The theater level

THEORY
The next level down in the strategic hierarchy is the theater level. What defines this level is the overall choice of targets: a particular geographical region, or a particular opponent who, in some cases, might not be bound by geography.

Anyone familiar with the history of World War II instantly recognizes theater level strategy for what it is. The United States had a grand strategy--defeat the Axis powers--and to achieve this goal, it fought in the European and Pacific theaters. Nazi Germany had its own theaters: the Western Front, the Eastern Front, and the Mediterranean. Britain fought in Western Europe, North Africa, and Asia. The USSR's main theater was in Eastern Europe, but it also fought smaller skirmishes with the Japanese in the Far East.

Normally, theater level strategy isn't too hard to craft--at least, in figuring out who your friends and enemies are. Military history is often marked by rare occasions, though, when theater level strategy seems dangerously out of whack with grand strategy. One of the great controversies among aficianados of Napoleonic history, for example, is whether France ever needed to invade Russia. Was Napoleon knocking out a powerful opponent before the Russians could cement an alliance with Britain, or was he disastrously jumping the gun?

Just as Napoleon may have overestimated the Russian threat, creating a need for a theater level strategy that didn't serve French grand strategy, other combatants have at times underestimated threats. The classic example is Chamberlain's appeasement policy--at least, in the traditional view that he was hoodwinked by Hitler's promise of peace. Recently, some historians have been arguing that Chamberlain was simply buying time, since Britain in 1938 wasn't ready yet for an unavoidable conflict with the aggressive Nazi regime.

Theater level strategy demands more than just the identification of an opponent and an area of operations. Combatants also need to determine, in broad brushstrokes, how to defeat their opponents. The debate over the Vietnam War often focuses on this aspect of theater strategy. Should the United States have just pursued the Westmoreland attrition strategy more aggressively? Would an invasion of the North brought victory? Would a focus on a different approach to counterinsurgency given the South Vietnamese government enough breathing room to stand on its own, even in the face of its hostile Communist neighbor? How, in any case, would the United States have been able to use its power and leverage to put an end to South Vietnam's political troubles, which threatened to make any military strategy moot?

This leads us to the third aspect of theater level strategy: a definition of victory. Was victory in the Vietnam War the preservation of South Vietnam, mirroring the defense of an independent South Korea? Was it the preservation of US credibility, regardless of the consequences? Was it simple containment? The eradication of any threat from the North? Often, people with opposing views on what went wrong in Vietnam are talking past each other, since they're assuming different definitions of victory in the Asian theater of containment.

One more point is worth making before leaving this summary of theater strategy: what defines the theater for one combatant may not fit anyone else's involved in the conflict. Asia was, for the United States, one of several theaters in the Cold War. What happened in Vietnam may or may not have been important in the Asian theater, but it was small compared to the global objectives of the United States. The Vietnam War was certainly unrelated to the goal of nuclear deterrence. However traumatic the American defeat may have been, in reality, all the United States did was to redraw the perimeter of containment after Saigon fell.

In contrast, there was only one theater for the North Vietnamese regime: South Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia were part of this theater to the extent that they factored into North Vietnamese operations against the South (the course of the Ho Chi Minh trail being one such consideration). Victory or defeat in that single theater was absolute for the North Vietnamese.

Not surprisingly, therefore, many interpretations of the Vietnam War cite the mismatch of wills between North Vietnam and the United States as a critical element. From the perspective of theater level strategy, this insight makes perfect sense. It's an observation worth noting in other situations, such as the history of colonial wars in the 19th and 20th centuries, and even our own War of Independence. For the "locals," there always is just one theater--and, to go back to our discussion of power and leverage, that fact gives the locals considerable leverage over their more powereful enemies.

The essence of theater strategy, therefore, often boils down to choices about this war, at this time, against this foe, with these forces, fought in this general way.

