything hinges on the Iraqi army. Everyone knows the US military can seize temporary control of Fallujah, Najaf, Karbalah, or anywhere else it wants to go. The critical question, however, is whether the Iraqi military can take permanent control of Fallujah, once the siege is finished.

Unfortunately, as I argued earlier, this approach seems doomed to failure. The measure of success--keeping the residents of Fallujah safe from further insurgent attacks--is far too high. The different insurgent groups will infiltrate the city, even with a well-trained, sizeable Iraqi force garrisoning it. The city is too big, and high-profile attacks--car bombings and kidnappings, most likely--are too easy to execute. And, needless to say, the Iraqi security forces haven't yet reached the numbers, training, and combat experience required.

<#4: Impressing the enemy with our strength

The last interpretation I've heard has both sophisticated and simple versions, but more or less boil down to the same idea: by dropping the hammer on the heads of the insurgents in Fallujah, we will so impress them with our might that they'll start losing their will to fight. You might call this the counterinsurgency version of "shock and awe," with similar discussions of tipping points, US technological advantages, and the supreme value of firepower.

Let's hope that this is not the actual strategy for ending the Iraqi insurgency. Other combatants in other wars--Afghanistan, Angola, El Salvador, and East Timor, to name a few--have tried this approach to defeat guerrilla armies, and they have uniformly failed.The "hurt them until they say uncle" approach has led to unending carnage, as the counterinsurgent army has tried to find the bottom to the well of violence, the point where the bloodshed has struck so deep that the enemy is forced to surrender. If this is the US/Iraqi plan for Fallujah, we have doomed the already unhappy residents of that city to an unwavering escalation of violence.

The institutionalization of charisma

IN THE NEWS

Since every news outlet is already abuzz about what will happen in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, now that Yassir Arafat has died, I'm going to take a somewhat different slant on the topic. Obviously, this isn't the first time in history that the torch of leadership passes from some founding charismatic figure (in this case, The Chairman) to another generation of leaders. Max Weber called this process the institutionalization of charisma, a painful but necessary stage of development. While this might sound like a dusty, overly academic topic, it actually has direct and vital relevance to American foreign policy towards the Middle East.

Weber wasn't the first person to document this phenomenon--Rousseau's discussion of "the lawgiver" in The Social Contract is essentially an analysis of the same thing--but Weber, in many ways, did it best. Charisma, in Weber's use of the word, isn't about popularity, good looks, a pleasing voice, or some other superficial measure of attractiveness. Charisma, in its original meaning (the one Weber uses), is the rare quality some people have of somehow standing outside the normal constraints of history, steering history instead of being steered by it. Often, the individual in question--for example, Moses, Luther, Buddha, Mohammed, Khomeini--appears to have been touched by the divine. Others--Napoleon, Washington, Lenin, Mao, to name a few--appear to have a conduit to some other greater power, albeit a more secular one. The phenomenon is the same, whether or not God or the gods sanctify the charismatic leader.

While the charismatic leader is alive, events may be tumultuous--wars, revolutions, mass conversions to the leader's new doctrine, huge movements of population--but, in some ways, the situation is simple for adherents: follow the leader. Once the leader dies, however, and no one can take his place, the situation becomes more difficult. If no one can take the leader's place, how then to carry on the movement he started? Who among the surviving leaders can best carry forward this creed? Is there a way to translate the leader's words into law and custom? The schism after the death of Mohammed between Sunnis and Shi'a shows exactly how difficult this transition--the institutionalization of charisma--can be.

Whatever your opinion of Arafat, he had this kind of unique role within the movement for Palestinian independence. After the humiliating defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the current generation of Arab leaders appeared feckless. Attention quickly shifted from the cosmopolitan, traditional Arab notables to a new generation of radical, militant leaders, of which Yassir Arafat as head of the Fatah faction of the PLO seemed the most effective. While, over tea in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut, the notables quibbled over next steps, the young radicals took action. For the many still shocked by the 1967 war, swift, tangible defiance--including, sadly, incidents like the Black September massacre of the Israeli Olympic team--was preferable to doing nothing.

Throughout the next several decades, Arafat certainly had his wins and losses. Arabs were used to this narrative: had not the Prophet fled from Mecca, only to return later as a triumphant conqueror? He also made his fair share of mistakes, such as making public statements in support of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Like Saddam Hussein, however, he was a consummate survivor, and he became a more effective symbol of Arab defiance than Hussein ever was.

Arafat was no lawgiver. Nothing like the Napoleonic code, Shari'a law, or the Ten Commandments will survive him. He has bequeathed, however, the spirit of defiance--often to self-destructive extremes--to the Palestinian movement. When Israelis surrounded his compouned in Ramallah with tanks, even Palestinians who were disenchanted with the elderly Arafat and the corrupt Palestinian Authority rallied to the side of The Chairman. It's hard to imagine that elan disappearing with his death.

