Arms and influence

And they get all Qaeda with us! I'm sure!

Once again, the confusion of Al Qaeda with Al Qaeda in Iraq goes unchallenged. Should we be keeping score somewhere?

Our fragile Department of Defense

Not only are the Army and Marines having a hard time retaining good people, but for different reasons, the entire Department of Defense is facing a potential brain drain, according to a GAO report:

In a letter sent to key members of the House and Senate Armed Services committees on Wednesday, GAO said the Pentagon was not prepared to meet several looming workforce challenges, especially considering half of its civilian personnel are eligible to retire in the next few years.

The GAO isn't predicting a stampede from the DoD. However, the risk of losing a large fraction of its most experienced employees is nothing to sneeze at, particularly during the difficult transitions that will occur in the next several years.

The DoD spokesperson who denied there was a problem gave a classic Sir Humphrey Appleby response: There are so many details to factor into this equation, you can't possibly conclude anything from these simplistic indicators.

"Our response to the congressional reporting requirement reflected a centralized enterprisewide strategic perspective, which was called for in the report," Bradshaw wrote. "Our plan is to include more compressive documents in our required March 2008 report."

On the Appleby scale, I'll give this 2 out of 5 Humphreys.

[Since it's almost the weekend, I'll end by sharing a classic Sir Humphrey moment.]

There is no base deal. I mean, yes, there is.

While the American voter is focused on the presidential primaries, one of the most important stories about Iraq is getting little attention. Is the US government trying to get permanent bases in Iraq? And, more to the point, how is the executive branch pursuing this goal?

There are few other issues that reveal the real US strategy in Iraq and the Middle East generally than military bases. What is the Bush Administration's current strategy for the Middle East: (1) not losing the Iraq war, or (2) using Iraq as a platform for spreading US influence throughout the Middle East? Do American officials expect the United States to be a direct military participant in future wars in this region? How much is the Administration willing to lose in good will in the Middle East in pursuit of its goals?

One interesting aspect of the pas de deux on this issue is who is doing the dancing. Thus far, the public face of this discussion is, more often than not, the Secretary of Defense and various Defense Department officials. Interesting how little you see, oh, say, the State Department or the White House represented. It's as if the basing issue were as purely a military issue as projected spending for attack helicopters in FY 2009. Obviously, the big, big lesson of the last several years is that we ignore the political consequences of military power at our peril.

The other lesson, which you also don't expect anyone in the White House to agree is that you should never bypass Congress and the electorate on major issues of war and peace. While there are lots of reasons why support for the Iraq war has plummeted, one contributing factor is the perception that it is Bush's war, not our war. Now, in his last year to steer America's Iraq strategy, Bush is, yet again, insisting on doing it in the least inclusive fashion possible, arguing (falsely) that he is not Constitutionally bound to get Congress' approval for any basing agreement.

Just as in 2003, the Administration is trying to convince us that it's not doing what it's obviously doing. Just as in 2003, it's up to Congress and the public to do more than watch.