PRACTICE
It may seem odd to describe counterterrorism as a theater level strategy, but that's effectively what it is. If the United States is now in mortal combat with al Qaeda, that group becomes one of our theaters of operations. Al Qaeda fighters may move from Afghanistan to the Philippines to New York, but wherever they are, they've become an important theater-level concern. Put in the simplest terms, American grand strategy demands the protection of defines life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Al Qaeda threatens broadly threatens all three sacred elements of the American way of life.

What makes much less sense, of course, is how Iraq became an important part of our theater level strategy. The most generous argument someone can make includes one or both of the following points:

• 9/11 was bad enough, but an al Qaeda attack with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons would have been far worse. Therefore, we have to work on two tracks simultaneously: (1) defeat al Qaeda and any other groups like it; (2) shut down secret weapons labs, restrict access to WMD technology, and do everything else necessary to eliminate anyplace terrorist might acquire WMDs. If the terrorist and WMD tracks ever do intersect, we'll have failed in our post-9/11 counterterrorist effort.


• Virulent anti-Western Islamist movements in the Middle East attract new adherents every day. So far, we've only affected Middle Eastern politics at the fringes. If we really want to shut down terrorist groups, we may need to take a bold stroke that re-defines the political equation in not jus a single country, but the entire region. In fact, we can't stop at one country, since such a masterstroke could turn into a terrible blunder if the backlash radicalizes more Muslims to join groups like al Qaeda.

Even in this generous interpretation of the Bush Administration's theater strategy in the Middle East and Central Asia, it has turned out to be a catastrophic failure so far. The invasion of Afghanistan made perfect sense. "Going downtown" (to borrow a phrase from the Vietnam War) meant invading to crush both the Taliban and al Qaeda so that Afghanistan could never become a terrorist base again. Many (myself included) have been critical of American follow-through in the Afghan operation. It's understandable that it will take time to stabilize the situation, given the ethnic, sectarian, and tribal conflicts in the country. No one expects an end to warlordism overnight--as President Kharzai readily admits. Victory in Afghanistan will take patience, resources, political skill, relentless pursuit of the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants, and time. However, the United States has done far less than it needed (and promised) to do in Afghanistan--in no small part because the Bush Administration was in a hurry to invade Iraq.

The Administration made an excessively risky bet in Iraq and lost. The WMDs weren't there. (By now, the looping strands of the "not finding WMDs isn't evidence that they don't exist" argument have completely unravelled.) There wasn't even an active WMD program, despite Bush's revisionist claim of "weapons of mass destruction-related programs."

There was no connection between the Baath Party and al Qaeda. The group to which Secretary of State Powell pointed as "proof" of the al Qaeda connection, Ansar al-Islam, was in fact a mortal enemy of Saddam Hussein. Since the post-war plans proved to be threadbare or non-existent, we've created many more enemies in Iraq than we should have.

The regional backlash many feared has in fact happened. The invasion gave anti-Western demagogues the chance to depict US soldiers as crusaders in new uniforms. The Abu Ghraib photos, the siege of Fallujah, American running battles with Sadrist forces, and related events have, needless to say, made a bad situation worse. (Bush's loose tongue about his fundamentalist Christian beliefs haven't helped either.)

Every day, American soldiers who had been safely based in Europe, the United States, or elsewhere in the Middle East are now dying in Iraq. American grand strategy, to the extent that it will eventually require shifting of resources out of Iraq to meet other threats, has also been crippled by the botched occupation. Facing down the North Koreans, who actually do have nuclear weapons, is now much harder, given the self-inflicted wound in Iraq. And we've helped make one terrorist group, Ansar al-Islam, more powerful than it once was--including the power to kill Americans.

Unless there's a dramatic change in fortune, the Iraq War will become the defining example of failed theater strategy for generations to come. The Baath regime was effectively contained, according to experts like former weapons inspector Scott Ritter and General Anthony Zinni, the former CENTCOM commander. Theater strategy in the Middle East was working, to the extent that Iraq posed little or no threat. Saddam Hussein had no WMDs to hand over to terrorists or launch against Tel Aviv. We may have been frustrated with Hussein's continued survival, and he certainly was the nastiest of tyrants. He wasn't, however, a factor in our war with al Qaeda--the part of American grand strategy that shot to the top of our post-9/11 priorities.

