Meet Thomas Schelling

THEORY
The title of this blog is the same as the title of one of the most famous books of the Cold War, Arms and Influence by Thomas Schelling. Schelling was one of the earliest theorist of nuclear deterrence (using the threat of nuclear attack to stop an actual nuclear attack) and compellence (using the threat of nuclear war to coerce an opponent into doing something). Schelling and others like Bernard Brodie and Herman Kahn helped move the discusssion in the think tanks and Washington from a combination of panic about the balance of terror with the Soviet Union to a more measured approach.

At times, the approach in places like the RAND Corporation got a bit too measured (or measurable), with complex mathematical models that attempted to model or predict how nuclear crises would play out. The problem was, the people working on these projects took the math a wee bit too seriously. Terms like "acceptable losses" and "collateral damage" implied that Strangelovean characters in the Pentagon were plotting how to "win" a nuclear exchange. Clearly, "existential deterrence" was closer to the truth: arguing that the US would "win" a nuclear war if we destroyed Moscow, Leningrad, and Minsk, while they only annihilated Chicago, was ridiculous. Deterrence worked because any attack was an unthinkable, apocalyptic event. (Much how people feel about terrorist-delivered nuclear attacks today.)

Every field has its hacks, as did the nuclear strategists. Schelling was no hack. He was a thoughtful, articulate, and often original thinker who performed some critical thought experiments about nuclear crisis management. He was also brilliant at coming up with apt analogies: for instance, he likened a nuclear confrontation to a game of chicken. Now, that statement may seem a bit trite, but Schelling's thinking went further: he identified the party with the least control over his car as the one with the most actual control over the confrontation. (One driver has more of a choice to veer off, in other words...And he feels the pressure of that choice.)

Schelling helped us "think about the unthinkable" in sober, realistic terms. His analysis veered into neither despair ("We're doomed!") nor hubris ("We have more nukes than they do--let's teach those Reds a lesson!"). Nuclear weapons had power, not so much in their use, as in the threat of their use--in some ways, almost by their existence alone. Decision makers could use the nuclear threat to engineer political outcomes, if only they (and the public) could think clearly about the subject.

Again, Clausewitz makes an appearance. I'm guessing that Schelling chose the title of his book carefully. It wasn't something obvious or meaningless, like Strategy in the Nuclear Age. The title instead implies, We have new arms in our arsenal--let's figure out how to use them as instruments of political influence.

PRACTICE
I hope that we're at the same point with terrorism that we were with nuclear weapons around 1950. A dramatic event--the first Soviet nuclear test, or later, the launching of Sputnik--makes us feel threatened in a way we never were before. Attack could come at any time, at any place. (Though, you'll certainly note, short of acquiring a nuclear weapon, the number of people a terrorist group can kill in an attack is far, far smaller than how many people could have died if one Soviet missile hit its target.) The enemy is enigmatic, relentless, and dedicated heart and soul to our destruction. Sympathizers and infiltrators may live right down the block from you, and you'd never know it.

Somehow, we managed not to lose our collective wits for too long over the Cold War nuclear threat. Fear did lead us down some dark, blind alleys, such as McCarthyism, but we undid our mistakes. Not only did the United States survive, but so did the Constitution, democracy, the rule of law, open communications and debate, a free market, and other hallmarks of "the American way of life." And the enemy finally self-destructed, in part because of the appeal of the American example to dissidents in Eastern bloc countries.

Worth remembering, I think, especially when comparing the scale of threat.

[Next time, back to the topic at hand: war aims. I realized after writing my first post, however, that I forgot to explain the blog's title.]

Comments

[samir]

I'm not so sure if exaltation of genius is necessary any longer. While it may be important to realize how the threat of nuclear weapons create and influence geopolitical strategy and action, I think it is of much greater interest to fashion an entirely different existence. The dollars and sense spent on the cold war build-up is inexcusable in a world with so much. The problem of violence and conflict is deep. It goes down to the fact that we interact so often in realtionships that are always between yourself and another. No matter what, this is how we tend to perceive and interact with the world. Instead of influence, perhaps we should think about understanding. Why do people arm themselves? Not why they are influenced to. What conditions produce arms and how can we change those conditions, so that arms aare not produced? Some Berkeley polisci profs were chatting about how Japan would be a part of China if it were not for the US. This may be true, yet we still need to do the hard work of making sure that kind of reality does not arise. Don't you think?

[JS Narins]

I must admit a relative amount of ignorance about Schelling, but I'd like to argue with you, to the ends of the Earth, about the "Chicken" analogy as an excuse for a Nixonian or Reaganesque "madman" tactic.

The party with less control of their car can not reliably veer away.

Self control is critical, or accidents will happen.

If you know precisely what you (need/want/are racing to a head on collision for) it will be crystal clear when the conditions for veering away from catastrophe have been met, and you will be able to veer.

Now, that being said, one can't be completely predictable, for a variety of reasons, and be an effective politician.

Someone did some research on schools of fish and sanity. A fish which was somewhat crazy would actually _lead_ the school. The school would turn if one of its members turns. However, if a fish was too crazy, it would turn so much that it would (in effect) leave the school behind in turns.