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03/27/2007

The skeptical eye

Just when you thought it was safe to trust National Intelligence Estimates again, ArmsControlWonk dissects the problems with recent NIEs about Iran's nuclear program. Fortunately, the more skeptical view arrives at a happier conclusion:

Recent public statements suggest that a new forthcoming NIE on Iran’s nuclear program will not significantly alter this estimate.  This is not to say that Iran is not making progress toward mastering enrichment, but merely that time remains for diplomacy.

In a similar vein, the Wonkster also takes a second look at the Tarhuna "weapons facility." In the 1990s, US officials warned that it was probably a Libyan chemical weapons facility. Er, um, wrong. There may have been good reasons to be suspicious, but US intelligence professionals seem to have lacked the hard evidence about Tarhuna that they had about its "sister" facility at Rabta.

Saints! Idiots! Nukes!

When you read the headline, "Rain KO'd Interceptors During Korea Missile Tests," what's your first reaction?

  1. Idiots! These [defense contractors/pro-SDI politicians/military professionals] are not to be trusted!
  2. Saints! They persevere, despite the highly slanted press against them!
  3. I don't know!

I strongly suggest that, if your reflex is either #1 or #2, you reconsider your approach to life, technology, and the news. Read the article, including the comments. Here's the picture that develops:

  • The fact that the ABM system was under construction, and the level of rainfall was "unprecedented," challenges the "They're all idiots" interpretation.
  • However, the contractor that built the silos seems to have done a crappy job.
  • Neither of the previous two points invalidates the idea of building an anti-ballistic missile defense.
  • On the other hand, there's no way of telling how well the Fort Greely defenses would work, were ICBMs fired in anger.

If there's anything the last several years should have taught us, it's the danger of jumping to conclusions, with limited information, about inherently complicated questions.

08/05/2006

Guerre revolutionnaire, again

IN THE NEWS
This article from Parameters neatly summarizes the problems with the French counterinsurgency strategy in Algeria. Their failures is a cautionary lesson tale for today:

French doctrine, tactics, and procedures had fundamental weaknesses
that ultimately contributed to the loss of Algeria and almost led to civil
war in France....

The ideological and spiritual nature of the conflict was internalized by many in the French Army and became one justification for torture. They saw the enemy as communist and therefore as inherently evil. The struggle was one of ultimate national and ideological survival.

Everything said about the Iraqi insurgent groups, or the Taliban, may be exactly true. What matters is winning the political argument. Being in the right is not enough, and being self-righteous is a surest way to lose.

04/03/2006

The India deal

IN THE NEWS
It's good to be "bold" or "nimble," as this Washington Post article depicts the Bush Administration's recent overtures to India. It's also worth taking a deep breath, ignoring the "Rice for President" rumors for a moment, and asking yourself, What is the United States getting out of this deal?

The headline, "India Nuclear Deal May Face Hard Sell," doesn't begin to describe the problems the deal has created, not solved. While the article focuses on Congress' likely resistance, in part because the Administration has completely sidelined them in this venture, there are a lot of other problems with the deal. Undoubtedly the biggest is the Administration's decision to ignore the Non-Proliferation Treaty in its haste to play tertium gaudens against India and Pakistan. Fred Kaplan nicely summarized the many ways in which this treaty undermines, not strengthens, international constraints against nuclear proliferation.

Was this deal the only way to get a closer relationship with India? Mmmmm, maybe. Even if that supposition proves to be true, would a warmer relationship with one emerging nuclear power be worth weakening or eliminating non-proliferation efforts elsewhere?

Lessons from Libya

IN THE NEWS
Another thanks to Armchair Generalist for the pointer to this analysis of Libya's abandonment of its nuclear program. The conclusion: the invasion of Iraq had, at most, a marginal effect on this decision.

Libya has been increasingly isolated since the collapse of the USSR, its chief patron, and the Lockerbie bombing, Qaddafi's biggest miscalculation. Like Castro, Qaddafi has been focused on survival since the Soviet Union evaporated. Unlike North Korea, Libya never had a large enough military to maintain the threat to its neighbors, even as its tanks, artillery, aircraft, and economy decayed. Unfortunately, also like North Korea, Libya did business with the A.Q. Khan network. The Libyan regime abandoned its nuclear program long before it progressed to where its Iranian, North Korean, and (of course) Pakistani counterparts are today.