Not only didn't the Iraq War contribute to our grand strategy, but US plans (such as they were) didn't even bring real victory in the Middle East or other theaters. As billions of US dollars flow into Iraq to keep the situation from disintegrating further, real priorities--such as the surviving threat of the Taliban, or the frightening revelation that the Libyans received nuclear technology from North Korea--suffer.

The wrong war, against the wrong opponent, fought the wrong way, at the wrong time for our war against al Qaeda. The more you view current events through the clarifying lens of grand and theater strategy, the more obvious and profound the failure appears.

Comments

[Oscar]

I have comments about both parts of this post.
Theory – very well thought out. I particularly like your points about Viet Nam, that much of the argument about that conflict have to do with different theatres and different goals within the theatre as being a big stumbling block among those who discuss this war. These explain, for example, why I think the US won in Viet Nam and you (if I read correctly) think we lost. I think we agree on the events pretty much, just we evaluate them differently for the reasons you explain. The only difference we may have on fact is suggested by your question: “Would a focus on a different approach to counterinsurgency given the South Vietnamese government enough breathing room to stand on its own?” I believe that the RVN’s had gotten to the point of standing on their own until the Kennedy arms embargo killed them, while you apparently do not.

Practice – here our disagreements are more substantial. You seem to see a single theatre war, while I see a two or even three theatre war. My theatres are:
1. al Qaeda and other Salafi-oriented terrorists
2. the failed world of Islam (not identical to the ENTIRE world of Islam, but not conterminous with the Middle East either)
3. A left over remnant of the old Marxist left.

The way I see these relating is that 1. is an offshoot of 2., but which now has allied with various diverse groups which include criminals, non-Islamic terrorists etc. 3. Has no love for either the US or groups 1. and 2., but hopes to get along with 2., and avoid getting in the main line of fire between the US and 1. This latter group is found mostly in Western Europe (ironically much less so in Eastern Europe), parts of South America, China, and some parts of the US itself. The interesting thing about this group is its lack of cohesion on many levels.

Where we agree is that Afghanistan was a part of 1. and that we have completed only the first step there.

I put Iraq in the second theatre, with Iran and SA. I think that Iraq was a reasonable choice as a starting point for getting started in that theatre, but I think that either of the other two might have worked. The advantage of Iraq is that it was an easier first shot than Iran, and that getting the Shi’ites on board to any extent at all in Iraq was easier than starting in Iran. This way we let the internal opponents in Iran do the heavy lifting, although we will have to be ready to help them if they ask us. Obviously SA is more on the direct route to stopping the growth of theatre 1. while also being an important part of 2. The big danger with starting there is that Mecca is there. I think our best shot at handling SA gracefully is to generate enough internal pressure there that the Frankenstein’s monster kills its creator while we watch from the sidelines. If this fails to materialise, we move on the plan B.

I also think we disagree about the facts of how things have gone in Iraq, but these are issues of perception and how we read the various news sources, and I think time will make it clear which of us is right on this.

As to the future, here is what I think needs to be done in all three theatres:
In the First theatre:
Prioritise and shut down the following training areas: Pansky Gorge , Waziristan and any others that we find in Syria, Iran etc.

Deal with the command and control groups in the West. (This overlaps with the second theatre.) Here, oddly enough, France seems to be leading the way in the EU with their recent deportation of radical Islamist clerics.

In the second theatre, work on reducing the attraction that Arabic leaders feel towards terrorism and anti West or anti-Israel propaganda as a protection for their own short comings. Several states in North Africa may be helpful here.

In the third, I think that Wesley Clark’s recent analysis of how America defeated the Soviet Union is on the mark, and that we will have to continue to push the contradictions on the various parties that are still entranced by the Marxist fallacies. This requires engagement with Russia and the former Warsaw pact nations to keep Russia on track and to try to minimize backsliding in parts of the old SU. We need to work China off against North Korea, and we will at some point need to deal with Castro and his few remaining Western friends.