For the rest of us mortals who are not charismatic leaders, we have to be more patient with the pace of history, and more circumspect about our ability to affect it. When opportunities arise, therefore, it's important to take advantage of them. Arafat's death is one such opportunity, not only because his personal obstructionism--to the peace process, to reform of the Palestinian Authority, to ceding power to another generation of leaders--is now gone. It's also important to recognize that Arafat's legacy, the institutionalization of charisma, is happening now. However Americans can support Palestinian efforts to move that legacy in the right direction, the US government should seize those opportunities.

The rest of the time, the American role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict moves more slowly, and often less productively. Opportunities have opened before, such as Arafat's sudden humility and flexibility after Operation DESERT STORM. He backed the wrong side, and now he had to be more willing to take steps with the Israelis he otherwise would not have contemplated. The road to Oslo started in Kuwait City; unfortunately, it never stretched all the way to Jerusalem.

Diplomacy towards the Middle East, by necessity, involved a long-term investment of American political capital. The payoff will not come immediately; it will, however, make it possible to seize opportunities when they arise. The less engaged we are, as the Bush Administration has remained (except for its continued backing of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon), the less capable we are of exploiting these opportunities. We don't have the contacts, the credibility, the overall leverage needed to help resolve the strife that fuels or excuses far too many other Middle Eastern conflicts.

The traditional approach to Middle Eastern diplomacy, therefore, is a lot like the work of venture capitalists. You invest your resources in a number of projects, and carefully shephered them forward, using the somewhat indirect means at your disposal. Other parties run the companies in which you invested; you can only hope to influence these ventures through your investment. In contrast, the Bush Administration has behaved more like someone hoping to strike it rich in Las Vegas, betting wildly on high-risk, potentially high-payoff wagers. The gambler doesn't normally sneer at the venture capitalist. The investor is simply trying to make money in a different way than the gambler. Both understand the risks and rewards--at least the successful ones do.

Then what?

IN THE NEWS

The last major assaults on Iraqi cities, including Fallujah, ended with the Marine commander on the scene publicly criticizing the basis of the operation. Sure, US troops fought efficiently and bravely, but what exactly was the operational objective? Now that we're in the thick of another siege of Fallujah, it's worth stepping back from the hourly news to ask the same question: what is the United States trying to do here?

It's hard to tell from the Central Command web site, today's coverage in The New York Times and The Washington Post, or the transcript of the most recent press briefing at Central Command. Naturally, journalists who cover the events of the day ask questions about what, from a military perspective, are lower-level details: how many of the 15,000 Americans have been killed; how many insurgents captured; are the troops encountering boobytraps, and so forth. However, even when asked directly about the overall objectives, Lt. General Thomas Metz doesn't indicate clearly where that bar is set, and how far above or below it you can measure the results of the current operation:

General Metz, based on what you've said, can you give us -- about the insurgents essentially either dying or falling back, can you tell us a little bit about what the overall strategy is for finishing off this campaign?  And can you give us any estimate of how long you think it's going to take, based on what you've seen so far?

GEN. METZ:  As I mentioned, we're a little ahead of schedule.  I would say that the coming days will tell us whether or not the enemy is thickening as he moves back into the city, or we are killing the enemy or capturing the enemy or pushing the enemy back.  I think we're looking at several more days of tough urban fighting.

I'm very pleased at the position that we have the force in right now and the situation that the enemy is facing.  He doesn't have an escape route because we do have the cordon around the city very tight.

The weather is -- was a little less than optimal in the past two nights.  It's now very clear, so that all the assets that we can bring to bear certainly in the intelligence and the surveillance business will assist us.  And I think we are -- we can measure the rest of battle in a number of days.  I do not want to pick a number of days. But I think we are progressing.  And we will see -- as the tempo goes through tonight and tomorrow, we will have a much better feel for whether or not the enemy is thickening and letting us, or he is being attritted in this urban fight such that it'll be a consistent fight here on in.

What's unfolding today is the classic prelude to either victory or defeat in counterinsurgency warfare. It is not the conclusion. It's obvious that, as before, the insurgent forces (who are always nameless in US government statements) hold the option of returning to Fallujah after US and Iraqi government forces seize the city. In fact, according to one account, insurgent groups have shifted their attention to other towns and other targets, including interim Prime Minister Allawi's family. If you strip the news accounts of the more emotionally-loaded language--the heart of the city, intense fighting, battle raging--you have a highly straightforward, conventional assault.

So what, then, is the objective? After Americans and their Iraqi allies re-take Fallujah, then what? It's clear that Fallujah is no Stalingrad: unlike that city on the Volga, Fallujah isn't the key to breaking the enemy's front lines (which don't exist). Nor is it a vital transportation, supply, and logistical hub, in the way that Stalingrad not lay at the intersection of rail and river traffic, but also had a significant amount of Soviet manufacturing capability inside the city itself. In one famous anecdote from the battle, Soviet T-34 tanks rolled off the assembly lines, straight into battle.