Ironically for an age when Americans dread the combination of nuclear weapons and terrorism, it was terrorism that undid Libya's nuclear program. Libya was already a pariah before Pan Am 103 exploded over Scotland. Libya's invasion of Chad turned into a farce; Qaddafi's anti-Western posturing led to a humiliating series of economic sanctions and tangles with the US military; his arrogance isolated him from other secular regimes in the region; his attempts to dress himself in the garb of a virtuous Islamic ruler fooled no one, including Al Qaeda, which began plotting against his regime. Libya's sponsorship of the Lockerbie bombing took the enmity against Qaddafi to a new level, ending any chance that Europe could prove slightly more tolerant of Libya than the United States would.

Qaddafi understood how tenuous his own position was, since his blunderings increased the possibility of a military coup against him. He also realized how little the nuclear weapons program gained him. With the intense scrutiny of multiple Western intelligence agencies turned on Libya, its leaders understood how little chance they had of perfecting nuclear technology, acquiring the necessary materials, building the bombs, and delivering them to any targets. The delivery problem was especially acute: Libyan planes would likely be intercepted by the US Sixth Fleet long before they reached any targets in Europe; Libyan efforts to smuggle a "suitcase bomb" into a foreign country would likely be detected and stopped by European, Israeli, or American spies. The nuclear weapons program had turned into a far greater risk than a potential benefit, with the United States and its allies waiting for a reason to end the Libyan threat once and for all, and Qaddafi's own government equally likely to turn on him if he bungled again.

Therefore, Qaddafi began a fifteen-year dialogue with his bitter enemies, the Americans and Europeans, to get out of the trap of his own creation. Libya's admission in court that it had been responsible for the Lockerbie atrocity, and its agreement to pay restitution to the victims' families, was a far more important landmark in the recent history of Libya than the invasion of Iraq. Libya was already straining to prove to the West that it could be trusted. While in public, one set of Libyan representatives were making amends to the Lockerbie families, in private, another group of Libyan representatives were working with American and European officials to expose, document, and dismantle their nuclear program. (It's important to note the roles that Nelson Mandela and Kofi Annan played in these negotiations. Aside from keeping the negotiations moving, Mandela and Annan helped Qaddafi save face, by claiming he was negotiating with the UN, not directly capitulating to the Americans and Europeans.)

The architects of the Iraq invasion—Feith, Wolfowitz, Perle, and others—believed that the US attack would have a powerful "demonstration effect" on other radical, anti-Western regimes. Their attempts to take credit for Libya's abandonment of nuclear weapons aside, the real Libyan story belies the "demonstration effect" theory. The end of Libya's nuclear ambition wasn't a sudden decision, but the result of a decade and a half of patient, diligent diplomacy. The United States did not rely on coercion alone, but instead followed a recipe of inducements and punishments, brewing under a lid of secrecy and intelligence-gathering. The United States did not have to act unilaterally; instead, the US worked in concert with European and Middle Eastern governments to seal off all decisions for Qaddafi but the one the American leaders wanted him to take. Once Qaddafi agreed, rather than be left wondering what to do next, the United States handed much of the remaining work to a Dutch court, UN diplomats, NATO military and intelligence experts, and other representatives of established and trusted organizations. In the end, the United States did not have to pay the political, economic, and military costs of the Iraq invasion and occupation, but could point to a genuine victory at very low cost against a once-troublesome foe.

02/14/2006

Arms control expert exodus

IN THE NEWS
Via Arms Control Wonk comes this Knight-Ridder article about the exodus of arms control experts from the US Department of State. Before the Foggy Bottom-bashers out there uncork the champagne over this news, keep in mind that the US government, not just the State Department, suffers from the loss of this expertise. It's pretty clear that, as long as the current Bush team is in place, there's little hope for rehiring these counterproliferation specialists in any part of the executive branch. It wasn't just Bolton and Feith, but Cheney, Rumsfeld, Cambone, and others who made government service intolerable.

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