There are other things that need doing as well: fix the UN which is hopelessly flawed IMHO. Try to avert the collapse of the EU, work on the India/Pakistan relationship etc. But we need to fix theatres 1 now, 2 soon and 3 eventually before we can really concentrate on anything else.

[Kingdaddy]

Oscar--

Very thoughtful replies. I hope I do them justice.

First, on the "multiple fronts" issue. I've rarely found someone who thought that the Afghanistan invasion was a bad idea--assuming we completed the necessary work. Our theater strategy seems more focused on knocking over an enemy than making sure that he stays down. US policy in Afghanistan is inexcusable on this point, because (1) we did almost no follow-through after the Soviet withdrawal, so we share the blame for Afghanistan turning into an al Qaeda base; and (2) the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants are undoubtedly our enemy, and undoubtedly the ones responsible for 9/11 (al Qaeda for doing the deed, and the Taliban for sheltering and supporting them).

Iraq, on the other hand, was, as you said, a domino that one could argue needed to fall if you wanted to transform the Middle East, including Iran. However, unless there's a big change in the works, we're not engineering that result. Far from it: we've given the most anti-Western elements in Iran an excuse to purge the ballot of reformist candidates and crack down on dissidents. The possibility raised this week that they might have been behind a massive con job via Chalabi is, of course, reason for pause about our approach so far.

That's not to say that Iraq is a lost cause. What got a lot of people horrified about Bush's speech at Carlisle, however, is that he didn't say anything to indicate that our strategy needed adjusting. He may have been trying to impress people with facts at his fingertips, but current force levels are way below what's needed. And, as I said in my latest post, the number of troops aren't the whole story. It's the operational strategy itself that's missing the mark, too.

I'm also sympathetic with Clark's position in his Washington Monthly article this month. Containment of Iraq was working; invasion (at least the way we did it) has failed to topple the Middle Eastern dominos; in any case, the dominos would never topple quickly anyway. If, as I argued elsewhere, we had focused on Ansar al-Islam, we'd be in a different situation in Iraq today. We'd have rid ourselves of another enemy, allowed the work in Afghanistan to continue, let the UN inspectors finish their work, and position more troops in the theater if needed. If an invasion of Iraq had proven necessary, fine. But there was no proof of a threat, no urgency, no clear picture of how the invasion would lead to regional transformation, no appraisal of the risks, no plan B if plan A didn't work. We gambled far too much for far too little stakes, and so far, we've lost.

It's not impossible to salvage. But it's definitely time to push the uninformed blowhards in the press and the US government to the sidelines and start discussing more realistic, tangible options like the ones you outlined.

It may be, in the short term, painful to do, but if I understand you correctly, I agree that we may have to pull back our defensive perimeter in Iraq temporarily. Rather than doing a poor job everywhere, we need some version of the "spreading stain" model of counterinsurgency a la,/i> Sir Robert Thompson, adjusted to fit local conditions. But we need people who know what they're doing, both in terms of this kind of warfare and this country in particular.

[coach handbags]

As is well known, books teach us to learn life, truth, science and many other useful things. They increase our knowledge, broaden our minds and strengthen our character. In other words, they are our good teachers and wise friends. This is the reason why our parents always encourage us to read more books.

[asics shose]

In the third, I think that Wesley Clark’s recent analysis of how America defeated the Soviet Union is on the mark, and that we will have to continue to push the contradictions on the various parties that are still entranced by the Marxist fallacies. This requires engagement with Russia and the former Warsaw pact nations to keep Russia on track and to try to minimize backsliding in parts of the old SU. We need to work China off against North Korea, and we will at some point need to deal with Castro and his few remaining Western friends.

