Arms and influence

Everyone misses his saving roll eventually

[Today's perfect storm of geekdom is almost past!]

This week, Gary Gygax, the co-creator of the Dungeons and Dragons role-playing game, passed away. I've seen remembrances springing up across the Internet. That's not surprising, since D&D was a landmark in popular culture with wider effects than are often appreciated.

Generation D: the original D&D
Before D&D, there was the miniatures branch of the wargaming hobby. People would use painted lead figures (you didn't say "toy soldiers," unless you wanted a punch in the snoot) to depict history's great battles. Gygax co-authored Chainmail, a set of rules for playing medieval miniature battles that included some elements straight from Tolkein and other fantasy stories, such as dragons, orcs, and elves.

Later, Gygax and his collaborator, Dave Arneson, decided that it would be fun to tell stories, not on the scale of the siege of Minas Tirith or the Battle of Pelennor Fields, but with a tighter focus on individual protagonists--more like the hobbits on the difficult journey to Mount Doom.

And thus the first edition of Dungeons and Dragons was born. The rules consisted of three small books, packed in a white box. The text was poorly organized and often confusingly written. The artwork was...Well, let's just say that the "artists" might not have been holding their pens with their hands, if you get my drift. The game itself was electrifying.

That's when I became a D&D geek. I fell in love with my copy of the white box set, and I soon found fellow enthusiasts. Although the plots were never as epic as Lord of the Rings or the Norse sagas, they did have their own odd fascination. In fact, it was hard to say that some games had a plot at all. You were the good guys, waiting around a tavern to do good deeds. A mysterious stranger approached and asked you to [fetch a powerful artifact/kill a terrible creature/unlock an ancient mystery] in the underground labyrinth nearby.

Way down into the hole you went, fighting a Stalingrad-esque battle from room to room. Every fight left you a little more experienced, and if you were lucky, a little richer. Once you learned how to trounce puny creatures like oversized rats and irritating goblins, you could graduate to tougher challenges.

Eventually, the rules improved. Not only did TSR, the publisher of D&D, come out with an "advanced" edition, but other companies started writing their own role-playing games (RPGs). This new medium could be the weekend entertainment for teenagers, or the vehicle for someone to describe their own world of high fantasy. (For one in a really different vein than the normal Western European medieval fantasy, check out Glorontha.)

Over time, the plots got better, too. Instead of "dungeon crawls," a form of high fantasy freebooting, many of the published storylines were just as involved as Tolkein. Players had dramatic moments--this heroic deed, that noble death--that they determined, as the protagonists in an interesting story.

The new game, D&D, had sired a new hobby. Another generation quickly followed with the spread of personal computers.

Generation E: the electronic RPG
Many computer game designers were D&D players, so it was natural to bring the D&D motif to another new hobby. Games like Wizardry and The Bard's Tale were as unsophisticated as the early D&D adventures, but they had the same fascinations. Another series of games, Ultima, gained a loyal following because of the more interesting plots and characters. The Ultima games also pushed the envelope of personal computer technology; many computer manufacturers owed their sales of next-
generation hardware to impatient Ultima fans.

Unintentionally, D&D and its computer cousins accomplished something else: they made fantasy a mainstream genre. George Lucas accomplished much the same thing with Star Wars, which made the "space opera" form of science fiction wildly popular. (Three seasons of the original Star Trek never generated anything like the mania around the first Star Wars film.)

During the 1960s, Tolkein was fashionable. Led Zeppelin mentioned Tolkein characters in their songs; the Beatles pondered making a Lord of the Rings movie. However, Tolkien remained a bit of a fad, which failed to inspire long-term interest in the fantasy genre beyond The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings trilogy.

D&D gave many people a taste for heroic fantasy that they might never have developed. Come for the rousing good fun of playing D&D over the weekend with your classmates. Stay for the wealth of novels and short stories in a genre you never knew existed.

Generation F: fashionability
Today, the SF section of chain bookstores are stuffed with fantasy novels. Fantasy is so popular, in fact, that some science fiction authors grumble about the vulgar tastes for this lower form of imaginative fiction. The Lord of the Rings movies were huge commercial successes--something unimaginable from the vantage point of 1974, when the first D&D boxed set was published. Celebrities like Steven Colbert and Vin Diesel talk fondly about their D&D roots. Millions of World of Warcraft players are  fighting their way through a virtual world that fits the D&D mold completely.

