The hyperpower's burden

IN THE NEWS
I recommend reading Eliot Cohen's short piece, "History and the Hyperpower," in the July/August 2004 issue of Foreign Affairs. It's a good thought piece, in the literal meaning of that term. The article is intended to get the reader to think about the US position in the world in a particular frame of mind: the realistic appraisal of what a "hyperpower" should and should not do in its foreign policy. It summarizes neatly the relevant facts (for example, the astonishing conventional military dominance of the US), as well as the important challenges the United States faces (for instance, how smaller actors, like al Qaeda or Saudi Arabia, have the advantage of focus and endurance that the US lacks).

It's a good piece from a level-headed scholar who rarely disappoints. Since one of Cohen's stated aims is to get the reader to think more about useful historical examples that might guide the United States, I'll say that, in my case, he succeeded. He got me thinking again how much more we should be studying the Peloponnesian Wars for lessons, and more importantly, for warnings. Athens, the democratic superpower of its age, pursued an arrogant, corrupt, and ultimately failed strategy against Sparta. It abused allies and enemies alike, rolled the dice on reckless gambits like the Sicilian expedition, and mistakenly trusted leaders like Alcibiades, whose statesmanship, sadly, never matched his popularity.

The other thought I had after reading Cohen's article is how much the military requirements of the United States resemble that of the late Roman empire. Like Rome, the United States needs a quick reaction force that could move to any theater where it might be needed. Like Rome, the US needs to maintain a superiority in fighting ability to offset an inferiority in numbers. Like Rome, US forces need to fight side-by-side with allies (or, in Roman terms, auxiliaries). And, like Rome, the United States needs to be careful as the dominant power to never let a coalition of its rivals form. That's what makes the Bush Administration's bluster hard to take at times--not just because the rhetoric is needlessly undiplomatic, but it's also needlessly provocative to multiple rivals at the same time.

Anyway, forget about my musings, and go read Cohen's article.

Comments

[Aikibrewer]

Perhaps that's why this administration has been so keen to build a missile defense system - not to shoot down enemy missiles, but so that, in a reenatcment of the Mytilenian revolt, they can "recall" one of our own hastily launched weapons before it reaches its target...

Unfortunately, the analogy to the late Roman Empire seems all too apt - surrounded by enemies (some of its own creation), Rome's military needs ultimately outstripped resources. Rome was forced to severely curtail the economic and political rights of its citizens, and increasingly rely on mercenaries to do its fighting, acceding to whatever they demanded as payment, which ultimately became the people and land of the Empire itself.

[Ali]

I'd not be looking at classical Greece or Rome but medieval Europe and the Crusades.

The Crusaders established an outpost of Christendom in Palestine. It was a safer and much more civilised place to live than France for a century. It left no lasting impact but bitterness on the Muslim world.

Iraq looks more like the Fourth Crusade, when the Crusaders sacked Byzantium and never got to Jerusalem.

History, of course, never repeats itself. We aren't the cruel lumpen mass of the Crusaders, the Jihadis are their equivalent.

[Kingdaddy]

Hmmm, maybe to extend the historical parallel with the Crusades a bit further:

There was, needless to say, a lot of genuine piety in the hearts of many Crusaders. For many, taking on the cross was as profound and happy an occasion as marriage, knighting, or other life events.

There was also a great deal of justified fear of "the Saracen." Muslim pirates attacked Christian ships and took slaves. Muslim armies skirmished with the Byzantine Empire. And the Moors had hung on tenaciously in Spain, after one of the most startling invasions of European territory since the Huns or the Magyars.

There was also, of course, plenty of baser impulses at play. Like many of the "continental crusades" (for example, against the Albigensians or the Baltic pagans), the crusaders in the Holy Land were often looking for land, titles, and honors they couldn't win at home.

The parallel to today? Of course, there are people genuinely concerned about threats from the Middle East, and many of them have the best intentions. However, we also have our far share of opportunists. Sorting through this motley crowd is difficult, but necessary. You don't want to give too much credit to some, and not enough to others. Nor do you want to lose track of whose hand is on the tiller (or in the coffers).

[Oscar]

The historical parallels are interesting, but ultimately unpersuasive. Rome at its height could not sow salt like we can. Recall that history is written by the victors, and it is not yet clear that a single Muslim will be alive on Earth in the year 2020.
"Look on my Works ye Mighty, and despair!"