[Nike Dunk Low]

I've always had a fondness for Nazi aesthetics, myself. Custom Jordan Shoes Of all the things to come out of Nazism, they pretty much top the list. Nike SB Dunks High Tops That doesn't mean that our WW2 memorial should appropriate the Nazi concept- and there's no question that part of the idea is to whitewash our war effort-but I can think of a lot of monuments that are less pleasing to the eye. Air Jordan 6 Rings

[newest air jordans]

Cheap Nike Shox Shoes On Sale! nike basketball shop cheap Air jordan shoes. cheap Jordan Sneakers. cheap kids jordans. Air Jordan Sneakers.HiJordan is a professional store sells Air Jordan Shoes with the best quality and jordan shoes supra shoes timberland ugg boots nike air force one all are very cheap in easyforbuy online store,jordan shoes 1 buy now! nike air jordan spizike.Cheap Jordans|Jordan Shoes for sale.">

[ff14rmt]

rmtなどがそうだ。rmt リネージュ2これらMMORPGといわれるオンラインゲームは、リネージュ2 rmt1つのサーバーに数千人のプレイヤーが同時にログインしゲームを行なっている。ここでいうサーバーとは、物理的なサーバーではない。MMORPGでは、rmt とはサーバーやワールドと呼ばれる単位で複数の同じ世界が存在する。アトランティカ RMT3万人が同時に1つのサーバへアクセスすると処理が重くなってしまうrmt aion

[ohio dermotologist]

It's how the politics of it work currently.

[iphone 4 aluminum case]

All in all, you can game blackjack very effectively! The players will either download the utility and play or consultation the sites directly. The consequent advancement about internet has also showed opportunities for gamers perform free games even way more. iphone 4 aluminum case best iphone 5 case iphone 5 case best iphone 4 case iphone 4 accessories galaxy s2 phone cases iphone accessories cases for galaxy s2 iphone 4s cases best ipad 3 cases (grizzlygadgets.com) Ipad 2 keyboard best Ipad 3 Cases Ipad 2 cover iphone 4 case Case For Samsung Galaxy S3 iphone 4 cases best galaxy s3 accessories (grizzlygadgets.com) iphone 5 accessories iphone 5 covers Iphone 5 Battery Case cases for ipad 2 s3 case best iphone 4s case best ipad 3 Cases ipad 3 covers iphone 4 cases iphone charger iphone cases iphone 5 wallet case iphone 4 case best iphone 4 cases keyboard for ipad 3 (http://grizzlygadgets.com/) aluminum iphone case (grizzlygadgets.com) best case for iphone 4 unique iphone 4 case best iphone 5 cases (grizzlygadgets.com) ipad cases best case for ipad 3 [grizzlygadgets.com] ipad 2 leather case samsung galaxy s2 accessories samsung galaxy s2 accessories coolest iphone 5 cases ipad 2 cases, grizzlygadgets.com, iphone 5 leather case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/) Ipad 3 Accessories ipad cover best keyboard for ipad iphone 4s cases ipad 3 covers - grizzlygadgets.com, metal iphone 5 cases, grizzlygadgets.com, best iphone 4 case ipad keyboard case Best Ipad Mini Case best iphone 4s cases best iphone 5 cases cases for samsung galaxy s2 Samsung galaxy s3 cases iphone 5 Case aluminum iphone case ipad 4 cases ipad mini case ipad stylus best ipad 3 cases samsung galaxy s2 accessories (Grizzlygadgets.Com) best ipad 3 cases (Grizzlygadgets.com) best ipad mini case (grizzlygadgets.com) best case for iphone 5 ipad Case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/ipad-accessories) iphone 5 wallet case iphone leather case cases for iphone 4 (grizzlygadgets.com) leather ipad 2 case Cool iphone 5 cases lifeproof case for galaxy s3 ipad 3 cases (http://grizzlygadgets.com/ipad-3-accessory) ipad bluetooth keyboard unique Iphone 4 cases targus ipad 3 case waterproof iphone case galaxy s3 Accessories Ipad Mini Case, Grizzlygadgets.Com, apple ipad accessories ipad 2 cases galaxy s2 accessories aluminum iphone Case cool iphone 5 cases leather ipad 2 case cases for ipad 3 Ipad Accessories keyboard for ipad best ipad keyboard iphone5 accessories phone cases for galaxy s3 cool iphone 5 cases leather iphone 4 case (grizzlygadgets.com) iphone 5 accessories cheap iphone 5 cases ipad 3 accessories iphone 4 cases ipad 2 cases and covers cheap iphone 5 cases cool iphone case iphone case Ipad cover With keyboard Ipad Mini Keyboard ipad keyboard case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/ipad-keyboard-cases) ipad cover