Gygax may have died in relative obscurity to other cultural innovators. He faded from view in the RPG hobby after he left TSR in the mid-1980s. Gygax authored other games like D&D--but they were too much like D&D to attract any attention.

D&D may have been Gygax's one shining moment that he could not repeat--but so what? We should all have such an impact on generations of people.

[For another Gygax tribute, with links to several others, click here.]

Master of BOO YEAH!

[And the geekdom keeps rolling on...]

Certain computer games have established a cachet so great that you almost don't have to say anything about them. The games were so fun, so addictive, so interesting that a certain generation of gamers just know, from the brief incantation of the game's name, that you're part of the brotherhood.

Here's a sample invocation:

MASTER OF ORION.

You know what I'm talking about.

If you don't, imagine the game that went beyond any science fiction book, TV show, or movie. You were in charge of a civilization clawing its way into the galaxy. Colonies on other planets! Space exploration on a galactic scale! Scientific breakthroughs! Aliens! Space battles! Add some diplomacy, economics, politics, and you have the recipe for one of the most engaging games you've ever played.

By engaging, I mean a game so good you could not tear yourself away from it. With all the dramatic events described in the previous paragraph unfolding in parallel, there was always a good reason to play for just one more turn. You had to see what happened when you declared war on the sneaky aliens that kept stealing your hard-earned technologies. You had to add to the defense of a colony that the sneak aliens were sure to attack. You had to build and deploy a fleet to intercept the sneaky aliens before they reached that colony in the first place. You had to upgrade your ship designs, before building the fleet, to incorporate some new wonder-weapon you just developed. Whoops, there went another hour...

Unfortunately, the pinnacle of space empire bliss, Master of Orion II, was published 12 years ago. The third in the series degenerated into a tedious accounting exercise, and would-be heirs just didn't have the alchemy of Master of Orion.

Until now.

I've started playing a new game, Galactic Civilizations II, which has every promise of being the new Master of Orion. The first version was a bit funky; the new version is just plain cool. Here's a quick video overview:

I'd say more...But I have an empire to run.

Wargames and poetry

[Today is the harmonic convergence of personal geekdom. I don't know why--it just happened that way.]

Here's a recent video review of a wargame I liked:

I have a lot of respect for people wargame designers, the poets of military history.

Poetry...Huh? I'll explain.

Brevity is the soul of wit
Designing wargames isn't like writing a book, in which more detail means greater accuracy. Wargames are supposed to be played, which means there's only a limited about of complexity you can cram into a game before it becomes unplayable.

Therefore, you pick the details that you think matter. You pick game mechanics that fit the subject. For example, ancient and medieval battles normally ended when one side's morale broke. High casualty rates in battles like Cannae were far and away the exception. Therefore, if you're designing a game depicting the important battles of the Hundred Years War, you don't want to pick game mechanics (usually involving a lot of die rolling) that ends with unhistorically high levels of carnage.

With a limited amount of rules that any player can learn, you therefore want to pick ones that capture the essence of what you're simulating. For ancient and medieval battles, you want morale to be the deciding factor. You might also emphasize the limited command and control that the army commander had, especially once formations started moving and fighting. Too many added details might actually get in the way of telling the story of a battle through the game.

The shock of the new
Interesting innovations happen when you can't borrow mechanics from earlier games. For example, about 15 years ago, Mark Herman, who had designed dozens of wargames, was thinking about how to make politics and historical events an important, vivid part of a new game about the American War of Independence. His Big Idea was a deck of cards that the players used to move their leaders and armies, drop "political control" markers around the map, and trigger important events like the Declaration of Independence and the French entry into the war. Today, the wargame market is flooded with "card-driven" games covering conflicts as varied as the Thirty Years War, World War I, and Napoleon's "Spanish ulcer."

[In the video, I refer to "block games," which use stand-up wooden blocks to hide the identity and strength of units from the other player. It's the same fog of war mechanic used in Stratego, but these are much more interesting games.]

More lovely and more temperate
Realistically, game designers also have to think about making the game interesting to play, not just historically faithful. You have to consider how long it will take to play the game, and how much "down time" one player suffers while the other player is doing something. You have to reach the right level of aesthetic appeal to engage the eye while the brain is churning away.

Playability is especially tricky, since most conflicts, from the grand strategic to the tactical, have favored one side over the other. "Nearly-run things" like Waterloo are the exception. Finding ways to make the game challenging and interesting to both sides often demands a lot of cleverness.