The unstated purpose, as one can best guess, of the Fallujah operation, is to make a political statement before the Iraqi elections. If the Iraqi provisional government maintains control of Fallujah, it will demonstrate that it's a muscular, dedicated, and possibly attractive alternative to the insurgents. Of course, it all depends on which insurgent group you're talking about--the Army of the Mahdi? Baathist fedayeen remnants? Bandits? What's highly unlikely is that whoever's in charge of Fallujah will prevent the groups responsible for car bomb attacks, most notably al-Zarqawi's Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad, from infiltrating this city of 300,000 people and carrying out some dramatic terrorist attacks.

Fallujah, therefore, still threatens to become another Stalingrad in a different sense. At the opening of the German offensive in 1942, Hitler's generals worried about the Fuhrer's excessive fascination with Stalingrad's presumed symbolic importance. While Nazi propagandists might make some significant hay from the fall of "the city named for Stalin," in military terms, Stalingrad was far less important than Hitler made it. Where some on the general staff even proposed bypassing the city temporarily, Hitler insisted that Stalingrad must fall. Similarly, in 1954, Dien Bien Phu assumed a symbolic importance far outstripping its real military value. During the Second Indochina War, the American war in Vietnam, Khe Sanh threatened to turn into a similar crystallization of the US war effort--one that could crack or even shatter if the fortress fell to the enemy.

While the operational tempo in Fallujah--attack, withdraw, attack, withdraw--is different than in Stalingrad, Dien Bien Phu, or Khe Sanh, the risk still exists. By making Fallujah too important to ourselves, we can easily lose track of what's really important to the Army of the Mahdi, al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad, and others whom we've named as our enemy.

Weary resignation

IN THE NEWS
Today is, naturally, the day of post mortems. I'll let other blogs comment on the hundred other anglesso that I can focus on just one: the effect on the personnel serving in the national security community.

The good news, on November 2nd, was that there were many highly skilled, experienced, and professional people, in both the civilian and military branches of the US government. They remained willing to serve, despite the extreme frustrations many of them were experiencing. If you read the recent of articles in The New York Times about the legal decisions concerning internees and torture, the failures to heed warnings about post-invasion Iraq, and the counterproductive dismantling of the Iraqi military, you'll spot an obvious theme throughout them. On nearly every important policy issue concerning the wars against the Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Iraqi Baathists, the Bush Administration installed articulate, energetic, loyal, but ultimately inexpert people--Richard Feith, John Yoo, and a string of other familiar names--in key decision-making positions. The Administration narrowed discussion to these deputies and the top Administration officials, cutting out military lawyers on Guantanamo Bay, the State Department experts involved in the Future of Iraq Project, and other experts ready to proffer their best advice. Inevitably, when people with years of experience dealing with terrorists, WMDs, or Iraq tried to press their case, Rumsfeld, Bush, Cheney, and other senior members of the Administration answered their concerns with either dismissiveness or hostility.

Still, many stayed, hoping that the Bush Administration might change its approach, or the election might bring a new team to the White House. If you want a sample of the type of person who feels this strong sense of duty, listen to this interview with Marine Captain Josh Rushing, the Pentagon's press liaison with Al Jazeera during the Iraq invasion. Rushing was a prominent figure in the documentary, Control Room. Watching Rushing, you couldn't help but be impressed with how much his earnestness and skill in defending the Administration was balanced by his open-mindedness and eagerness to talk with Arabs and Muslims.

Rushing admits, by the way, that he was far from the best person for his job. With a copy of Iraq for Dummies in his back pocket, he suddenly became the point man for explaining the Iraq invasion to the Arab world via Al Jazeera. He spoke no Arabic, nor did he have a translator. He was not a country specialist, or even a region specialist.

Still, he tried. He's obviously a smart, educated man. And he left the Marines in disgust after, according to him, extraordinarily shabby treatment.

What concerns me isn't Josh Rushing specifically, though it's a damn shame that he chose to leave the Marines. It's the large number of Josh Rushings in the US government, many of whom were waiting to see what would happen on November 2nd. Rushing would probably still be in the Marines, if he had not been pilloried for what amounts to the best presentation of any Americans in Control Room. (And, again, at the time, he was defending the invasion.) Would he have stayed after yesterday's election? I leave it up to you to decide, once you've heard the interview.

Whatever you might think Rushing might have done, others are likely to leave. Why stay, if your services, as the Times articles outline, are not only not needed, but are extremely unwelcome? Whether you voted for Bush or Kerry, that's a cost that the nation will pay, starting today, November 3rd.

Return of the King(daddy)

IN THE NEWS
After a couple of weeks away from this blog, I'm going to start posting regularly again. I'm happy to say that the job hunt has proceeded well--I've interviewed with several companies, and I'm in the late stages of discussions with a couple--so I feel that I can afford the time to write again. This blog is important to me, as you might tell. However, it also can be a drain on my time and energy, so I needed to put it on the shelf temporarily.

As we got closer to the election, I found that my writing contained more frustration than analysis. That was my cue to take a break, if for no other reason that, regardless of the outcome of the federal elections, I'd still need my objectivity to write effectively.

Anyway, I hope I haven't lost too many readers in the break. It's good to be back. Did I miss anything?