[iphone 5 accessories]

There are also easier systems, such as the Genius Five count, but these are less accurate and demand that you raise your wagers near a much greater rate. All through 1995 cryptologic software has been around since which gave the complimentary touches to a comprehensive online casino via financial processing. iphone 5 accessories cases for galaxy s2 best case for iphone 4s metal iphone case samsung galaxy s3 case iphone 5 Waterproof case unique Iphone 4 case case for samsung galaxy s2 waterproof iphone case leather iphone 4 case - grizzlygadgets.com - cool iphone 4 cases cases for ipad 3 iphone 5 covers iphone 5 adapter best iphone case iphone 4s cases apple ipad accessories Ipad cover iphone 4 cases (http://grizzlygadgets.com/) cheap iphone 4 cases metal iphone 5 case (grizzlygadgets.com) s3 cases mini ipad cases iphone 5 leather cases [grizzlygadgets.com] ipad mini keyboard Ipad 2 cases samsung galaxy s2 case lifeproof iphone 4s case ipad 3 accessories cases for galaxy s2 ipad 3 covers iphone 4 wallet case Best Case For Iphone 4 cases for iphone 5 best galaxy s3 accessories ipad cases with keyboard ipad mini cases iphone 4 case iphone 5 leather cases ipad mini cases keyboard for ipad iphone 5 adapter iphone 4s cases (http://grizzlygadgets.com) ipad cover accessories for samsung galaxy s3 cool iphone 4 cases cool ipad 2 cases iphone accessories custom iphone 5 cases cheap iphone 4 cases best ipad mini case samsung galaxy s2 cases (http://grizzlygadgets.com/samsung-galaxy-s2-case) ipad case phone cases for samsung galaxy s3 (grizzlygadgets.Com) cheap iphone 5 cases (http://grizzlygadgets.com/iphone-5-accessory) cases for samsung galaxy S2 (grizzlygadgets.com) iphone 5 lifeproof case best ipad 3 cases - http://grizzlygadgets.com/best-ipad-case - ipad 3 accessories iphone 5 case best ipad 2 case best ipad cases cool iphone 5 cases cool ipad 2 cases leather ipad 2 case best iphone case ipad 4 case (Lasonya) phone cases for samsung galaxy s3 ipad 2 case kate spade iphone 4 case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/) iphone 5 wallet case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/iphone-5-case) waterproof iphone 4 case iphone 5 cable iphone 4 Accessories (http://grizzlygadgets.Com/iphone-4-4s-accessory) best case for iphone 5 (http://grizzlygadgets.com) leather cases For iphone 5 best iphone 5 cases iphone cases (http://grizzlygadgets.com/) ipad 3 covers (http://grizzlygadgets.com/ipad-3-accessory) designer iphone cases iphone 5 battery case - grizzlygadgets.Com, iphone case ipad 3 case samsung galaxy s3 cases unique iphone 4 cases ipad covers ipad 3 accessories ipad bluetooth Keyboard metal iphone 5 case (http://grizzlygadgets.com/) iphone 5 cover samsung galaxy s2 case iphone 5 chargers iphone 4s accessories leather ipad 3 case galaxy s2 covers iphone 5 case (grizzlygadgets.com) iphone 4 cases ipad smart cover ipad 3 cases and covers new ipad cases ipad mini keyboard case iphone 4 Leather case ipad cases with keyboard cool iphone case ipad 2 cases Ipad 3 Cases best iphone 5 accessories