Wargames, therefore, pack a lot of meaning into a constrained medium. They have to be interesting, evocative, and often provocative. They have to capture something truthful and essential. They are, in these ways, the poetry of military history, which complement the prose of books and articles. 

Light posting for the next few days

Our experiment in switching phone and DSL providers blew up in our face. The short version: if you make the change, be sure to parse the phrase "phone line" correctly. It does not mean the physical connection to your house. Instead, it means an active phone number assigned to your house. Guess wrong, and you may not have both a phone and Internet access.

On the upside, I've learned a new term, "dry loop." Plus, I'm learning the virtue of patience, the kind that keeps me from punching someone in the face.

The benefits of manual labor

Normally, when the Army publishes a new field manual, it's no excuse to stop the presses. The new operations manual, FM 3-0, is the exception.

The old: must-read, but not a lot to digest
Army field manuals are dry reading. If you're a rifle platoon leader, here are the standard formations and maneuvers to assault a fixed position. If you're new to the artillery, here's what acronyms like TOT and FFO mean.

The manuals are also pretty vague, providing, at best, the rough outlines of what each job demands. Doctrine isn't supposed to be a straitjacket, forcing people to act in highly detailed, almost robotic ways. The US Army tries to breed people who can take orders, act without hesitation, but also think on their feet.

Traditionally, the manuals have said little about the larger strategic and political context. That omission is understandable, if you believe that military operations are separate from political decisions and outcomes. In fact, the conventional warfare mindset, which has guided the Army through most of its history, sees warfare as the derivative of politics. That's Clausewitzian in only a limited sense, but appropriate for a country which has kept the military strictly subordinate to the civilian since the days of Washington and the Continental Congress.

Meanwhile, warfare has evolved into a tangle of political and military action. Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism have some of the tightest connection between politics and violence. However, carrier battle groups deployed to the Persian Gulf to "send a message" are also part of a parallel political and military effort, as much as the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the Army's discomfort with counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, special operations, and other highly politicized military operations led to doctrinal ghettoization. In the 1980s, the Department of Defense stuffed operations as different as peacekeeping (dampening conflict) and "proinsurgency" (training and equipping insurgents to escalate conflict) into the same doctrinal pigeonhole, "low intensity conflict" (LIC). Specialized Army manuals covered LIC and its subcomponents, almost ensuring that 99% of  Army officers  wouldn't read them.

The manuals, therefore, reflected the great irony of the US Army, and the American military in general. The war for which the Army prepared the most, a NATO/Warsaw Pact version of Ragnarok in Central Europe, didn't happen--and given the superpower balance of terror, was highly unlikely to happen. Meanwhile, the real shooting wars in which the US Army was either directly or indirectly involved--for example, the civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua--were the sorts of conflicts the Army tried to avoid talking about.

The new: now with more mental nutrition
That backstory makes reading the newly released FM 3-0 a bit of a shock. It takes efforts to explain the forces generating conflict, instead of leaving them a distant political vision on the far, far side of the battlefield. The first chapter of FM 3-0, "The Operational Environment," discusses everything from globalization to urbanization in a decent level of detail, with even some thoughtful, interesting passages that are alien to Army field manuals. Here's an example:

1-3. Technology will be another double-edged sword. Often, innovations that improve the quality of life and livelihood are also used by adversaries to destroy those lives. It would seem as though technology is an asymmetric advantage of developed nations. They have greater access to research facilities to develop and innovate. Technology also gives nations access to the industrial base. These nations can then mass-produce advanced products and widely distribute them at relatively low costs. The low cost of products, their userfriendly design, and their availability in a global economy makes advanced technology accessible to unstable states as well as extremist organizations. The revolution and proliferation of benefits derived from integrating multidisciplinary nano- and bio-technologies and smart materials potentially promises to improve living conditions. However, these products will not always be available at the pace and in the quantities necessary to make them and their benefits as universally available as desired. This disparity can create another source of friction between the haves and have-nots. Moreover, the proliferation, falling costs, and availability of technologically advanced products—especially expanded information technologies using mobile networks and expanded use of wireless and global fiber-optic networks—enable nonstate adversaries to acquire them.

OK, maybe it's not exactly Alvin Toffler or Jared Diamond, but it is something that Army officers are supposed to read and digest.

Most books that include the words "operational art" fumble their description of what the operational level of strategy really is. Clausewitz, who is quoted liberally (and accurately) throughout FM 3-0, thought it was the most important facet of strategy to master, and the most difficult to understand.

To the credit of FM 3-0's authors, the new manual provides a top-notch description of the operational art. It includes helpful warnings about the pitfalls of operational-level strategy, such as this one:

6-4. A natural tension exists between the levels of war and echelons of command. This tension stems from different perspectives, requirements, and constraints associated with command at each level of war. Between the levels of war, the horizons for planning, preparation, and execution differ greatly.

And, hallelujah, the new FM 3-0 treats insurgency and terrorism as a normal part of modern warfare, and therefore a necessary part of the Army's mission. In fact, the first few pages of Chapter 2, "The Continuum of Operations," almost make general war--the sort of conventional interstate conflict the Army has traditionally preferred--the exception, not the norm.

Most official statements of Army doctrine struggle to find the right words to describe revolutionary warfare. It's refreshing, therefore, to read the following passage in FM 3-0, which neatly defines insurgency and puts it into operational context:

2-6. Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). It is a condition of politically motivated conflict involving significant intra- or interstate violence but usually short of large-scale operations by opposing conventional forces. Insurgencies often include widespread use of irregular forces and terrorist tactics. An insurgency may develop in the aftermath of general war or through degeneration of unstable peace. Insurgencies may also emerge on their own from chronic social or economic conditions. In addition, some conflicts, such as the Chinese Revolution, have escalated from protracted insurgencies into general wars. Intervention by a foreign power in an insurgency may increase the threat to regional stability.

There, that wasn't so hard, was it? Revolutionary warfare isn't a set of tactics; instead, people with revolutionary ambitions pick the techniques, normally "asymmetric," that make the most sense at a particular point in time. "Terrorist tactics" are a means to an end--a far different view of than the normal stereotype of "terrorists," depicted as people obsessed with a particular method over a desired political outcome.

Breaking with tradition
FM 3-0 isn't perfect. For example, the first appendix lapses into some of the traditional language used to convey strategic principles (mass, maneuver, economy of force, etc.), which fits most comfortably with conventional, interstate conflicts. Napoleon might have seized the initiative at Austerlitz, by tricking the Austrians and Russians into thinking he had a weaker force than he really did. In a far different but no less important way, Hamas stole the initiative from Fatah during the second intifada through a combination of political mobilization and terror attacks. The next generation of Army officers need to understand how their  opponents might steal the initiative from them in ways that have nothing to do with the electronic battlefield or better close air support coordination.

Still, FM 3-0 is a big step forward in the history of Army doctrine. It would be startling if the hard lessons of the last several years had no part in this change of heart. However, it's important to remember that, all along, there have been people in the US military who had a better understanding of conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq than many of their superiors. FM 3-0 may be the result of giving them a chance to speak.

[For another view of FM 3-0, with critical comments about its treatment of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, click here.]

[A quick aside: FM 3-0 does not read like one of the "military transformationist" tracts of a few years ago. In other words, I wouldn't give Cebrowski, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, et al. credit for the new, improved approach reflected in this manual. In fact, many elements of FM 3-0 run counter to the "transformationist" doctrines.]

#2 with a bullet

The death of Raul Reyes, one of the top leaders of the FARC, has inspired the predictable, reflexive, pointless discussion about command hierarchies in a revolutionary organization: Who will be the new #2?

Of course, that question presupposes that Reyes was the #2 leader in the FARC. He was certainly close to Tirofijo, the top man in the FARC. Reyes was the "public face" of the FARC, a member of the governing directorate, and Tirofijo's confidant. But in what sense was he #2?

In most revolutionary organizations, there is no #2. Instead, there are leaders with different roles. In Al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri is the top "operational" person. He is not, however, the "public face" of Al Qaeda in the same fashion as Suleiman Abu Gaith. Abu Mohammed al-Masri often has a more direct role in Al Qaeda operations, even though he's nominally not as high-ranking as Zawahiri. Meanwhile, with Osama bin Laden in hiding, with less freedom of action than he had before the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, it's hard to see what being the #1 guy in Al Qaeda really means.

Organizations with parallel military and political arms only confuse matters. How would you rank Gerry Adams' role as the head of Sinn Fein, when the IRA was still pursuing the "armed struggle"? Was he #2 by virtue of being the head of the political wing, or did he have less influence within the overall IRA/Sinn Fein organization than other military leaders?

Other terrorist and guerrilla groups have different roles, with more or less power in the hands of the top leader, and different responsibilities (fund-raising, operations, policy, propaganda, etc.) distributed across the top leaders. It's hard, therefore, to find any organization like the FARC or Al Qaeda in which #2 is a meaningful designation.

I don't know the origins of the "Who will be #2?" question. Maybe the people asking it assume that terrorist or guerrilla groups operate in the same fashion as SPECTRE, with a clear top Bond villain and an equally clear trusted lieutenant. (Which means that US agents will have to kill the lieutenant before they can duke it out with the top leader. And they have to be ready for the top leader to appear dead, only to suddenly make a last, desperate lunge for his gun, laser cannon, or earth-penetrating drill.) Or maybe it's from watching the old BBC series, The Prisoner, in which the question, "Who is #2?" had special meaning.

In any case, it's a pretty stupid question. Reyes had a particular role in the FARC. Judge the effects of his death based on that reality, instead of some goofy shorthand for people who can't bother to research the news stories they're covering.

Well, it's a start

Armchair Generalist has an interesting post about tighter procedures around foreign military sales to Iraq. No, these new measures are not 100% corruption-proof. An Iraqi soldier can still claim that he lost his gun. Munitions, once under the control of an Iraqi quartermaster, might go a lot of different places. Nevertheless, you gotta do something.

I'm sure Lt. Col. Muschalek has a few interesting stories about what it took to put these procedures into effect:

“FMS has had its challenges, and one of the biggest problems is (Iraqi officials) understanding the FMS system and program,” Muschalek said. “What makes it hard in Iraq is the translation. It is very important that the Iraqi officials and the Ministry of Defense understand the FMS program.”

By "understand the FMS program," Muschalek might mean, "agree to turning down the corruption spigot." Sloppy oversight on the American side, made worse by the deepening political and security crisis after the invasion, created a lucrative business for Iraqis who wanted to make personal profit from American military aid.

Corruption around military aid is nothing new. American officials have struggled with it during other wars in which the  US acted as the patron of a government. The unusual part, as with other problems in the Iraq war, is how long it took to address it.

Expert testimony on cleavage in Iraq

Do House Republicans not want to be re-elected? First, we had the hilarious partisan defense of the instrinsically non-partisan Roger Clemens testimony. Now, we have a Thelma Drake (R-Virginia) wants Angelina Jolie to testify about Iraq before the Armed Services Committee.

"Sadly, Ms. Jolie's positive perspective on the current security situation in Iraq has gone largely unnoticed by the mainstream press," Drake wrote in a letter to Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., the committee chairman.

Perhaps, if you read between the lines, you'll find a cry for help: "I can't stand being a Republican in Congress any longer. Please don't vote for me. I can't make myself look much more ridiculous than this."

News from a forgotten war

Remember Afghanistan? Other than the occasional, information-free story about Taliban bombings or NATO operations, we don't hear much from The Forgotten War. Obviously, there's way too many important things to say about flag pins and senatorial mistresses to waste our time discussing a war we've been fighting for the last six years. Or, at least, that's how the US news outlets treat Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, history marches on. This post at Arrgghhh! shows us what we're missing. If every news item now has to have a presidential election spin, it's also a snapshot of what the next US president will be facing. Whatever happens in Iraq--stay, leave, draw up, draw down--we'll still be in Afghanistan. However, we won't necessarily have a national consensus about what we should be doing there.

The news item quoted at Castle Arrgghhh! might be accurate reporting, or it might be wishful thinking wrapped in a press release. Either way, it's a picture of what should be happening--and still could.

Pashtun or Tajik, Afghans are tired of decades of war. They're sick of the Taliban mucking up their lives. A lot of expatriate and refugee Afghans would also like to return home.  An ANA capable of the operation described is well within the realm of possibility, all stereotypes about the Afghans aside.

If I were making a run for the White House (again with the election!), I'd make Afghanistan a big part of the debates. Turn any national security discussion into a detailed discussion of Afghanistan. Here are the people we abandoned once before, and we're abandoning again. Here is where the mettle of the United States in the Islamic world is being tested. Here is where we can learn how to fight these small but challenging wars a lot better than we are now. Unless you have a real strategy for Afghanistan, you're yet another irresponsible American politician.